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Introduction
One of the finest things about being an Indian is that everyone is interested in your 
“plight.” Other groups have difficulties, predicaments, quandaries, problems, or troubles.
Traditionally we Indians have had a “plight.”
Vine Deloria, Jr.^
This work is a philosophical examination of the Indian “plight.” It will 
examine some of the problems facing Native American people and their nations here 
in the United States and it will argue for a solution to those problems. The solution 
sought will be to implement true sovereignty for Native American nations. Though 
the rhetoric of U.S. law asserts that Indian nations have “inherent” and “retained” 
sovereignty it will be argued that the form this “sovereignty” has taken make it at 
best a form of self-governance and at worst a cruel joke.
Modem philosophical arguments that might support Indian sovereignty will 
be avoided. Such theoretical arguments are unlikely to have any real effect. They 
would involve complex problems o f group rights and social obligations, problematic 
notions in themselves and unlikely to affect the policymakers in Washington D.C.. 
Indeed, as Nicholas Rescher pointed out.
Do American philosophers exert influence? Here the critical question 
is: Upon whom? Certainly as far as the wider society is concerned it 
must be said that the answer is emphatically negative. American 
philosophers are not opinion-shapers: they do not have access to the
' Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer D ied fo r  Your Sins, (Norman and London: University o f  Oklahoma 
Press, 1988), I.
media, to the political establishment, to the ‘think tanks’ that seek to 
mold public opinion. In so far as they exert an external influence at 
all, it is confined to the academics o f other fields.^
Rescher believes that one of the causes o f this inefficacy is the inaccessibility 
of modem U.S. philosophy. Overspecialization has made it overly technical. This 
work will attempt to be more efficacious by being more accessible. Ongoing 
injustices that have endured for hundreds of years should end. Since the group to be 
persuaded is the Federal Government of the United States, to be o f any practical 
effect, this work must proceed from premises accepted by that Government. Thus 
rather than utilizing theoretical frameworks common to modem academic American 
philosophy, it will attempt to use the stated philosophy o f the U.S. Government as 
revealed in laws, official documents and public pronouncements by competent 
officials. This doesn’t mean theory will be completely eschewed. However, it does 
recognize that a new theory is unlikely to have any significant practical 
consequences in the short term.
Besides this methodological commitment to practical effects through applied 
philosophical reason, the author believes that few new theories are really necessary 
to deal with most of the current problems. The laws that have limited, on this view 
ended, the sovereignty of Native nations are fundamentally inconsistent with the 
supposed guiding principles and laws of the United States. This paper will show
Nicholas Rescher, “American Philosophy,” The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted 
Hondericli, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 27.
that many of the problems faced by Native nations were caused or worsened by 
laws, policies and court decisions that are inconsistent with these principles. If  this 
position can be maintained then it would seem that the problems should be amenable 
to existing laws and theories.
In form, this work will constitute a cumulative argument consisting of a 
series of individual arguments against existing Federal Indian law. Together they 
will form a tapestry supporting Indian sovereignty. Many of the arguments will be 
interconnected and fairly complex, due to the complexities of Indian law. But in the 
end, the reader should come to realize that the basic issues are relatively simple 
despite the complexities of the law. Indeed, it will turn out that the complexities 
have arisen precisely because the principles are simple.
The first chapter will provide a prima facie  case for change by examining 
some of the problems faced by Native Americans and their nations. If policymakers 
see no problem, they are unlikely to be moved to change course. In addition. 
Chapter One will examine some of the causes of these problems. This will allow for 
a link to be made between the problems and U.S. policy. Chapter Two will provide 
an overview of U.S. policy allowing the link to be completed and will provide the 
evidence to be used in Chapter Three. The narrative of Chapter Two, uninterrupted 
by extended argumentation, will also help to make clear the contradictory nature of 
U.S. law and policy by its rapid juxtaposition of the varying laws through time. 
Chapter Three will draw on evidence from Chapter Two, arguing that since
decreased sovereignty led to the problems, we can hope that increased sovereignty 
will decrease the problems. It will then show that the historical denial o f Indian 
sovereignty was and is inconsistent with the fundamental guiding principles of the 
United States, while the current assertion of Indian sovereignty in Federal law is no 
less problematic. In doing so, it will also suggest how this fundamental 
inconsistency has created the complex structure o f Indian law. Ultimately, it will be 
argued that Federal plenary power over Indian nations must end both for the good 
of the Indian nations and for the realization o f the potential of the United States.
Chapter I: Current Problems
If you multiply every social problem in America by 10—high school dropouts, suicide 
among teenagers, alcohol and drug abuse, death by violence, disease— you have what
Indians go through.
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell^
Many complex problems face Native Americans and their tribes. The 
problems can be divided into a few broad categories including economics, education 
and health care. Obviously these categories are not exhaustive, nor are the problems 
in any of them isolate. The problems can and do interact. Despite this complexity 
we can lay out many of the individual problems fairly simply. We’ll allow some of 
the complexities to creep in when examining causes. To the extent that the U.S. 
Government assumes responsibility for Indian welfare, problems in these areas may 
indicate problems in U.S. policy. Whether U.S. policy can be shown to be the 
cause, if the U.S. assumes this responsibility in these areas then the problems 
enumerated here certainly provide a prima facie  case for critical policy review.
Income, one of the standards of welfare accepted by the U.S. Government, 
shows a significant difference between groups and particularly between Native 
Americans and Euro-Americans despite the fact the Federal Government has a goal
 ^ Quoted by Rochelle Stanfield. “Getting Out the Tribal Vote,” National Journal, (Washington 
D.C.: National Journal Inc.. 1992), v 24, n 30, p 1756.
of improving the economic opportunities of Native Americans/ American Indians 
had a median family income of $21,619 in 1990, the most recent year reported/ 
The median family income for Whites that year was $41,922/ The Indian figures 
are averaged out over all the tribes, but for some tribes the picture is even worse. 
Among the Navajo, median family income was only $13,940.’ The Cherokee, 
Choctaw and perhaps the Iroquois* help to offset the lower figures of the Navajo 
and others.
The figures appear even starker when poverty levels are considered. The 
percentage of White families below the poverty line is 9.4^, while some 27.2 percent 
of Indian families'” live below the poverty line. As with the income figures, there is 
significant variation between tribes. The Navajo again appear to come out worst 
with some 47.3 percent" of families below the poverty line. Even among the best
See Appendix A for tlie mission statement o f the Bureau o f Indian Affairs, which specifically 
cites this as a goal.
 ^ U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States 1995, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office), Table 52.
® Ibid., table 49.
’ Ibid., Table 52.
* Median family incomes for all o f these tribes were well above the median across all tribes, 
however, none of them was as much as 2/3 the median income o f Whites. The highest by far, 
the Iroquois, may actually have been misreported as noted by the Census Bureau. Ibid.
® Ibid., Table 49.
Ibid., Table 52.
" Ibid.
off tribes you are roughly twice as likely as a White to be poverty-stricken 12
Another problem area is education. The Federal Government o f the United 
States has accepted significant responsibility for Indian education through a variety 
of programs including the Johnson-O’Malley Act'^ as well as more general 
responsibility through the Bureau o f Indian Af f a i r s .Desp i t e  the importance 
attached to Native American education, only 65 percent of American Indians have a 
high school diploma and only 9.4 percent have a bachelor’s degree^^. Among the 
White population 83.1 percent have graduated high school, while some 22.9 percent 
have a college degree.
Unfortunately this disparity in Indian education is unlikely to change soon. 
For it to change in the short term there would have to be a significant increase in 
current graduation rates. Even over the long haul, there would have to be 
equivalent graduation rates for Indians as a group to achieve educational parity with 
their White counterparts. The graduation rate is not higher, nor on par, but is 
actually lower. Native Americans are roughly 8/lOths of one percent of the
'* Matliematical comparison o f tables 49 and 52 Ibid.
U.S. Statutes at Large 48:596.
See Appendix B for tlie mission statement o f the Office of Indian Education Programs, showing 
the importance the U.S. Government attaches to Indian education.
Ibid,. Table 52.
Ibid., Table 49 and matliematical interpretation o f data.
population. Assuming even distribution among the other segments o f the
population, about 8/lOths of one percent of all graduating classes at all levels
should be composed o f Native Americans. This is not the case. In higher 
education. Native Americans made up only 5/lOths of one percent of all those 
graduating with a bachelor’s degree; 4/lOths o f one percent of all those receiving 
master’s degrees; and 3/lOths of one percent o f all those receiving doctoral 
degrees. These figures show that the disparity in education level will continue for 
some time.
Though poverty and education are certainly problems for Indian people, the 
most obvious problems are in health care. Despite the fact that the U.S. 
Government has taken responsibility for Indian health care through the Indian 
Health Service, there are enormous disparities between Native Americans and 
other segments of U.S. society. American Indians are 1.1 times as likely to die 
before reaching their first birthday, 1.6 times more likely to die between one and 
four years of age, 1.4 times as likely to die between five and fourteen, and twice as 
likely to die between fifteen and twenty-four when compared to the rest of the U.S.
A bad assumption, but one tliat should, if anything make the comparative graduation rates 
appear higher titan they are.
Ibid., Table 303.
See mission statement of the Indian Health Service in Appendix C, shelving the importance that 
the U.S. Government attaches to Indian health..
population.^” The ratio of American Indian death rates to those o f the overall 
population for other age groups continue at these elevated levels until age sixty-five. 
The statistics are even worse when compared only to the White population. From 
age twenty-five to age forty-four, American Indians are more than twice as likely to 
die as whites. Every year from age five to age fifty-four Indians are at least 1.5 time 
as likely to die as Whites. About the only good news is that Native Americans who 
manage to reach seventy-four can expect to live somewhat longer on average than 
the rest of the population. Death rates from that age on are somewhat lower than 
either that of Whites or that of all races.^*
Given that the U.S. Government has, as some of its goals, the economic well 
being of Indians; the education of Indian people; and the health o f its Native 
American citizens; it would appear that it has failed. This argues weakly for a 
discontinuation of past U.S. policy. A more forceful case would require a clearer 
link between U.S. policy and its failure to meet these goals. In each instance we 
must examine the causes for failure and then see if these are attributable to the 
policies. Even if the policies are at fault, it may be that the causes are not tied 
sovereignty per se. So, if we are going to call for ‘true’ sovereignty, then the link
Statistics in this paragraph are taken from, U.S. Indian Health Service, Trends In Indian Health- 
-1994, (Wasliington D.C.: Department o f Health and Human Services, 1994), Table 4.10, p 55. 
Ibid., 55.
must be directly to elements o f  U.S. policy that have ended the sovereignty of 
Native American. The remainder of this chapter begins this process by laying out the 
causes of these problems.
What causes poverty? Many theories have been advanced to account for 
poverty, especially in countries like the U.S. where abundance is taken to be the 
norm. Without any significant theorizing, we can certainly say that wholesale 
dispossession of wealth and sources of wealth would be a cause. If government 
policies have caused such dispossession, then government policies should be 
changed.
Besides obvious causes like dispossession, there are numerous other causes 
that may have a bearing on the current state of native finance. Unfortunately, 
decades of research on poverty have not yielded a comprehensive theory as to its 
causes. As Syed Samad wrote, “The basic configuration o f poverty and its global 
distribution are fairly well known and documented. Its causes and consequences, 
however, continue to generate heated debates, leading occasionally to polarized 
positions.”^  Even worse, he maintains that poverty research in the United States 
has been, “ ... anchored in the ideological leanings of the researcher-analyst.”^
~  Syed Abdus Samad, “Tlie Present Situation in Poverty Research,” in Poverty: A Global Review 
eds. Else Oyen, S. M. Miller and Syed Abdus Samad, (Oslo and Paris; Scandinavian University 
Press and UNESCO, 1996), 33.
^  Ibid, 43.
10
Though highly politicized and without a single comprehensive theory, or even a 
leading theory, poverty researchers still have a lot to offer in the way of possible 
causes.
Theories on the causes of poverty have historically been divided into the 
following famil iesLocal i ty and demography; economic structures and policies; 
social structural explanations; culture and individual behaviors; poverty policies as 
causative agencies; and power and poverty. Within each of the families there are a 
number o f specific theories, though the causes presented within each family are 
fairly homogeneous.
Locality and other demographic theories often cite the differences between 
urban and rural populations. Rural populations are usually poorer than urban 
populations, though the large number of urban poor in the U.S. requires explaining 
as well.^ Poverty of rural populations may be caused by a variety o f factors 
including the relatively low value placed on agricultural and raw material production 
l a b o r . A n  intriguing view concerning the urban/rural dichotomy is that there is a
*■’ The general taxonomy presented here is taken from S. M. Miller, “The Great Chain of Poverty 
Explanations," ibid. 569-586 and informed by George Thomas, Poverty in the Non- 
Metropolitan South: A Causal Explanation, (Lexington Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 
1972), chap. 3, which suggested the idea o f applying a variety of theories in analyzing specific 
instances o f  poverty.
^  Miller, 571, makes this point
Jolm Kennetli Galbraitlt. The Nature o f  Mass Poverty, (Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University, 1979), 17-20.
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persistent bias toward urban development, caused by a wide variety of factors 
including the centralization of governmental power in urban areas and the fact that 
most governmental officials not only live in these urban seats of power but are 
originally drawn from them/^ Since most Native American people live in rural 
areas, this bias may be a factor in their poverty.
While this explanation may provide insight into rural Indian poverty, there 
would have to be some other explanation for the poverty of urban Indians within 
this paradigm. There are a variety of locality explanations concerning the urban 
poor, but we need not examine most o f them since they are concerned with urban 
immigrants from foreign nations or with minority groups that have lived in urban 
areas for some time. Native American are relative newcomers to U.S. cities, a large 
number of them having come to the city within only the last generation or two. As 
such their poverty is a kind of “hold over” of their rural poverty, the well recognized 
“vicious cycle.”^^  On this view poverty is self-perpetuating because of the relative 
inequality of poor people’s starting point in our society. To overcome past poverty 
takes time, if it can be overcome at all. Locality theorists accept the vicious cycle
Tliis is one o f tlie key points made by Michael Lipton, Why People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in 
World Development^ (Cambridge: H ^ a r d  University, 1977).
^  This view is common in the literature. A short explanation o f it in terms of education can be 
foimd in Kennetli Kehrer, “Education, Race and Poverty,” in Perspectives on Poverty^ Dennis 
J. Dugan and William H. Leahy eds., (New York: Praeger, 1973), 31-42 and particularly 32-33.
12
explanation for urban poor in circumstances like those of most urban Indians.
Economic structure and policy theorists are the most prolific in their range of 
explanations. Since they are looking at particular structures and policies, their 
theories vary from country to country and from year to year. In addition they may 
be discussing the effects o f specific legislation on particular groups. Thus much of 
this theorizing is not going to be relevant in our search for the causes of Native 
American poverty. Only one of the major families o f policy theories may fit Native 
Americans; Those used for colonized people. These explanations say that the 
poverty is part of the legacy of colonialism. “Colonial rule deliberately enforced 
industrial backwardness for reasons o f commercial interest, destroyed self- 
confidence, created habits of dependency.”^  Even on short reflection, we can 
imagine many ways in which colonial rule would affect a group’s later development. 
Clearly, much wealth could be siphoned off during the colonial period as the 
colonizers took advantage o f the raw materials in the colony. To the extent that we 
see the U.S. as colonizers in North America, successors to the colonial powers they 
supplanted, this model may help to explain Indian poverty.
According to social structural theories.
^  Galbraith ibid., 17-18. Note Galbraith’s use o f psychological terms here, this becomes important 
later.
13
The socially vulnerable become the economically vulnerable. They 
suffer discrimination in the labor market because of prejudice and 
stereotyping. Marginalized people, whether they are demarcated as 
women, minority groups, or recent immigrants, may have difficulty in 
getting jobs (indeed, may be barred by law or custom from seeking 
paid work or working in certain protected activities) and may receive 
low wages when they are employed.^®
To the extent that Native Americans are marginalized people, this too may be a part 
o f the puzzle.
Cultural explanations are among the most favored today. The 
assumption is that the poor themselves do something that makes them poor, or 
keeps them poor. Though some theorists stress individual behaviors, most 
emphasize the “culture of poverty”  ^^ as the origin of these individual behaviors. 
People are acculturated into poverty, learning behaviors that go with their status. 
Unfortunately, most of these behaviors extend poverty. Few are of any aid in 
trying to escape it.
In trying to understand the psychology of individuals within the culture 
of poverty, Theordore Sarbin^^ identified three factors as being key; The 
conceptualization of time; linguistic codes; and locus of control. Poor people’s
30 Miller, ibid., 575-576.
The tenn was popularized by Oscar Lewis in “Tlie Culture of Poverty,” Scientific American 
1966. 215. 19-25.
Theodore R. Sarbin, “The Culture o f Poverty, Social Identity and Cognitive Outcomes,” in 
Psychological Factors in Poverty, Vernon L. Allen ed., (Chicago: Markham 1970), 32.
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concept of time is more oriented in the present, not allowing them to defer 
gratification in order to achieve longer term success/^ Their linguistic codes are 
simplified and aimed at reinforcing and implementing the social structure rather 
than conveying information.^** In addition, those in the culture of poverty believe 
that external forces over which they have no power ultimately control their 
destiny."^ With external forces in control, they would clearly believe any move 
to escape poverty was futile. This latter seems likely to be applicable to Native 
Americans as we later examine U.S. policies.
Poverty policies themselves have been viewed as potential causes of the 
very blights they seek to eradicate. If such policies provide incentives for the 
poor not to seek work, then they are liable to perpetuate poverty. Those who 
lived through the “Reagan era” well-know the pervasiveness of this view which 
is still a major factor in current policymaking. Though these views probably 
have some applicability to Native Americans, at least one critic has suggested 
that even typical liberal views when applied to the problems o f the world’s 
indigenous people, leads them to the wrong conclusions.
It all adds up to culture-busting, often without much interest
Ibid., 33. 
Ibid., 34. 
Ibid., 34-35.
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in the problems, except to cheer when it happens fast. It also adds 
up to a kind of cultural arrogance on the part o f the West which 
makes one pause. I’m right — you’re wrong. Maybe — but that 
isn’t exactly what the old-fashioned liberals had in mind. But, as we 
said before, what else have we got.
If you buy the necessity of busting up cultures, there is 
another problem. How do you bust them up efficiently? We don’t 
want American Indian type results.^^
Power and poverty theories place the blame for poverty at the feet o f those 
who wield power, the privileged groups that seem to exist in most societies. It is 
not surprising that, already having power, they would have not only the motive but 
the means to keep it.
At this point it should also be obvious just how intertwined these theories 
are. Power theories posit inequality o f power as a source of poverty, but so too did 
the rural/urban theorists as well as the legacy of colonialism camp. The poor are an 
out-group either because they were rural, of the wrong race or ethnicity. Of course 
in most cases they were “all of the above.” It is not surprising when social 
structures favor the rich and poverty programs fail to alleviate the burdens of the 
poor. Poverty begins to look more like a “family resemblance” in which a large 
number of characteristics are common to the family and the poorest tend to have 
most of the characteristics. Unfortunately, Native Americans seem to be among
Richard N. Farmer, Benevolent Aggression: The Necessary Impact o f  the Advanced Nations on 
Indigenous Peoples, (New York: David McKay, 1972), 82.
16
those that have most of the characteristics for poverty.
Given their poverty, it is perhaps not surprising that they should also be 
poorly educated. But besides poverty are there other reasons why Indian education 
lags behind that of other segments of society? To the extent that education is 
available to Indian people,^^ why do they not avail themselves of the opportunity? 
Perhaps it is because they lack motivation.
The key to effective educational experience lies in motivation. The 
child will exert himself with whatever capacity he can muster when 
he is working toward goals that are real and meaningful in terms of 
motives and purposes, on the one hand, and his background of ability 
and experience on the other. His need for self-enhancement will not 
permit him to do otherwise. . . . On the contrary, to the extent that 
the child is forced to participate in experiences that are not related to 
the attainment of his goals and purposes, aversive effects—apathy, 
superficial learning, frustration, negative attitudes, misbehavior, 
maladjustment—are likely to follow.^*
This seems all the more likely when we realize that other factors, such as 
intelligence have a fairly low correlation with educational success, about .50 and 
that motivation is generally take to account for this difference.^^ A fairly standard
It is probably safe to say tliat primary and secondary education is available to Native American 
students. Though college education may be less readily available, the differences in high 
school graduation rates remain. In addition, it is safe to say that the high school graduation 
rates negatively affect college attendance.
^  George J. Mouly, Psychology fo r  Effective Teaching edition, (London and New York: Holt 
Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1968), 567.
N. L. Gage and David C. Berliner, Educational Psychology, (Chicago: Rand McNally College 
Publisliing Company, 1975), 282.
17
account of motivation holds that motivation is a factor of two main forces; the 
individual’s expectation of reaching a goal and the importance of the goal to the 
person/" That these standard factors taken from well-known education texts are 
applicable to Indian students is well-recognized. As stated in Teaching American 
Indian Students,
The fundamental consensus that Indian children are like most other 
children provides a foundation for one of the book’s major 
assumptions: teaching Indian children is no different than teaching 
other children. This does not mean that Indian children are the same 
as non-Indian children. . . . Neither appreciation nor respect are 
possible without knowing the children’s cultural and environmental 
backgrounds.**^
So, it would appear that educational success is more likely among those 
Indian children that are motivated to learn methods that will enable them to achieve 
their own goals and purposes. We would thus expect that policies which hampered 
the achievement of goals or which made the goals appear unattainable, would 
militate against the successful education of Native American children.
In the area of health care, the real key is why Native Americans experience 
such high death rates when compared to other Americans. Age-adjusted mortality 
rates comparing Native Americans and all U.S. races show that American Indians
Anita E. Woolfolk, Educational Psychology 4"’ edition, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990), 306.
■” Jon Reyhner, ed. Teaching American Indian Students. (Norman and London: University of 
Oklahoma Press. 1992), 13.
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have a 440 percent greater chance of dying of tuberculosis, 430 percent greater 
chance of dying of alcoholism, 165 percent greater chance of dying by accident, 154 
percent greater chance o f dying from diabetes mellitus, 50 percent greater chance of 
being killed, 46 percent greater chance of dying from pneumonia or influenza and a 
43 percent greater chance of committing suicide/^ Unfortunately, even this mass of 
statistics isn’t quite sufficient to truly define the problem. For example, though 
tuberculosis is far more prevalent among Native Americans than among the general 
populace, it isn’t one of the major causes of death for any age group. Though the 
rate of tuberculosis mortality is shocking when compared the rest o f the U.S. 
population, the actual number of deaths is fairly small.
The real culprits'*  ^ behind the startling death rates are accidents (the number 
one cause of death between ages one and forty-four), suicide (the second leading 
cause of death between ages fifteen and twenty-four and fourth leading cause from 
twenty-five to forty-four), homicide (third leading cause of death between ages one
Indian Healtli Service, Trends in Indian Health, Ibid., 5. These figures, indeed all o f the figures 
taken from Trends in Indian Health are overly conservative, as reported in U.S.Indian Health 
Service, Regional Differences in Indian Health. (Washington D.C.: Department o f Health and 
Human Services, Division o f Program Statistics, 1994), p 5. In reviewing data by region, the 
IHS found that the Oklahoma, California and Portland region statistics were skewed by 
underreporting of Indian race on death certificates. Such underreporting has the effect of  
lowering statistical mortality rates. If these regions are removed from calculation, the 
alcoholism death rate jumps to 630 percent tliat o f the general populace and all the other 
mortality rates take similar jumps. The lower rates cited herein firom Trends in Indian Health 
were chosen because they represent the lowest possible figures.
Analysis o f data presented in Ibid., 46-50.
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and forty-four) and chronic liver disease/cirrhosis (second leading cause of death 
between ages twenty-five and forty-four). In general the ranking o f these causes is 
the same for the U.S. population as a whole, though the rates are greatly 
exaggerated for American Indians. The real anomalies are suicide and chronic liver 
disease/cirrhosis. These causes were actually ranked higher among Native 
Americans in various age groups than among the populace as a whole. When one 
considers that the main cause of chronic liver disease/cirrhosis is alcohol abuse; that 
many accidental deaths are alcohol related (e.g. drunk driving fatalities); and that 
alcohol often plays a role in suicide and homicide, a trend begins to appear. 
Unfortunately this trend is one which many would like to ignore. It has led to the 
common stereotype of the “drunken Indian,””^  a stereotype that is not only unjust 
but has led to bad scholarship and bizarre policy recommendations.
Probably the most famous example of bad scholarship in the area of Indian 
alcohol use is the study'^  ^ that suggests, wrongly, that Indians metabolize alcohol 
more slowly than other racial groups. Unfortunately, in exposing the shortcomings 
o f this study and exploding other myths concerning Indian alcohol use, some
■*" Robert F. Berkhofer, }x.,The IVhite Man's Indian, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 30, notes 
that if there is a third major Wliite image o f the Indian after the contradictory Noble/Savage 
stereotypes then a “...degraded, often drunken, Indian constitutes the essence of that 
understanding.”
D. Fenna, et al., “Ethanol Metabolism in Various Racial Groups”, Canadian Medical 
Association Journal 105 (1971). 472-475.
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researchers have gone a bit too far. Phillip May'^ explodes the myth that alcoholism 
is the number one health problem among American Indians by equivocating between 
alcoholism and alcohol abuse. As he says, “More accurately, alcohol abuse and 
alcoholism combine to be the leading cause o f mortality.” This is certainly 
comforting.
Recommended solutions to the high alcohol related mortality rate sometimes 
suffer from the desire to avoid stereotyping Indians as problem drinkers. One 
study"*^  suggests that alcohol related accidental deaths like those involving car 
crashes or pedestrian hypothermia can be reduced by bringing the alcohol to the 
Indians — eliminating prohibition on those reservations that still have it. Barring 
that, they suggest carpools for patrons and reflector stripes for pedestrians might 
help. The closest that the study comes to suggesting a decrease in consumption is a 
recommendation to limit the hours of operation of bars near reservations. 
Prevention, treatment and rehabilitation are mentioned only in passing and only in 
the final sentence. Though it is impossible to prove that the desire to avoid 
stereotyping was behind the choice to linger on solutions to the final as opposed to 
the proximal causes of death, it certainly seems likely. The fact that the same
Phillip A. May, "The Epidemiology o f Alcohol Abuse”, American Indian Culture and Research 
Journal, v 18, n 2 (1994), 122-123
Margaret M. Gallaher, et a i,  "Pedestrian and Hypothermia Deaths Among Native Americans in 
New Mexico”. Journal o f  the American M edical Association, v 267, n 10 (1992), 1345-1348.
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volume of the Journal o f the American M edical Association that carried this study 
also carried an article'** against stereotyping Indians as drunks is suggestive.
Avoiding stereotypes doesn’t make the problem go away. Alcohol is 
arguably the number one killer of Native Americans. Dropping prohibition or 
busing Indians to bars is merely treating a symptom. It might help to alleviate some 
of the accidental deaths but only at the risk of increasing the longer-term health 
problems like cirrhosis. To truly end the problem, the drinking should be curbed.
In the search for causes we are aided by those that have exploded the myths. 
It is clear that there is no cause for drinking that is unique to Native Americans. 
Indians drink for the same reasons that other people do."*^  Swinson and Eaves^° 
summarily state that, “People who have high personal motivation toward drug- 
taking tend to originate from groups which commonly produce inadequate, insecure, 
tense members, who are subject to little in the way of effective controls against 
deviant behavior.” Though rather disingenuously put, this statement must be taken
Carol Chiago Lujan. “Alcohol-related Deaths of American Indians, Stereotypes and Strategies”. 
Journal o f  the American Medical Association, v 267 n 10 (1992), 1384.
Though there certainly are differences in drinking style which exacerbate the problem. See 
Deborali Jones-Saumty, Larry Hochhaus, Ralph Dm and Arthur Zeiner, “Psychological factors 
of Familial Alcoholism in American Indians and Caucasians,” Journal o f  Clinical Psychology, 
(Brandon VT: Clinical Psychology Publishing Company), v 39, n 5, 1983 and Ray Stratton, 
Artliur Zeiner and Alfonso Paredes, “Tribal Affiliation and Prevalence o f Alcohol Problems,” 
Journal o f  Studies on Alcohol, (New Bmnswick: Publication Division o f the Rutgers Center of 
Alcohol Studies), v 39, n 7, 1978.
Richard Swinson and Derek Eaves, Alcoholism and Addiction, (London: Wobimi Press, 1978), 
77.
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seriously. Forrest^ ^ provides other reasons saying, “Identity and role confusion are 
precursors to alcoholism and alcohol abuse.”
In quantitative studies, many different instruments have been used to test 
various psychological factors. Among these is “Locus of Control” (LOG). Though 
early studies of LOG using the Rotter scale had conflicting results, newer studies 
using the Levenson scale have shown a correlation between alcoholism and external 
LOG^^ as well as a correlation between a shift to internal LOG and treatment 
success.”  This is extremely significant, since we have also seen a link between 
external LOG and poverty in the work o f Theodore Sarbin during our examination 
of the causes of poverty. A study comparing LOG of Indians and non-Indians in 
Oklahoma showed that Native Americans generally had a much higher external LOG 
than Whites. This study showed a LOG “Powerful Other” of 24.13 for Indians as 
compared to 20.46 for Caucasians and an LOG “Chance” of 26.71 versus 20.92. 
Clearly Native Americans tend to feel that they do not control their own lives.
Gaiy G. Forrest., The Diagnosis and Treatment o f  Alcoholism, (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas 
Publisher) revised, 2"** ed. 1978. As quoted in his Alcoholism and Human Sexuality, 
(Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1983), 366.
Deborali Jones-Saumty, et. al, 788.
David Caster and Oscar Parsons, “Locus o f Control in Alcoholics and Treatment Outcomes,” 
Journal o f  Studies on Alcohol, (New Brunswick: Rutgers Center of Alcohol Studies), v 38, n 
11, 1977, 2093 and passim.
Deborali Jones-Saumty, et. al.,787.
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Many of the problems facing Native Americans seem to be related to an 
external locus of control. Poverty and alcoholism are related directly, with 
standardized studies of LOG showing a strong correlation. In addition, the 
commonsensical nature o f such explanation as well as the power of the explanation 
is obvious. People who believe they have little or no control over their own lives 
might despair of escaping their fate, take no positive action, and could well end up 
seeking solace in drugs or alcohol. Even standard education theories cite 
motivation, in particular the efficacy o f the education in meeting the goals o f the 
student. If the student’s destiny is controlled by outside forces, or if the student 
believes it is so, then why bother?
In our examination of U.S. policy, we should be on the lookout for laws and 
policies that take control of Indian life out o f their hands; or which would lead them 
to believe that control had been wrested. Directly harmful policies should also be 
examined not only for their harm, but as further reason for an external locus of 
control among Native Americans. Other policies that would be in line with the 
causes outlined previously, such as dispossession, should also be noted.
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Chapter 2: A Policy History
The man who said that he would plant a stake and draw a line around us, that never 
should be passed, was the first to say that he could not guard the lines, and drew up the 
stake and wiped out all traces of the line. I will not conceal from you my fears, that the 
present grounds may be removed. I have my foreboding, — who of us can tell after 
witnessing what has already been done, what the next force may be.
George W. Harkins, District Chief of the Choctaw Nation, 1833^^
The most charitable characterization of United States’ law and policy 
concerning the Indians is paternalistic; the least that it is attempted genocide. The 
interplay of forces that shaped the policy included both base and noble, though more 
often than not the noble sentiments were obscured by parochialism or even racism. 
This chapter will not attempt an overview o f all elements of Federal Indian law and 
policy. That would be too ambitious and is unnecessary. For the purposes of this 
work, those policies that may have brought about conditions leading to the ills 
outlined in the last chapter are the ones that will be examined. To help place the 
policies in context and to prepare for the next chapter, we’ll also look at the stated 
reasons for these policies. Where possible, competent U.S. Government authorities 
will be cited at length. This is to ensure that the extended argument so developed 
will be the most effective. If the policies and outcomes are described by the U.S. 
officials involved, then it will be hard for modem American readers to ignore the
As quoted by T.C. McLuhan in Touch the Earth: A Self-portrait o f  Indian Existence, (New 
York: Promontory Press, 1971), 139. Within 65 years Harldns’ forebodings proved prophetic.
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evidence. Since a link has been made between decreased self-governance and the 
many problems faced by modem Natives, self-governance and the broader issue of 
sovereignty will be a key. To the extent that the policies were unjust or genocidal, 
they will constitute elements of further arguments to be completed in the subsequent 
chapter.
In examining the history, particular emphasis will be placed on the history of 
the so-called “Five Civilized Tribes” more commonly termed “The Five Tribes” 
today. These are the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, Seminole and Cherokee nations. 
Though the author’s Choctaw citizenship plays a role in this, there are independent 
reasons as well. Chief among these is the length of their struggle for sovereignty in 
the wake of U.S. independence. The fourth U.S. treaty with any Indian nation was 
with the Cherokee, the fifth and sixth with the Choctaw and Chickasaw respectively; 
all concluded before the enactment o f the United States Constitution. With their 
forced inclusion in the state of Oklahoma, they became the last Indian nations to be 
included in a state and they continue their fight for sovereignty to this day. The 
history of their interaction with the United States Government thus spans, the history 
of the United States itself and includes all major elements of U.S. policy concerning 
Indian nations.
Most commentators call the earliest era of U.S. policy “assimilation,” though
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this more nearly characterizes the hopes of U.S. policymakers rather than the actual 
results of their policies. With the spirit o f the enlightenment, believing their new 
government to be truly superior, the founders o f the United States thought that the 
Indians would willingly join them. Until then, in the words of Jefferson, "... the 
Indians had the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they choose 
to keep it, and that this might be forever.” ®^ Thus from the earliest days of the 
Republic, such luminaries as Jefferson fully recognized Indian sovereignty in no 
uncertain terms, however no one seriously believed that the Indian nations would 
maintain their independence once the benefits of “civilization” were known to them. 
To this end the United States engaged in relatively non-coercive trade and education 
during this period. Though governmental policy was supposedly one of freely- 
chosen assimilation, the citizens of the United States pursued their own ends in 
direct conflict to official policy. Their unoflBcial “policy” might best be termed 
“settler imperialism.” Like assimilation, settler imperialism had its roots in the 
American Revolution.
The causes of the American Revolution aren’t just taxation, representation, 
or a desire for democracy. Perhaps paramount was the desire to take land held by 
Indians. Two crucial elements came together to bring about the desire to overthrow
As quoted by Francis Paul Frucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade 
and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834. (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1962), 141.
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British rule. One was the Treaty of 1763 ending the war with France; the other is 
the Proclamation Line of 1763.
The importance o f the Treaty o f 1763 was at once American and 
Atlantic, continental and maritime. The French Empire in North
America had come to an end; in Canada English culture and
institutions came to dominate, but never quite swamp, the French; 
and British North America was more than doubled in extent, 
although the habitants numbered only some seventy-five thousand....
Britain no longer needed to make concessions, and the colonies for 
their part developed wills of their own. The paths to the West now 
seemed open to them.... The American Revolution has its origins in 
the oversuccessful terms of the Treaty of 1763.^^
The second element, the Proclamation Line of 1763, was the last obstacle to 
westward expansion. King George III set up the line as the official boundary 
dividing the English colonies and the Indian nations. Prior to this, relations between
the British and the various Indian nations had grown steadily worse. Colonists
constantly intruded into Native held land and the Indian nations responded by 
attacking British settlements. The war with the French had been longer and more 
costly than necessary because the French had more support among the Indian 
nations. With the end of the war, the King sought to end the ongoing strife with the 
Indian nations.^* While it might be profitable for the colonists to take the Indian
Esmond Wright ,“Fabric o f Freedom 1763-1800’" in The Making o f  America, David Donald 
ed., (London: Macmillan, 1965), 2.
^  Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father, (Bison books paperback combined and unabridged 
volumes I and 2 edition, 1995; Lincoln and London: University o f Nebraska, 1984),21-28.
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land, it was very unprofitable for the crown whose troops had to protect the 
colonists. The Proclamation Line of 1763 was thus a major irritant to the colonists 
who sought to expand the frontier.
The fi-ontier represented America’s imperialism and, like all settler 
imperialisms, it was rough and ready in its methods, antinative in its 
essence, and scornful of the liberal but remote control of London.
The liberty it sought in the West was liberty to take Indian property 
without too much fuss, an imperialism that did not cease with 
1776.
Settler imperialism was to be the practical form of U.S. policy toward Native 
Americans from 1776 to at least the 1830’s. Just like the British government before 
them, the U.S. Government attempted to minimize its losses by maintaining peace 
despite the pressure of settlers hungry for Indian lands. The United States 
government negotiated over one-hundred treaties in this era.®° Each one set out 
boundaries; guaranteed safety and protection of Indian people and property; and 
either implicitly or explicitly recognized the sovereignty of the Indian signatories. 
Despite this, the citizens of the United States openly violated the agreements. After 
1789, with the U.S. Constitution and Government in place, this practice can be
”  Wright,. 44.
** See Appendix D for a set of particularly explicit treaty excerpts. Most of these date from after 
tlie assimilation era, primarily because Indian nations did not demand explicit recognition of 
their prerogatives until after tliese had been ignored a number o f times. However, the over one- 
hundred treaties of tlie assimilation era all implicitly recognize sovereignty, independence, 
government, laws and jurisdiction of Indian nations.
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easily traced by examining official pronouncements of the President. One of the first 
is in a letter from George Washington to the United States Senate. It mentions 
earlier abuses; lays out the culpability of U.S. citizens and the responsibility of the 
United States to punish those citizens; and offers the alternative that the United 
States might compensate the Indians for land taken by settlers. It reads in part;
During the last year I laid before the Senate a particular 
statement of the case of the Cherokees. By a reference to that paper 
it will appear that the United States formed a treaty with the 
Cherokees in November, 1785; that the said Cherokees thereby 
placed themselves under the protection of the United States and had 
a boundary assigned them; that the white people settled on the 
frontiers had openly violated the said boundary by intruding on the 
Indian lands; that the United States in Congress assembled did, on 
the 1st day of September, 1788, issue their proclamation forbidding 
all such unwarrantable intrusions, and enjoined all those who had 
settled upon the hunting grounds of the Cherokees to depart with 
their families and effects without loss of time, as they would answer 
their disobedience to the injunctions and prohibitions expressed at 
their peril.
But information has been received that notwithstanding the 
said treaty and proclamation upward o f 500 families have settled on 
the Cherokee lands exclusively of those settled between the fork of 
French Broad and Holstein rivers, mentioned in the said treaty.
As the obstructions to a proper conduct on this matter have 
been removed since it was mentioned to the Senate on the 22d of 
August, 1789, by the accession of North Carolina to the present 
Union and the cessions of the land in question, I shall conceive 
myself bound to exert the powers intrusted [sic] to me by the 
Constitution in order to carry into faithful execution the treaty of 
Hopewell, unless it shall be thought proper to attempt to arrange a
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new boundary with the Cherokees, embracing the settlements, and 
compensating the Cherokees for the cessions they shall make on the
occasion.
The intrusions and subsequent purchases of land continued apace throughout 
this era. They can be traced through the Presidential Proclamation o f 26 August, 
1 7 9 0 2^ ; Presidential Proclamation of 19 March, 1791®^ ; President Washington’s 
Fourth Annual Address of 6 November, 1792^“*; and a particularly terrible episode 
recorded in this Presidential Proclamation;
Whereas I have received authentic information that certain 
lawless and wicked persons of the western frontier in the State of 
Georgia did lately invade, bum, and destroy a town belonging to the 
Cherokee Nation, although in amity with the United States, and put 
to death several Indians of that nation; and
Whereas such outrageous conduct not only violates the rights 
of humanity, but also endangers the public peace, and it highly 
becomes the honor and good faith o f the United States to pursue all 
legal means for the punishment of those atrocious offenders:
I have therefore thought fit to issue this my proclamation, 
hereby exhorting all the citizens o f the United States and requiring all 
the officers thereof according to their respective stations, to use 
their utmost endeavors to apprehend and bring those offenders to 
justice. And I do moreover offer a reward of $500 for each and every 
of the above-named persons who shall be so apprehended and
James Richardson ed.. Messages and Papers o f  the Presidents, (Washington: Bureau o f National 
Literature. 1911) v 1. p 71.
Ibid., 72-73
Ibid., 93-94.
^  Ibid., 119.
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brought to justice and shall be proved to have assumed or exercised 
any command or authority among the perpetrators o f the crimes 
aforesaid at the time of committing the same.
In testimony whereof I have caused the seal of the United 
States to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my 
hand. Done at the city o f Philadelphia, the 12th day of December.
A.D. 1792, and of the Independence of the United States the 
seventeenth. [SEAL.] signed George Washington.^^
Further evidence is contained in a Letter to Congress o f 17 February 1795^ *^ , 
Letter to the Senate of 25 June 1795^\ Letter to Congress o f 8 December, 1795^*, 
and the 2"“* Annual Address o f 8 December 1798.®^  A particularly interesting letter 
was sent to congress by Thomas Jefferson on the 18'*’ of January, 1803. In part it
says;
The Indian tribes residing within the limits of the United States have 
for a considerable time been growing more and more uneasy at the 
constant diminution of the territory they occupy, although effected by 
their own voluntary sales, and the policy has long been gaining 
strength with them of refusing absolutely all further sale on any 
conditions, insomuch that at this time it hazards their friendship and 
excites dangerous jealousies and perturbations in their minds to make 
any overture for the purchase of the smallest portions of their land. A 
very few tribes only are not yet obstinately in these dispositions.’*
Ibid.. 129.
“  Ibid., 167.
Ibid., 171.
“  Ibid., 174 and 177. 
Ibid., 264.
Ibid., 341.
32
Though many of the sales o f territory had been prompted directly by the 
settler imperialism of the United States, and probably all were influenced by it, 
Jefferson nevertheless calls the sales “voluntary.” Indian voluntarism is a theme 
repeated in various circumstances throughout the history of U.S. Indian policy. The 
Indian nations are given a choice between two evils, like loss of territory versus 
death and destruction by settlers with a concomitant loss of territory anyway. When 
they choose to cede territory, it is a “voluntary cession.” That the Indian nations 
should be adamant in refusal to sell further land, as admitted by Jefferson, gives lie 
to the supposed voluntary nature of the transaction.
Though the Indian nations and individuals of those nations were regularly 
engaged in hostilities with the White settlers, they usually did so in response to 
provocation admitted by the President of the United States. In only two instances 
during this era did the President insinuate that there might not have been 
provocation. George Washington did so concerning tribes north of the Ohio River 
in his 2"“* Annual Address on December 8‘*’, 1790^‘ and James Madison did so 
concerning some southern tribes in his 7^ Annual Address of December 5*^ , 1815.’^
Ibid.. 74. However. Washington’s protestations appear to have been a rationalization for 
"subduing” the Indian nations in tlie area so tliat the war debt front the revolution could be met 
siezing and selling their land. For a complete account, see Wiley Sword, President 
Washington’s  Indian War: The Struggle fo r  the Old Northwest 1790-1795, (Norman and 
London: University o f Oklahoma, 1985).
Richardson, 548.
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Thus it would seem that the Indian nations, on the whole, attempted to get along 
with their American neighbors.
Despite the fact that the Federal Government lacked the will to enforce its 
own treaties, it was not completely without principle. The U.S. Government was 
aware almost from the start that the treaties were insufiScient to stem the tide of 
intruders. In an attempt to stop settler imperialism and advance the cause of 
assimilation. Congress passed a series o f acts known as the Trade and Intercourse 
Acts.’  ^ Given that the U.S. Government was unable to enforce the treaties, it 
should be clear that stacking up even more laws toward the same end would result 
in just that many more unenforceable laws. It did. Most of the incursions already 
cited occurred after the Trade and Intercourse Acts were law. Though the Trade 
and Intercourse Acts cannot be called a complete failure, by the 1830’s most o f  the 
Indian nations in the eastern portion of the United States were surrounded. In 1819 
the situation was so serious that the Civilization Fund Act was passed in part to 
prevent the “...final extinction of Indian tribes, adjoining the frontier settlements of 
the United States...”.’*
For the texts of the first and last o f these acts, in 1790 and 1802, see Francis Paul Prucha ed., 
Documents o f  United States Indian Policy , 2"'* expanded edition, (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska, 1990). 14-15, 17-21.
U.S. Statutes at Lctrge, 3:5 16.
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Why did settler imperialism win despite what seems like sincere concern and 
outrage on the part of some o f the top policymakers in the U.S.? Political 
expediency, racism, elitism and practical matters of implementation all seem to have 
played a part. A crucial element in the failure o f U.S. law was the fact that it 
immediately arrogated unto itself the right to try and punish Whites that had 
transgressed.’  ^ But, as Prucha put it, “The typical frontier community could not be 
brought to convict a man who injured or murdered an Indian...”’  ^ This combined 
with the fact that the Indians were often not allowed into court meant that even if an 
arrest was made, the White man would usually go free.
But far fewer were arrested than might be thought. It is probable that local 
police were almost as biased as the juries. Since the statutes and treaties were often 
enforced in war-like situations, it frequently fell to military formations to provide the 
enforcement. Here the history and principles o f the United States worked against 
enforcement. The United States still mistrusted the notion of a standing Army, so 
most of the U.S. military was state militia. But the militia, often drawn from the 
very settlers who were perpetrating the crimes, were of little value in enforcing the
Though some tribes were recognized by treaty as having a right to punish white people, for 
example tlie Choctaw as stated in Article 4 of, TREATY WITH THE CHOCTAW {1786, 
Jan. 3} 7 Stat.. 21, tliis was uncommon. In addition, exercise o f such right was apt to create a 
backlash.
Prucha, Great Father, 105.
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mies. George Washington may be alluding to this in a 1797 letter to the House of 
Representatives calling for troops to enforce agreements with the Indian nations.
It is generally agreed that some cavalry, either militia or regular, will 
be necessary; and according to the best information I have been able 
to obtain, it is my opinion that the latter will be less expensive and 
more useful than the former in preserving peace...
Whether he was referring to the bias o f the militia, or to its general ineffectiveness 
probably can never be known. Either way, the militia were to be the main enforcers 
of the Indian boundaries despite their ineffectiveness.
The tribes generally continued a friendly policy despite a steady diminution 
of their land. Even so, there was a constant pressure for more land that could not be
sated. Events like the Louisiana Purchase seemed to solve the land problem by
providing enough land for any influx o f settlers. However, more thoughtful minds 
realized that the entire area purchased contained Indian nations which, whatever 
their relative population density, occupied the territory. That policymakers were 
aware o f the Indian nations within the purchased territory and recognized their right 
to self-government is laid out in Jefferson’s Annual Message of 1803:
With the wisdom of Congress it will rest to take those
ulterior measures which may be necessary for the immediate
occupation and temporary government of the country; for its
Richardson. 204.
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incorporation into our Union; for rendering the change of 
government a blessing to our newly adopted brethren; for securing to 
them the rights of conscience and of property; for confirming to the 
Indian inhabitants their occupancy and self-government, establishing 
fnendly and commercial relations with them, and for ascertaining the 
geography of the country acquired. Such materials, for your 
information, relative to its affairs in general as the short space of time 
has permitted me to collect will be laid before you when the subject 
shall be in a state for your consideration.^*
Thus the Louisiana Purchase, for the remainder o f the assimilation era, just meant a 
larger realm for settler imperialism to work on while the Government ineffectually 
attempted to enforce the increasing number o f treaties that were supposed to 
guarantee the integrity of the Indian nations.
By failing to enforce its own laws and treaties, the Government of the United 
States had allowed the Indian nations in the east to be completely surrounded. The 
remaining land was scarcely sufficient for the eastern Indian nations to survive. 
Continued pressure for new land and a growing desire for what might be called 
“territorial integrity” led some state governments to pressure the Federal 
Government for the complete removal of Indians from their state. As early as 
1802’ ,^ Georgia had entered into an agreement with the Federal Government in 
which the Federal Government was to purchase the remaining Indian land in
Ibid.. 346-347.
J. E. Hays, ed.. Indian Treaties: Cessions o f  Land in Georgia 1705-1837, (W.P.A. Project No. 
7158, 1941), 332-334.
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Georgia. Unfortunately the Indian nations o f  the east, and particularly those in 
Georgia, would not sell the little land remaining to them. This would be a stumbling 
block to removal until the I830’s.
Assimilation had failed, but there was no straightforward legal grounds 
under existing U.S. law to force the Indians to sell their lands and move on. The 
Indian nations gladly accepted trade and the various technical innovations brought 
by the United States, but refused to give up sovereignty over the land remaining to 
them. Thus the inexorability of the settler demand for land meant that the United 
States Government would have to choose between breaking their own laws and 
treaties, or changing them. Each branch of government would have a role to play in 
the end of voluntary assimilation. The Supreme Court would provide the legal 
underpinnings which would allow removal; the Presidency, long held by idealists, 
would finally be held by a President willing to rationalize the necessary policies; and 
the Congress would continue making the treaties and eventually the laws that would 
govern removal and all subsequent actions.
A series of Supreme Court decisions provided the framework for removal 
and continue to be central to understanding U.S. Indian Law. The first of these, 
Johnson v. McIntosh of 1823, laid out the legal framework for the taking of Indian 
lands.
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On the discovery of this immense continent the great nations 
of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as 
they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered ample field 
to the ambition and enterprise of all; and the character and religion of 
its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people 
over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an 
ascendancy. The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in 
convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the 
inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and 
Christianity, in exchange for unlimited independence. But, as they 
were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in 
order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war with each 
other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the 
law by which the right o f acquisition, which they all asserted, should 
be regulated between themselves. This principle was, that discovery 
gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose 
authority, it was made, against all other European governments, 
which title might be consummated by possession...
Thus, all the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory 
on this continent. Have asserted in themselves, and have recognized 
in others, the exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the 
lands occupied by the Indians. Have the American States rejected or 
adopted this principle?...
The United States then have unequivocally conceded to that 
great and broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this 
country. They hold, and assert in themselves, the title by which it 
was acquired. They maintain, as all others have maintained, that 
discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of 
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest...
We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists, 
merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to 
expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their 
limits. Conquest gives a title which the courts o f the conqueror 
cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions o f 
individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which
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has been successfully asserted... These claims have been maintained 
and established as far west as the river Mississippi, by the sword...
When the conquest is complete, and the conquered 
inhabitants can be blended with the conquerors, or safely governed as 
a distinct people, public opinion, which not even the conqueror can 
disregard imposes these restraints on him...
But the Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages... 
[T]o govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they 
were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were 
ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.
What was the inevitable consequence of this state of things? 
The Europeans were under the necessity of either abandoning the 
country, and relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or of enforcing 
those claims by the sword, and by the adoption of principles adapted 
to the condition of people with whom it was impossible to mix, and 
who could not be governed as a distinct society, or of remaining in 
their neighborhood, and exposing themselves and their families to the 
perpetual hazard of being massacred.
Frequent and bloody wars in which the whites were not 
always the aggressors, unavoidably ensued...
However extravagant the pretension of converting the 
discovery of a country into conquest may appear; if it has been 
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country 
has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass 
of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and 
cannot be questioned... However this restriction may be opposed to 
natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be 
indispensable to that system under which the country has been 
settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it 
may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be 
rejected by Courts of justice.*”
80 Johnson v. McIntosh. 8 Wheaton 543 (1823), 572-592.
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The U.S. Government then, had a right under the “doctrine of discovery” to 
take Indian land by purchase or by conquest. It stipulates that the territory as far 
west as the river Mississippi had been won “by the sword,”** recognizing that the 
Whites were usually the aggressors, but merely because the Indians were “ready to 
repel by arms every attempt on their independence.” This remarkable opinion even 
recognizes the dubious moral ground that the United States was standing on. 
Almost explicitly invoking the notion that “ought implies can,” Marshall asserts that 
settler imperialism cannot be stopped and thus will be institutionalized. The one 
mitigating factor is that only the Federal Government can exercise the power, since 
the right of discovery has devolved on the Federal Government and only they can 
declare war.
Though the United States claims the legal right to conquer outright, making 
it manifest that their right to purchase has coercive force, this force will not brought 
into play until Jackson becomes president and not even openly then. As late as 
1824, a year after the U.S. had claimed the legal right to take Indian land. President 
Monroe would not make use of it. As he remarked in a letter to Congress 
concerning Georgia’s demands that the U.S. live up to its compact of 1802 and 
extinguish remaining Indian title in Georgia,
Here Marshall seems to recognize the forced nature of most of the Indian “sales” o f land. In fact 
almost all tlie land had been purchased.
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The express stipulation of the compact that their title should be 
extinguished at the expense of the United States when it may be done 
peaceably and on reasonable conditions is a full proof that it was the 
clear and distinct understanding of both parties to it that the Indians 
had a right to the territory, in the disposal of which they were to be 
regarded as free agents. An attempt to remove them by force would, 
in my opinion, be unjust.*^
Even so Monroe himself laid the ground for the rationale that allows Jackson 
to implement removal, and in addition foreshadows the later allotment policy in his 
2"** Inaugural Address of March 5“' 1821,
The care o f the Indian tribes within our limits has long been 
an essential part o f our system, but, unfortunately, it has not been 
executed in a manner to accomplish all the objects intended by it. We 
have treated them as independent nations, without their having any 
substantial pretensions to that rank. The distinction has flattered their 
pride, retarded their improvement, and in many instances paved the 
way to their destruction. The progress of our settlements westward, 
supported as they are by a dense population, has constantly driven 
them back, with almost the total sacrifice of the lands which they 
have been compelled to abandon. They have claims on the 
magnanimity and, 1 may add, on the justice of this nation which we 
must all feel. We should become their real benefactors; we should 
perform the office of their Great Father, the endearing title which 
they emphatically give to the Chief Magistrate of our Union. Their 
sovereignty over vast territories should cease, in lieu o f which the 
right of soil should be secured to each individual and his posterity in 
competent portions; and for the territory thus ceded by each tribe 
some reasonable equivalent should be granted, to be vested in 
permanent funds for the support of civil government over them and 
for the education of their children, for their instruction in the arts of
82 Richardson, v 2, p 804.
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husbandry, and to provide sustenance for them until they could 
provide it for themselves. My earnest hope is that Congress will 
digest some plan, founded on these principles, with such 
improvements as their wisdom may suggest, and carry it into effect 
as soon as it may be practicable.^
Though clearly providing a rationale for the dissolution of the Indian nations, 
Monroe did not avail himself of the option. Indeed, as late as April 12“*, 1824 in his 
?“* Annual Message to Congress he would write.
My impression is equally strong that it would promote essentially the 
security and happiness of the tribes within our limits if they could be 
prevailed on to retire west and north of our States and Territories on 
lands to be procured for them by the United States, in exchange for 
those on which they now reside. Surrounded as they are, and pressed 
as they will be, on every side by the white population, it will be 
difficult if not impossible for them, with their kind of government, to 
sustain order among them. Their interior will be exposed to frequent 
disturbance to remedy which the interposition of the United States 
will be indispensable, and thus their government will gradually lose 
its authority until it is annihilated. In this process the moral character 
of the tribes will also be lost, since the change will be too rapid to 
admit their improvement in civilization to enable them to institute and 
sustain a government founded on our principles, if such a change 
were compatible either with the compact with Georgia or with our 
general system, or to become members o f a State, should any State 
be willing to adopt them in such numbers, regarding the good order, 
peace, and tranquillity of such State. But all these evils may be 
avoided if these tribes will consent to remove beyond the limits of 
our present States and Territories. Lands equally good, and perhaps 
more fertile, may be procured for them in those quarters. The 
relations between the United States and such Indians would still be
Ibid., V 1,661.
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the same/'*
Between these two documents we can see the sense of futility engendered in 
some policymakers by the failure o f assimilation; the sense that they will have to 
abandon their idealism and their great reluctance to do so. In the first Monroe 
entertains the actual dissolution of the tribes, claiming they have no “pretensions” to 
the rank of independent nation though he recognizes that they “have sovereignty 
over vast territories.” In the second, Monroe’s idealism is reasserted. He seems to 
recognize that there is not pretense, that they are independent nations. He explicitly 
recognizes that the Indian nations have governments, though he believes that the 
U.S. Government is superior and should be the model for Indian nations. In the end, 
he is resigned to removal because he does not believe the press of White settlers will 
allow the time for any other solution. This administration and the next would create 
treaties with tribes in which they would be traded lands to the west in the hope that 
they would remove there of their own free will, even though at this juncture such a 
move could hardly be called “fi'ee.” States with large settler populations were quite 
hostile both through the actions of the state government and through the 
independent actions of the settlers themselves. Yet despite this coercion, the tribes 
resisted.
84 Ibid.. V 2, 804-805.
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Unwillingness to force removal would continue through the Adams 
administration, despite the seeming license given in Johnson v. McIntosh. Pressure 
continued for decisive action, but the President could not be brought to willfully 
break treaties. Intrusions into Indian territory continued, particularly in Georgia, 
with the people of that state acting openly to bring the Indian nations into their 
jurisdiction even to the extent of sending surveyors into Indian territory. In an 
1827 letter to Congress, Adams acted to prevent violence and maintain the integrity 
of the treaties, almost pleading with the Indians to forego self-defense knowing that 
the Georgians would use any violence on their part as a pretense for open war.
Instructions have accordingly been given by the Secretary of War to 
the attorney and marshal of the United States in the district of 
Georgia to commence prosecutions against the surveyors complained 
of as having violated the law, while orders have at the same time 
been forwarded to the agent o f the United States at once to assure 
the Indians that their rights founded upon the treaty and the law are 
recognized by this Government and will be faithfully protected, and 
earnestly to exhort them, by the forbearance of every act of hostility 
on their part, to preserve unimpaired that right to protection secured 
to them by the sacred pledge of the good faith of this nation. Copies 
of these instructions and orders are herewith transmitted to 
Congress.*^
Later in the same letter, it becomes clear that this is a constitutional crisis of the 
highest magnitude as Adams threatens the use of force against the state of Georgia.
85 Ibid., 938.
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He makes it clear that congress can avert the crisis by changing the law, but also 
seems to invoke moral authority.
In the present instance it is my duty to say that if the legislative and 
executive authorities of the State of Georgia should persevere in acts 
of encroachment upon the territories secured by a solemn treaty to 
the Indians, and the laws o f the Union remain unaltered, a 
superadded obligation even higher than that o f human authority will 
compel the Executive of the United States to enforce the laws and 
fulfill the duties of the nation by all the force committed for that 
purpose to his charge.*®
Adams’ threat of force created an uneasy stalemate that would not be broken 
until the Jackson presidency. Ironically, though perhaps inevitably, Andrew Jackson 
broke the stalemate. His presidency was largely based on his reputation as a hero of 
the War of 1812 at the Battle of New Orleans. In this battle a force of Choctaws 
had fought alongside Jackson, living up to their treaty obligation of friendship.*^ 
Despite this powerful example of solemn observance o f treaties well-known to him, 
Jackson would seek to break the treaties held with Indian nations including the 
Choctaw. Rationalizing removal by merging the various themes from his 
predecessors, the courts and the congress as well as artfully forgetting facts long 
since admitted, Jackson forced removal. His general stance is laid out in these
Ibid., 939.
Tim Pickles, New Orleans 1815: Andrew Jackson Crushes the British, Osprey Military 
Campaign Series, vol. 28 ed. David G. Chandler (London: Osprey, 1993), 37. Gives the order 
of battle o f the U.S. forces wliich included 62 Choctaws.
46
excerpts from an extended policy statement made on December 8 , 1829.
The condition and ulterior destiny of the Indian tribes within 
the limits of some of our States have become objects of much interest 
and importance. It has long been the policy of Government to 
introduce among them the arts of civilization, in the hope of 
gradually reclaiming them from a wandering life. This policy has, 
however, been coupled with another wholly incompatible with its 
success. Professing a desire to civilize and settle them, we have at the 
same time lost no opportunity to purchase their lands and thrust them 
farther into the wilderness. By this means they have not only been 
kept in a wandering state, but been led to look upon us as unjust and 
indifferent to their fate. Thus, though lavish in its expenditures upon 
the subject. Government has constantly defeated its own policy, and 
the Indians in general, receding farther and farther to the west, have 
retained their savage habits. A portion, however, of the Southern 
tribes, having mingled much with the whites and made some progress 
in the arts of civilized life, have lately attempted to erect an 
independent government within the limits of Georgia and Alabama. 
These States, claiming to be the only sovereigns within their 
territories, extended their laws over the Indians, which induced the 
latter to call upon the United States for protection.
Under these circumstances the question presented was 
whether the General Government had a right to sustain those people 
in their pretensions. The Constitution declares that "no new State 
shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State" 
without the consent of its legislature. If the General Government is 
not permitted to tolerate the erection of a confederate State within 
the territory of one of the members of this Union against her consent, 
much less could it allow a foreign and independent government to 
establish itself there...
Actuated by this view of the subject, I informed the Indians 
inhabiting parts of Georgia and Alabama that their attempt to 
establish an independent government would not be countenanced by
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the Executive of the United States, and advised them to emigrate 
beyond the Mississippi or submit to the laws of those States.
Our conduct toward these people is deeply interesting to our 
national character. Their present condition, contrasted with what 
they once were, makes a most powerful appeal to our sympathies.
Our ancestors found them the uncontrolled possessors of these vast 
regions. By persuasion and force they have been made to retire from 
river to river and from mountain to mountain, until some o f the tribes 
have become extinct and others have left but remnants to preserve 
for awhile their once terrible names. Surrounded by the whites with 
their arts o f civilization, which by destroying the resources o f the 
savage doom him to weakness and decay, the fate of the Mohegan, 
the Narragansett, and the Delaware is fast overtaking the Choctaw, 
the Cherokee, and the Creek. That this fate surely awaits them if they 
remain within the limits of the States does not admit o f a doubt. 
Humanity and national honor demand that every effort should be 
made to avert so great a calamity. It is too late to inquire whether it 
was just in the United States to include them and their territory 
within the bounds of new States, whose limits they could control.
That step can not be retraced. A State can not be dismembered by 
Congress or restricted in the exercise of her constitutional power.
But the people of those States and of every State, actuated by 
feelings of justice and a regard for our national honor, submit to you 
the interesting question whether something can not be done, 
consistently with the rights of the States, to preserve this much- 
injured race.***
Some of the old Jeffersonian idealism remains. The failure of assimilation is blamed 
on the wanderings caused by constant sale of lands. The Indians just weren’t in any 
one place long enough for the teachings to take hold; U.S. civilization would have
' Richardson, v 2, p 1019-1021.
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taken hold otherwise. Forgetting that the U.S. has maintained govemment-to- 
govemment treaty relations with the Indian nations from the very first, Jackson 
credits the civilizing influence of the Whites for allowing the independent 
governments the Indians “have lately attempted to erect.” In a bizarre twist, the 
notion that the Indians are erecting these White inspired governments is what allows 
Jackson to rationalize removal. The Constitution forbids the establishment of new 
states within old. Jackson openly wonders at the justice of allowing states to come 
into being with Indian nations in their midst, but like the Supreme Court, he 
considers it idle to speculate on history. At each step it seems, there is what justice 
demands and then there is what actually happens to the Indian nations. If only after 
the fact, the injustice is recognized. Unfortunately it is also institutionalized.
In an attempt to avoid the Georgia crisis and head-off similar problems in the 
future. Congress passed the Indian Removal Act of May 28, 1830.*  ^ It enables the 
President to make arrangements for removal, but does not straightforwardly assert a 
right to force the Indian nations to move. It speaks of the “... tribes or nations of 
Indians as may choose to exchange the lands where they now reside, and remove 
t h e r e . . . T h e  prod, as before, was to be the individual U.S. citizens and the state
U.S. Statutes at Large, 4:411-12. 
Ibid., 411.
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governments; and, as before, the government was to “ ...forever secure and guaranty 
to them...”^‘ their new land. The closest it comes to requiring force is in section 2,
... That it shall and may be lawful for the President to 
exchange any or all o f such districts, [western land set aside for 
removal] so to be laid off and described, with any tribe or nation of 
Indians now residing within the limits of any o f the states or 
territories, and with which the United States have existing treaties, 
for the whole or any part or portion of the territory claimed and 
occupied by such tribe or nation, within the bounds of any one or 
more of the states or territories, where the land claimed and occupied 
by the Indians, is owned by the United States, or the United States 
are bound to the state within which it lies to extinguish the Indian 
claim thereto.
Though tortuously worded, it appears that this section authorizes removal in two 
cases where the land is within the confines of an existing states or territories. One is 
when the United States already owns the land, the other is when the U.S. is bound 
to extinguish the Indian title. The second appears to refer to cases like that of the 
Georgia Compact, but speaks of the U.S. as being “bound” to “extinguish” and fails 
to include the original Compact’s proviso that it be done peaceably. Given that 
Johnson v. McIntosh allows Indian title to be extinguished by purchase or by 
conquest and that the U.S. is bound to extinguish the title, it appears that this 
requires the Government to use force if the Indians do not sell.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Perhaps most ominously, the Removal Act’s guarantee that the new Indian 
land shall be theirs forever contains the proviso, “That such lands shall revert to the 
United States, if the Indians become extinct, or abandon the same.”^^
Georgia continued its policy o f intrusion, in an effort to force removal. 
Though there was great pressure to remove, most tribes resisted. Jackson’s 
previously outlined rationale was insufficient to overcome the laws that prompted 
Adams’ threat of force. Yet, when Georgia continued its policy of intrusion, 
Jackson did nothing to interfere. This prompted the Senate to require an 
explanation of Jackson’s failure to enforce the various treaties and acts that should 
have prevented Georgia’s actions. Jackson’s February 26^, 1831 letter to the 
Senate reinterprets the Trade and Intercourse Act to allow his inaction.
By the nineteenth section of this act it is provided that 
nothing in it "shall be construed to prevent any trade or intercourse 
with Indians living on lands surrounded by settlements of citizens of 
the United States and being within the ordinary jurisdiction o f any of 
the individual States." This provision I have interpreted as being 
prospective in its operation and as applicable not only to Indian tribes 
which at the date of its passage were subject to the jurisdiction of any 
State, but to such also as should thereafter become so. To this 
construction of its meaning I have endeavored to conform, and have 
taken no step inconsistent with it. As soon, therefore, as the 
sovereign power of the State o f Georgia was exercised by an 
extension of her laws throughout her limits, and I had received
93 Ibid., 412.
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information of the same, orders were given to withdraw from the 
State the troops which had been detailed to prevent intrusion upon 
the Indian lands within it, and these orders were executed.®'*
Thus the same law which prompted Adams to threaten Georgia was now interpreted 
as allowing states to encompass Indian nations and take them into their jurisdiction, 
removing them from Federal protection. This not only threatened the Indian 
nations, but also set at odds the requirements o f treaties, laws and the Constitution. 
Congressmen sympathetic to the Indians or concerned with the integrity of U.S. law 
were not completely idle, but as always there was not enough support for decisive 
action against states or citizens involved in the taking of Indian land.
The ambivalence with which the United States Government enters removal is 
difficult to describe. It would seem that Johnson v. McIntosh asserts a legal right 
for the U.S. to take any Indian land it wishes in a straightforward war of conquest, 
at least until some tribes catch on to the fragility o f Indian title and began to accept 
title in fee simple. But policymakers were troubled by conscience. Even those who 
believed the Indians to be complete savages could not ignore the treaties and laws 
that were at odds with Johnson v McIntosh. A war of conquest was distasteful even 
to some of the would-be settlers.
The Federal Government took over the imperial role, with the states and the
94 Ibid., 1100.
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settler as threat. The taking of land would now be a wholesale proposition with 
clearly laid out government authority. Though it was still driven by the settler desire 
for land, it was government regulated. Despite all this, it was still essentially the 
same process. As de Tocqueville chronicled it at the time:
Nowadays the dispossession of the Indians is accomplished in 
a regular and, so to say, quite legal manner.
When the European population begins to approach the 
wilderness occupied by a savage nation, the United States 
government usually sends a solemn embassy to them; the white men 
assemble the Indians in a great plain, and after they have eaten and 
drunk with them, they say: "What have you to do in the land of your 
fathers? Soon you will have to dig up their bones in order to live. In 
what way is the country you dwell in better than another? Are there 
not forests and marshes and prairies elsewhere than where you live, 
and can you live nowhere but under your own sun? Beyond these 
mountains that you see on the horizon, and on the other side of the 
lake which skirts your land to the west, there are vast countries 
where wild beasts are still found in abundance; sell your lands and go 
and live happily in those lands." That speech finished they spread 
before the Indians firearms, woolen clothes, kegs of brandy glass 
necklaces, pewter bracelets, earrings, and mirrors. If after the sight 
o f all these riches, they still hesitate, it is hinted that they cannot 
refuse to consent to what is asked of them and that soon the 
government itself will be powerless to guarantee them the enjoyment 
of their rights. What can they do? Half convinced, half constrained, 
the Indians go off to dwell in a new wilderness, where the white men 
will not let them remain in peace for ten years. In this way the 
Americans cheaply acquire whole provinces which the richest
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sovereigns in Europe could not afford to buy.
Coerced sales preceded removal as one-by-one the tribes o f the southeast 
and eventually other parts of the continent sold their land and removed to land in the 
center of the continent. The Choctaws went first, even before Jackson’s failure to 
curb Georgia. Prior to Johnson v. McIntosh the United States had tried to induce 
the Choctaws to remove of their own fi'ee will, or at least under less coercion. 
Treaties, such as that of 1820,^^ traded western land for some o f the eastern 
Choctaw holdings in the hopes that they would remove themselves. The trade was 
termed a “cession” and thus the precise nature of Choctaw title to the new land was 
unclear. After Johnson v. McIntosh the Choctaws require a treaty which gives title 
in fee simple under a special grant by the president; a guarantee that the land is to be 
theirs as long as they exist as a nation; jurisdiction and government over all people 
and property within their limits; a guarantee that they shall never be encompassed in 
any territory or state of the union; and a guarantee that no such territory or state 
shall ever have a right to pass laws for them.^’ The precision with which these 
treaty provisions answer the U.S. Government threat is unmistakable. If  kept, these 
provisions would ensure that there was no further diminution of Choctaw territory
^  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. by J. P. Maayer, Uansl. by George Lawrence, 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966; HarperCollins 19* edition), 324-325.
TREATY WITH THE CHOCTAW {1820, Oct. 18},7 Stat., 210. Proclamaüon, Jan. 8, 1821.
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or sovereignty. The removal treaties of other Indian nations may be less precise, but 
in each there are evidences that the nations understood some part o f the threat they 
faced and took steps to protect themselves. In all cases they must have felt, like the 
Choctaws, that removal guaranteed their continued sovereignty.
Though removal was gaining momentum, there was an attempt to swing the 
balance back to enforcement of previous laws. Jackson’s rationale centered on his 
interpretation of the Trade and Intercourse Act and it was this interpretation that 
would be tested. The third branch of government, the judicial, would be called on 
to determine whether states could extend their jurisdiction into Indian territory as 
Jackson had asserted. The Cherokee, backed by numerous non-Indian individuals 
and groups, undertook a series of legal challenges to deny state jurisdiction. They 
insisted that their treaty rights precluded removal and guaranteed their self- 
governance with no state as overlord. Two Supreme Court cases resulted, 
providing the rest of the legal framework for Indian policy started in Johnson v. 
McIntosh. The first is Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.
If Courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case 
better calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined. A people 
once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by our 
ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample 
domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and 
our arms, have yielded their land by successive treaties, each of 
which contain a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they retain no 
more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed necessary to
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their comfortable subsistence. To preserve this remnant, the present 
application is made.
Before we can look in to the merits of this case, a preliminary 
inquiry presents itself. Has this Court jurisdiction of the case?
The third article of the constitution describes the extent of the 
judicial power. The second section closes an enumeration of the 
cases to which it is extended, with “controversies” “between a state 
or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.” A 
subsequent clause of the same section gives the Supreme Court 
original jurisdiction in all cases in which a state shall be a party. The 
party defendant may then unquestionably be sued in this Court. May 
the plaintiff sue in it? Is the Cherokee nation a foreign state in the 
sense in which that term is used in the constitution?
The counsel for the plaintiffs have maintained the affirmative 
of this proposition with great earnestness and ability. So much of the 
argument as was intended to prove the character o f the Cherokees as 
a state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable 
of managing its own affairs and governing itself has, in the opinion 
of a majority of the judges, been completely successful. They have 
been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country. 
The numerous treaties made with them by the United States 
recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of 
peace and war, o f being responsible in their political character for any 
violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on 
the citizens of the United States by any individual o f their 
community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. 
The acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as 
a state, and the courts are bound by those acts.
A question of much more difficulty remains. Do the 
Cherokees constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution?
...But the relation o f the Indians to the United States is 
marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where 
else.
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The Indian territory is admitted to compose a part of the 
United States. ... In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our 
commercial regulations, in any attempt at intercourse between 
Indians and foreign nations, they are considered to be within the 
jurisdictional limits of the United States, subject to many of those 
restraints which are imposed upon our own citizens. They 
acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be under the protection 
of the United States; they admit that the United States shall have the 
sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and 
managing all their affairs as they think proper...
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an 
unquestionable, and heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they 
occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession 
to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes 
which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United 
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. 
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic 
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a 
title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of 
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they 
are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian. ...
The court has bestowed its best attention on this question, 
and, after mature deliberation, the majority is of the opinion that an 
Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state in 
the sense of the constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the 
courts of the United States. ...
If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not 
the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that 
wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater wrongs are to be 
apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or 
prevent the future.^*
98 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters I (1831), 15-16, 20.
57
Marshall avoids a confrontation with the executive branch by denying that 
the courts have jurisdiction, but he still tries to provide some protection for the 
Cherokees. Though the Cherokees are not a foreign nation and thus not in the 
court’s jurisdiction, they are what he calls a “domestic dependent nation.” This leads 
Marshall to advance two incompatible theses; that the Indians have responsible 
governments recognized by treaty, and they are in a state of “pupilage.” He never 
explains what they are to be taught in their pupilage, though it would seem that 
“civilization” or perhaps “governance” were in mind despite the recognition that 
they had responsible government. But their denomination as “wards” to the U.S. 
“guardian” does provide a rationale for protecting the Indian nations independent of 
the requirements of treaties and laws that Jackson was creatively reinterpreting. The 
opening soliloquy in which Marshall examines the reasons for indulging 
“sympathies” points to this. The fact that two of the Justices denied that the 
Cherokee had any political or property rights in Georgia may also have played into 
this. Marshall may have been attempting to arouse the sympathies of the people for 
their newly created Indian “wards.” If their sympathies were aroused, then Jackson 
might be brought to heel without prompting a constitutional crisis.
Whatever Marshall’s reasons, the “guardianship” of the United States over 
Native Americans constituted an extension of power over them. It presumed 
preeminence and control but did not state precisely who would wield this power.
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nor to what end, though the presumption would be that the guardianship was for the 
protection of Indians.
The opinion was not unanimous. Two Justices asserted that the Cherokee 
constituted a foreign nation.^^ Though many arguments were made for and against 
jurisdiction (some not included in the above excerpts), none were completely 
convincing, particularly in circumstances where this effectively denied the standard 
avenue for redress o f violation of U.S. law: the courts.
Though there was certainly a great deal of sympathy for the Indian case, it 
was not enough to stop Jackson or the state of Georgia. Cherokee sympathizers 
engineered another case to get a definitive ruling. The third of Marshall’s landmark 
decisions, Worcester v. Georgia provided a test case that could not be avoided by 
denying jurisdiction. A U.S. citizen, Worcester had been imprisoned under a 
Georgia law which extended its jurisdiction into the Cherokee nation. Worcester 
sought release claiming that Georgia law could not extend into Cherokee territory. 
A U.S. citizen was suing a state for his release from its jail, so it was certainly within 
the court’s jurisdiction. It also meant that the Cherokees were mainly spectators to 
the case that promised to determine their fate.
99 Pnicha, Great Father. 210 provides a short account of the differences among the Justices.
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The decision provides an offhand answer to where the power concerning 
Indian nations is vested, but does not explicitly connect this power to the Indian 
status as wards. Complete power regarding Native nations lies with the Congress. 
As Marshall explains,
... [The Articles of Confederation] gave the United States in 
congress assembled the sole and exclusive right of “regulating the 
trade and managing all the affairs with the Indians, not members of 
any of the states: provided that the legislative power of any state 
within its own limits be not infnnged or violated.”
The ambiguous phrases which followed the grant of power to 
the United States, were so construed by the states of North Carolina 
and Georgia as to annul the power itself ... The correct exposition of 
this article is rendered unnecessary by the adoption of our existing 
constitution. That instrument confers on congress the powers of war 
and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states and with the Indian 
tribes, [emphasis in original] These powers comprehend all that is 
required for the regulation o f our intercourse with the Indians. They 
are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions. The shackles 
imposed on this power, in the confederation, are discarded.
It is interesting to note that the powers of peace, war, treaty and regulation 
of commerce were all that was required, and one might even say allowed., for 
interaction with Indians. But why make explicit that this fairly narrow set o f powers 
may be applied to Indians, powers which congress exercises with respect to foreign
iVorcesterv. Georgia. 6 Peters 515 (1832), 559.
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nations anyway? One reason may be that Indians were really of very little interest 
unless one wished to get more territory or conduct some trade. A treaty would do 
for obtaining land from “pliable” tribes; for “recalcitrant” tribes war and Johnson v. 
McIntosh would suffice. For conducting trade the Constitution gave Congress full 
power in the commerce clause. Worcester v. Georgia makes it clear that the powers 
of war, peace and treaty-making as outlined in the Constitution are specifically 
applicable to the Indian nations, as had always been understood. Thus between 
these documents, the only important reasons for dealing with Indians were covered. 
But it seems strange that Marshall would have delineated powers that were well- 
known, so it is at least possible that he outlined them rather as limitations to 
powers.Unfortunately, by denominating the Indians as wards and stating that the 
restrictions on congressional actions were lifted even though strictly applicable only 
to the powers limited under the confederation, Marshall left open avenues which 
could be used to increase control over Indian nations.
But such control was still in the future and the remainder of the decision 
makes it clear that, at the very least, Indian nations are considered self-governing. 
In particular he established this in the face o f objections that treaty stipulations
Felix S. Cohen. Handbook o f  Federal Indian Law, (Washington DC.: Bureau of Printing, 1943; 
reprint, Buffalo: William S. Hein, 1988), 90 makes a similar point contrasting this with the 
notion o f plenary power commonly cited today.
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recognizing other sovereigns, first the British crown then the United States, meant 
that Indian nations’ right to self-government were diminished. Regarding such a 
stipulation in the TREATY WITH THE CHEROKEE {1785, Nov. 28} 7 Stat., 18, 
Marshall writes.
This stipulation is found in Indian treaties, generally. It was 
introduced into their treaties with Great Britain...
... The Indians perceived in this protection only what was beneficial 
to themselves — an engagement to punish aggressions on them. It 
merely bound the nation to the British crown, as a dependent ally, 
claiming the protection of a powerful friend and neighbor, and 
receiving the advantages of that protection, without involving the 
surrender o f their national character.
This is the true meaning of the stipulation, and is undoubtedly 
the sense in which it was made. Neither the British government, nor 
the Cherokees, ever understood it otherwise.
The same stipulation entered into with the United States, is 
undoubtedly to be construed in the same manner.
Regarding a similar stipulation in the TREATY WITH THE CHEROKEE {1794, 
June 26} 7 Stat., 43. Proclamation, Jan. 21, 1795, Marshall writes, “This relation 
was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful; not 
that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to 
the laws of a master.” In a more general sense Marshall writes.
Worcester V. Georgia, Ibid, 551-552. 
Ibid., 555.
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... [T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weak power 
does not surrender its independence — its right to self government, 
by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak 
state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the 
protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself o f the right 
of government and ceasing to be a state.... At the present day, more 
than one state may be considered as holding its right to self 
government under the guarantee and protection of one or more 
allies.
McLean’s concurrence reiterates this theme.
What is a treaty? The answer is a compact formed between 
two nations or communities having the right of self-government...
By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed themselves 
under the protection of the United States: they have agreed to trade 
with no other people, nor to invoke the protection o f any other 
sovereignty. But such agreements do not divest them o f the right of 
self-government, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or 
compacts.
Thus it is clear that arguments which would use Indian recognition of U.S. 
sovereignty in treaties to deny Indian self-government cannot be maintained.
At least one passage by Marshall draws a direct parallel between Indian 
nations and other nations including those of Europe,
... The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as 
those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and 
sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and
Ibid., 561. 
Ibid.. 581-582
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consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable 
of making treaties. The words “treaty” and “nation” are words of 
our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative 
proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well 
understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have 
applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all 
in the same sense.
The practical ramifications o f Indians tribes as nations in this passage are not clear 
given the contradictions of Indians as “wards” and the pre-eminent title of the 
United States under Johnson v. McIntosh. However, it certainly underscores the 
recognition of Indian nations as separate self-governing entities and makes clear that 
the treaties with them are supposed to be as solemn as those with any other nation.
The occasion for the case, the extension of Georgia laws into Cherokee 
territory leading to the arrest of Samuel Worcester, was won by the Cherokees. The 
majority decision was to release Worcester because the laws of Georgia “can have 
no force” within the Cherokee nation. Thus Jackson’s rationale for inaction was 
thrown out. Despite this setback, removal forces remained implacable. Worcester 
was ordered released, but the court’s order was not immediately enforced due to a 
technical loophole. Though the crisis point had been reached, no one was willing to 
provoke what might have been a civil war. The only alternative was for the
Ibid., 559-560. 
Ibid., 561.
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Cherokees to remove/”* McLean’s concurrence foreshadows the practical outcome 
of the decision, and seems to recognize that it is part of a public policy at odds with 
the demands o f morality.
The exercise o f the power o f self-government by the Indians, 
within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary. This is 
shown by the settled policy of the government, in the extinguishment 
of their title, and especially by the compact with Georgia. It is a 
question, not of abstract right, but o f public policy. I do not mean to 
say, that the same moral rule which should regulate the affairs of 
private life, should not be regarded by communities or nations. But a 
sound public policy does require that the Indian tribes within our 
states should exchange their territories, upon equitable principles, or, 
eventually, consent to become amalgamated in our political 
communities.
The Cherokees began their move to Indian Territory shortly after the decision, 
affirming their continued independence by removing themselves from the 
encroachment of Georgia.
With this ruling, settler imperialism continued apace. The Removal Act had 
authorized removal only of Indians then residing within the limits of a territory or 
state, but McLean’s concurrence and the general understanding promoted by 
Jackson was that they had to remove or be amalgamated whenever they were
See Prucha, Great Father, 212-213. for a short account of the aftermath o f Worcester v. 
Georgia.
Ibid.. 593.
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surrounded. Though the removal treaties guaranteed their land and President Martin 
Van Buren asserted that it was a settled element of U.S. policy to extinguish Indian 
title, remove them west of the Mississippi and “... guarantee to them by the United 
States of their exclusive possession of that country forever, exempt from all 
intrusions by white men...","" no effective law existed to keep settlers from 
continuing to surround Indian nations. The Indian Territory to which so many tribes 
were removed was eventually invaded as well. Originally comprising most o f 
present-day Oklahoma, Kansas and Nebraska, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854"' 
removed these two territories from the Indians and opened the way for their 
admission as states of the union. Though many Indian nations retained reservations 
in these and other states, their ability to do so and retain their government relied 
largely on the size and desirability of their holdings. If the settlers, or those that 
profited from them such as the railroads, wanted a particular piece of land badly 
enough they were almost sure to get it.
The spread of settlers and resultant Indian removal caused the deaths of 
thousands. The 1849 discovery of gold in California brought an influx of settlers 
and miners who wantonly killed the Indians there. According to Thornton,
2" Annual Message. December 3 1838. from Richardson, v 3. p. 1715. 
U.S. Statutes at Large 10:277.
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“Primarily because of the killings, the California Indian population — which some 
scholars say once had been at least 310,000, perhaps over 700,000 — decreased 
almost two-thirds in little more than a single decade; from 100,000 in 1849 to
35.000 in 1860.” Elsewhere, settler violence was prevalent though seldom at the 
same level as California. Tribes that removed to escape the violence or extension of 
state authority fared little better. The Choctaws lost about fifteen percent of their 
population during removal, a comparatively small loss due to their “voluntary” early 
removal. The Creeks and Seminoles lost about fifty percent of their population, 
though the latter was mainly from the war that was required to force them to 
remove. The Cherokees lost about one-third of their population on what came to be 
known as “The Trail o f Tears.” Overall Indian population in the U.S. went from
600.000 in 1800 to 250,000 in 1900, while the number of non-Indians went from 5 
million to over 75 million in the same period, largely through immigration."'' 
Though European diseases took many Indian lives, their spread had started as early 
as the 16'*’ century. Most Indians of the 19'*’ century should have been almost as 
resistant as the Europeans. Even for those that weren’t as resistant, the hardships 
brought on by U.S. expansion would have been a factor. Though some of the
"■ Russell Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History Since 1492, 
(Norman and London: University o f Oklahoma, 1987), 109.
Ibid., 114-115, 118, 133 either directly provides mortality and population figures, or provides 
information from which they are calcidated.
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deaths are related to intertribal warfare, much o f this was the result of tribes being 
forced together as a result of removal. Ultimately, the spread of U.S. settlers must 
be seen as the primary cause for this decimation.
Despite such problems, many of the Indian nations were doing well in their 
new homes. In his First Annual Message on December S'*", 1857, President James 
Buchanan provided clear U.S. recognition of the “civilization” of the Five Tribes.
The tribes of Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Creeks 
settled in the Territory set apart for them west of Arkansas are 
rapidly advancing in education and in all the arts of civilization and 
self-government and we may indulge the agreeable anticipation that 
at no very distant day they will be incorporated into the Union as one 
of the sovereign States.” '*
The U.S. Civil War intervened before this could happen.
Most of the Indian nations were bystanders in the U.S. Civil War, often 
happy to see the country that had persecuted them dissolve in conflict. The Five 
Tribes however all signed treaties with the Confederacy, though this brought about a 
civil war in some. The Creeks and Cherokees in particular had large factions that 
refused to violate their treaties with the United States. The same sentiment was 
present in varying degrees in all the Indian nations, though their cavalier treatment at 
the hands of the United States and the fact that it appeared they had been deserted
Richardson, v 4, p 2991.
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by the U.S. at the beginning of the war served to break down this resistance. 
Among the many reasons for the actions of the Five Tribes, it is clear that national 
sovereignty was an issue. The Choctaws made this quite explicit,
...George Hudson, principal chief of the Choctaw Nation, acting in 
accordance with the will of the National Council, which had met four 
days before, publicly declared the Choctaw Nation was “free and 
independent
The Osages, Senecas, Shawnees and Quapaws also signed treaties with the 
Confederates, though not on as favorable terms as the Five Tribes.
Especially notable was the fact that under these treaties a Choctaw- 
Chickasaw, a Creek-Seminole, and a Cherokee delegate sat in the 
Confederate Congress throughout the war — a prospect held out to 
the Indians ever since the Delaware treaty in 1778, but never 
implemented by the United States."®
Outside Indian Territory there was a great deal of turmoil. As Debo 
describes it.
There was no consistent pattern. As the military forces were 
withdrawn for fighting the great battles in the East, the Indians in 
some places had a breathing space; in others they seized the 
opportunity of going on the war path; in still others they were the 
victims of local Indian-haters..."’
Annie Heloise Abel. The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, (Cleveland: Arthur 
H. Clark, 1915; reprint, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska, 1992), 156. This work 
also provides a detailed examination of other factors at work within the tribes.
Angie Debo, A History o f  the Indians o f  the United States, The Civilization o f the American 
Indian Series vol. 106, (Norman and London: University o f  Oklahoma, 1970), 172.
"'Ib id.. 184.
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The Santee-Sioux (Dakota) in particular, began one of the most bloody uprisings in 
history. Angered by settler incursion, delay in treaty-guaranteed annuity payments 
and other grievances they staged raids that killed over 800 settlers."* This level of 
violence fueled the hatreds of settlers in all parts o f the country, who had everything 
to gain and little to lose from war with local Indians. The prime example of this was 
in Colorado.
Governor John Evans, rebuffed in efforts to persuade the Cheyennes 
and Arapahos to exchange their hunting grounds for a reservation, 
sensed that what could not be gained by diplomacy might fall as a 
prize ofw ar..."^
The war was pursued despite the fact that most of the Indians sued for peace 
immediately. Black Kettle and his band had met with Governor Evans and Colonel 
Chivington, head of the territory’s military, to arrange peace. They also sought 
protection as prisoners of war at a nearby fort. A month later, after raising 
additional troops for the purpose, Chivington and his territorial troops attacked 
Black Kettle’s band. They killed hundreds, primarily women and children, 
mutilating their corpses. The attack was carried out while an American flag and a 
white flag flew over the Cheyenne camp. On their triumphant return to Denver, the
For an account o f this conflict see Robert M. Utley and Wolcombe E. Washburn, Indian Wars. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 202-204. This book is also a very good overall history o f the 
Indian wars in the U.S.
Ibid., 206.
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territorial troops proudly displayed Indian scalps at a local theater/^® This outrage 
resulted in open war with the Cheyenne, Arapaho and Sioux nations and caused 
tension among all the tribes.
The Sand Creek Massacre also caused a stir of revulsion among many 
Whites, particularly those in the east near the seat of federal power. With the end of 
the Civil War and the election of a new president, the Sand Creek Massacre helped 
set the stage for a change in Federal Indian policy.
A week before his inauguration in 1869, President-elect 
Grant told a newspaper reporter that the new administration planned 
a fresh and fair Indian policy. “All Indians disposed to peace will find 
the new policy a peace policy,” said Grant. For Indians undisposed 
to peace, he added a caveat drowned in the public acclaim for the 
Peace Policy, there would be “a sharp and severe war policy.” On 
their reservations the Indians would be educated. Christianized, 
taught to support themselves by farming, given rations, clothing, and 
other goods to ease the transition. There too they would be safe 
from the Army. But if any felt the pull of old habits and strayed off 
the reservation, they could expect to be treated as hostiles.
Most of the actual administration of Indians on reservations was turned over 
to religious groups. Grant explains his reasons for turning to religious groups in his 
First Annual Message of December 6*^ , 1869,
See Ibid., 207., Piucha, Great Father, 459 and Stan Hoig, The Sand Creek Massacre, (Norman: 
University o f Oklahoma, 1961).
Utley and Wolcombe, 226-227.
71
From the foundation of the Government to the present the 
management of the original inhabitants of this continent—the Indians- 
-has been a subject o f embarrassment and expense, and has been 
attended with continuous robberies, murders, and wars. From my 
own experience upon the frontiers and in Indian countries, I do not 
hold either legislation or the conduct of the whites who come most in 
contact with the Indian blameless for these hostilities. The past, 
however, can not be undone, and the question must be met as we 
now find it. I have attempted a new policy toward these wards of the 
nation (they can not be regarded in any other light than as wards), 
with fair results so far as tried, and which I hope will be attended 
ultimately with great success. The Society of Friends is well known 
as having succeeded in living in peace with the Indians in the early 
settlement of Pennsylvania, while their white neighbors of other sects 
in other sections were constantly embroiled. They are also known for 
their opposition to all strife, violence, and war, and are generally 
noted for their strict integrity and fair dealings. These considerations 
induced me to give the management of a few reservations of Indians 
to them and to throw the burden of the selection of agents upon the 
society itself...'^
As Prucha put it, “The peace policy might just as properly have been labeled the 
religious policy.” '^  Reservation Indians, definitely now in the status o f wards, were 
to be given to the Christians — eventually divided up by sect among various 
Christian groups. This alliance of church and state would continue as an important 
element of Indian policy into this century. “For superintendents and Indian agents 
not on the reservations, officers of the Army were selected.” These officers.
James Richardson, Ibid.. vol. 6, 3992-3. 
Prucha, Great Father. 482.
James Richardson, Ibid., 3993.
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Christian and Army, would be working speedily within the old reservation system, 
to avert tragedy. As President Grant put it.
The building o f railroads, and the access thereby given to all 
the agricultural and mineral regions of the country, is rapidly bringing 
civilized settlements into contact with all the tribes o f Indians. No 
matter what ought to be the relations between such settlements and 
the aborigines, the fact is they do not harmonize well, and one or the 
other has to give way in the end. A system which looks to the 
extinction of a race is too horrible for a nation to adopt without 
entailing upon itself the wrath of all Christendom and engendering in 
the citizen a disregard for human life and the rights of others, 
dangerous to society. I see no substitute for such a system, except in 
placing all the Indians on large reservations, as rapidly as it can be 
done, and giving them absolute protection there. As soon as they are 
fitted for it they should be induced to take their lands in severalty and 
to set up Territorial governments for their own protection.'^
Emergent elements of this policy included the allotment of lands in severalty and the 
idea of the Natives banding together in Territorial governments for their own 
“protection.” The severalty issue would slowly develop into the allotment policy 
that would typify the end of the nineteenth century. Indian land ownership had 
always been “in common.” But private ownership was a bulwark of the U.S. 
system. In the views of non-Indian policymakers, the private ownership of land was 
clearly better, offering incentives to work that did not exist in the communal system 
of the Indians. Grant’s musings about Indian territorial governments, just like prior
125 Ibid.
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and subsequent musings about Indian states, never came to pass. His linking of such 
territorial governments to their protection, seems to indicate that only U.S. citizens 
could expect real protection against the depredations of other U.S. citizens, though 
of course Grant could not state this openly. Treaties still supposedly guaranteed 
protection for the remaining Indians.
The military side of the peace policy was in the hands o f William Tecumseh 
Sherman and Phillip Henry Sheridan who “ ... believed in total war against the entire 
enemy population...”.*^® Their field commanders were former Civil War generals 
like George A. Custer, now returned to their permanent ranks o f colonel or lower. 
They were “spoiling for action — of the kind that would bring fame and permanent 
promotion to general.” *^  ^ Sherman himself had said in 1866, “God only knows 
when, and I do not see how, we can make a decent excuse for an Indian war.”*^^
The peace policy was an effective carrot-and-stick formulation that did not 
change the general thrust of dispossession and concentration, it merely refined it. 
Outraged Whites were mollified by the seeming change as well as some clear 
benefits under the peace policy. The new Indian agents and functionaries were 
churchmen who were usually not as corrupt as their predecessors. Goods and
Utley and Wolcombe, 210. 
‘-'Ibid., 211.
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monies appropriated for Indian nations reached their intended destinations for a 
time, until corruption again won out. The Federal Army’s direct hand in the 
dispossession meant that most of the killing of Indians would usually take place in 
open warfare rather than in brutal murders and massacres that had characterized the 
actions of civilians and the territorial militias. Unfortunately, the no-compromise 
nature of the peace policy meant that the warfare would be almost constant until the 
end of the 1880’s.
As the peace policy was implemented, at least some tribes were considered 
well advanced in civilization by U.S. officials. In the 1869 case United States v. 
Lucero, P u e b l o  Indians were lauded above even American citizens.
This court has known the conduct and habits of these Indians for 
eighteen or twenty years, and we say, without fear of successful 
contradiction, that you may pick out one thousand of the best 
Americans in New Mexico, and one thousand of the best Mexicans in 
New Mexico, and one thousand of the worst Pueblo Indians, and 
there will be found less, vastly less, murder, robbery, theft, or other 
crimes among the thousand worst Pueblos than among the thousand 
best Mexicans or Americans in New Mexico.
Using this reasoning the court forbade interference with the Pueblo government, 
reasoning which the U.S. Supreme Court would uphold in the 1876 case United
129 See Prucha. Great Father, 525 for an account of the retirni to corruption. 
1 N.M. 422.
1N.M 441.
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States V. Joseph}^^ Yet, less than forty years later the Supreme Court would 
reverse itself in United States v. Sandoval.
The people o f the pueblos, although sedentary rather than 
nomadic in their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, are 
nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government.
Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to 
primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and 
fetichism, and chiefly governed according to the crude customs 
inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, 
uninformed, and inferior people.
Whatever the status o f the various Indian nations, the peace policy would 
see their concentration onto reservations within two decades. The undermanned 
Federal Army would be aided in its efforts by white hunters and settlers who killed 
the game and turned the grasslands into farms. With little or no game to hunt, the 
tribes were forced to accept reservations. This pattern had already served a role in 
the removal of the eastern tribes. Though these tribes, particularly the Five Tribes, 
practiced a significant amount of agriculture, their food supply was supplemented by 
increased hunting in bad-harvest years. Game animals were an absolutely essential 
backup food supply in a region and era where long-term food storage was
United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), 617. 
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), 39.
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problematic. 134
Tribes directly dependent on game were even more vulnerable to the efifects 
o f White over-hunting. This included most of the Plains tribes, which depended on 
buffalo (the common name for all varieties o f the North American Bison). As 
usual, private profit was the main motive for depriving the Indians; and equally as 
usual, the Federal Government would not stop the depredation. Enterprising Whites 
had discovered how to tan buffalo hides to produce fine leather. Within a few years 
the Great Plains stank fi-om the smell of putrefying buffalo carcasses, as hide hunters 
killed the animals by the millions; skinned them and left the remains to rot. Between 
1870 and 1890, as the peace policy worked to force the plains tribes onto 
reservations, the buffalo population dropped from 14,000,000 to a little over a 
1 0 0 0 . When buffalo were wiped out on White land, the hunters moved onto lands 
reserved for Indian hunting and even onto lands owned by the Indians. Such 
hunters asked Colonel Dodge what he would do if they moved onto Indian hunting 
grounds in Texas.
Richard Wliite, The Roots o f  Dependency: Subsistence, Environment and Social Change 
Among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Mavajos, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska. 
1983), 29-33. Provides an account o f the secondary subsistence pattern o f Choctaws as well as 
the settler role in destroying this food supply.
Interestingly, it was the introduction o f horses and guns by Europeans that caused these tribes to 
become so dependent on the buffalo.
Thornton, Table 3-1 on page 52 gives buffalo population figiues.
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“Boys,” said the Colonel, “if I were a buffalo hunter, I would 
hunt where the buffalo are.”
So much for the protection the Indians could expect in 
preserving their hunting grounds. Dodge’s slightly veiled proposal to 
the hide men to move across into the Panhandle was a deliberate 
invitation to trouble with the Indians, and he was not so naïve as not 
to have known it. However, he was not speaking carelessly and 
expressing only his own views; Sherman, Sheridan, and other (but 
not all) Army officers had taken the position that the quickest way to 
tame the roving Indians and keep them on the reservations would be 
to hurry up the extermination of the buffalo.
There were many reasons to stop the killing but.
The army, in fact, was instrumental in preventing any halt to 
the slaughter. Many Texans had become appalled at what was called 
an insane butchery of God’s creatures, and a bill was introduced in 
the state legislature to halt all such hunting. This bill was strongly 
opposed by leather lobbies and ranching interests — for the western 
cowmen saw the bison as useless and an obstacle — but it would 
have probably been enacted, had not Sheridan, with Sherman’s 
approval, made a special trip to Austin to address the legislature. 
Sheridan argued vehemently that to oppose the killing of the buffalo 
was to oppose the advance of civilization. The alliance of ranchers, 
eastern leather-makers, soldiers, and Indian-haters won over the 
politicians. The bill was killed and never resurrected.
The Plains tribes joined the previously “pacified” tribes on reservations as 
their way o f life was destroyed. The peace policy recognized only two types of
Ralph K. Andrist. The Long Death: The Last Days o f  the Plains Indian, (New York: Collier 
Books, 1969; New Collier Books. 1993), 183.
T.R. Felirenbach. Comanches: The Destruction o f  a People, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
1974; New York: Da Capo, 1994). 525.
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Indians, the hostile and the pacified; those that had not been forced onto 
reservations yet and those that had already been forced onto them. Such a clear 
distinction admitted of little negotiation. When carried to its conclusion all Indian 
tribes would be subjugated. This attitude spread to all parts of the Federal 
Government. After 1871 Congress voted to make no more treaties with Indian 
tribes.'"^ The general rationale for this is laid out in Indian Affairs Commisioner Ely 
S. Parker’s annual report of 1869.
It has become a matter of serious import whether the treaty system in 
use ought longer to be continued. In my judgment it should not. A 
treaty involves the idea of a compact between two or more sovereign 
powers, each possessing sufficient authority and force to compel a 
compliance with the obligations incurred. The Indian tribes of the 
United States are not sovereign nations, capable of making treaties, 
as none of them have an organized government of such inherent 
strength as would secure a faithful obedience of its people in the 
observance of compacts of this character. They are held to be wards 
of the government, and the only title the law concedes to them to the 
lands they occupy or claim is a mere possessory one. ... Many good 
men looking at this matter only from a Christian point of view, will 
perhaps say that the poor Indian has been greatly wronged and ill 
treated; that this whole country was once his, of which he has been
despoiled.............but the stem letter of the law admits of no such
conclusion...
Though Parker seems to recognize the inherent injustice of the position, as many
The end o f treaty making came in an appropriations bill rider, stating that tribes were no longer 
tlie sort of entities tliat tlie U.S. could contract with by treaty. It did, however, point out that 
prior treaties were binding. U.S. Statutes at Large, 16:566.
Prucha, Documents o f  U.S. Indian Policy, 134-135.
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before him, he still asserts that it is the law. The relation of superior to inferior is 
now clear after having built up over decades. Indians are wards, if only because of 
the action of the Federal Government. Most ironically, Parker claims that one 
cannot make a treaty with Indians because their government cannot compel 
obedience. He seems unaware of the history of treaty breaking engaged in by his 
own people.
For their part, the courts slowly turn away from Indian sovereignty. McLean 
cites the commerce clause and the treaties to this end in 1855.
A question has been suggested whether the Cherokee people 
should be considered and treated as a foreign state or territory. The 
fact that they are under the constitution of the Union, and subject to 
acts of congress regulating trade, is sufiBcient to answer this 
suggestion. They are not only within our jurisdiction, but the faith of 
the nation is pledged for their protection.^'*'
In 1870, District Judge Caldwell cites McLean and uses the long history of U.S. 
arrogation of the right to try cases that involve U.S. citizens in disputes with 
Indians, to strike down parts of a treaty and explicitly deny Indian sovereignty.
Ever since the organization of this court it has sat here 
administering and enforcing the laws of the United States over the 
Indian country. Indians are taken from that country, brought here for 
trial, and are tried and punished — in some instances capitally. They 
are prohibited from trafficking in certain articles. ... They are without
M l Mackeyv. Coxe, 18 How. 100 (1855).
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a single attribute that marks a sovereign and independent people/'*^
Despite such pronouncements, Indian self-governance continued on the 
reservations. On most reservations, the Christian groups assigned to administer 
Federal policy did not control the government. They proselytized, educated and 
tried to push the tribes that were not already doing so into governing themselves 
along the same lines as the United States, but they seldom dictated. Various Federal 
laws applied to Indian people, but they were mainly ones that pertained to 
interaction with non-Indians. The killing of Spotted Tail by Crow Dog would 
change all that. Spotted Tail was a peaceful Brûlé Sioux chief who had maintained 
close and friendly relations with the United States. The killing was handled 
traditionally and the matter was closed from standpoint o f the tribe, but Whites 
desired vengeance for the death of their f r i e n d . L i k e  Worcester v. Georgia, the 
1883 case of ex Parte Crow Dog was a nominal victory for the Native nation. 
Because it was an Indian on Indian crime in Indian country, the court ruled that no 
relevant U.S. law was broken by the killing. However, it explicitly opened the way 
for such laws.
... The pledge to secure to these people, with whom the United 
States was contracting as a distinct political body, an orderly form of
United States V. Tobacco. 28 Fed. Cas.. 195 (1870), 196-197.
Vine Deioria, Jr. and Clifford Lytle, American Indians American Justice, (Austin; University of 
Texas, 1983), 168-169 gives a somewhat more detailed account.
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government, by appropriate legislation thereafter to be framed and 
enacted, necessarily implies, having regard to ail the circumstances 
attending the transaction, that among the arts of civilized life, which 
it was the very purpose of all these arrangements to introduce and 
naturalize among them, was the highest of all, self-government, the 
regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the 
maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the 
administration of their own laws and customs. They were 
nevertheless to be subject to the laws of the United States, not in the 
sense of citizens, but, as they had always been, as wards subject to a 
guardian; not as individuals, constituted members of the political 
community of the United States, with a voice in the selection of 
representatives and the framing of laws, but as a dependent 
community who were in a state o f pupilage, advancing from the 
condition of a savage tribe to that of a people who, through the 
discipline of labor and by education, it was hoped might become a 
self-supporting and self-governing society.
The U.S. guardian could thus enact laws to cover such actions and it did. The
Major Crimes Act*"*^  of 1885, covered a variety of acts committed by Indians against
Indians within Indian country.
This legislation was upheld in United States v. Kagama in 1886.
Following the policy of the European governments in the 
discovery of America towards the Indians who were found here, the 
colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States 
since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil 
over which they hunted and established occasional villages. But they 
asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes 
were forbidden to sell or to transfer it to other nations or peoples
ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), 568-569. 
U.S. Statutes at Large. 23:385.
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without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe 
wished to dispose of its land, or any part o f it, or the State or the 
United States wished to purchase it, a treaty was the only mode in 
which it could be done. The United States recognized no right in 
private persons, or in other nations, to make purchase by treaty or 
otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relations are equally 
difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as 
having a semi-independent position when they preserve their tribal 
relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full 
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of 
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought 
under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they 
resided...
It seems to us that this (extension of U.S. law into Indian 
country) is within the competency o f Congress. These Indian tribes 
are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the 
United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for 
their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and 
receive from them no protection. Because of local ill feeling, the 
people of the States are often their deadliest enemies. From their very 
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of 
the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has 
been promised, there arises a duty o f protection, and with it the 
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by 
Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen. ..
The power of the General Government over these remnants 
o f a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is 
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among 
whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never 
has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within 
the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never 
been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws over all the
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tribes.
Miller’s decision rests on two main points, that the doctrine of discovery 
assumes a certain paramountcy which necessarily diminished Indian sovereignty 
from the beginning and that the course of events had forced the Indian nations into 
dependent roles that required guardianship. The role o f guardianship presumes the 
power and the Federal Government had always been supreme under the doctrine of 
discovery anyway, so they are the ones wielding the power.
The presumption of power over Indians within their reservation was a 
watershed. Relations between the U.S. and Indian nations had progressed from a 
relationship between sovereigns to a relationship between a stronger sovereign and a 
weaker one over whom the former exercised protection, and now to a relationship 
between a sovereign and a people over whom they exercised complete authority as 
ward. Indian nations had not voluntarily ended their governments and asked to be 
amalgamated with the United States. Far from it, they had resisted at every step. 
Now they would be forced to understand the benefits o f the American form of 
democratic government. The Federal Government would dictate internal policies to 
the Indian nations, supposedly for their benefit. The greatest benefit would be 
absorption into the United States, but the Indian practice of common ownership of 
land stood in the way.
M6 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), 381-385.
84
Despite the fact that common ownership seemed to work for most Indian 
people of the time, it was in direct opposition to the free-market, private enterprise, 
profit motivated American system. Senator Henry Dawes sought to justify 
allotment by speaking of his recent examination trip among the Cherokees;
There was not a pauper in that nation, and the nation did not owe a 
dollar. It built its own capitol, in which we had this examination, and 
it built its schools and its hospitals. Yet the defect of the system was 
apparent. They have gone as far as they can go, because they own 
their land in common. It is Henry Georges’s system, and under that 
there is no enterprise to make your home any better than that of your 
neighbors. There is no selfishness, which is at the bottom of 
civilization. Till this people will consent to give up their lands, and 
divide them among their own citizens so that each can own the land 
he cultivates, they will not make much more progress.
Amazingly, just a year later, the Board of Indian Commissioners would use a 
contradiction of this argument as a further argument for allotment.
At present the rich Indians who cultivate tribal lands pay no 
rent to the poorer and more unfortunate of their race, although they 
are equal owners of the soil. The rich men have too large 
homesteads and control many times more than their share of land. ...
Already the rich and choice lands are appropriated by those most 
enterprising and self seeking.
Extracted from the Board o f Indian Commissioners, Annual Report, 1885, 90-91, citation 
contained in Angie Debo, And Still the Waters Run: The Betrayal o f  the Five Civilized Tribes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University, 1940; reprint Norman and London: University o f Oklahoma, 
1989), 21-22.
Extracted from tlie Board o f Indian Commissioners, Annual Report, 1886. House Executive 
Document no. I 49* Cong., sess.. serial 2467, 81-82, 86-88 citation contained in Prucha, 
Documents o f  U.S. Indian Policy, 169-170.
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It didn’t matter whether their enterprise was retarded by common ownership of 
land, or they had managed to use the system to promote entrepreneurial free 
enterprise. Contradictory as the arguments were, common ownership o f land had to
go.
The Board also reiterated the theme of the “absurdity” o f governments 
within governments to justify the forced absorption of the tribes.
While I greatly prefer that these people should voluntarily change 
their form of government, yet it is perfectly plain to my mind that the 
treaties never contemplated the un-American and absurd idea o f a 
separate nationality in our midst... These Indians have no right to 
obstruct civilization and commerce and set up an exclusive claim to 
self-government, establishing a government within a government... I 
repeat, to maintain any such view is to acknowledge a foreign 
sovereignty, with the right of eminent domain, upon American soil — 
a theory utterly repugnant to the spirit and genius o f our laws and 
wholly unwarranted by the Constitution of the United States."^
Though many Whites supported allotment and argued for it in various ways, 
their motives were occasionally called into question. The minority report o f the 
House Indian Affairs Commission concerning an early version o f the allotment bill 
was quite clear on the motives.
The real aim of this bill is to get at the Indian lands and open them up 
for settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit o f the Indian 
are but the pretext to get at his lands and occupy them... . If this
149 Ibid.. 171.
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were done in the name of greed it would be bad enough; but to do it 
in the name of humanity, and under the cloak of an ardent desire to 
promote the Indian’s welfare by making him like ourselves, whether 
he will or not, is infinitely worse.
These words, seemingly prophetic, were more nearly hindsight. History to 
this time had certainly shown a greed for Indian land, but more importantly Native 
Americans had already been deprived of their lands under allotment. Tribal 
remnants had received allotments going back at least to the 1830’s, and their 
experiences had often been horrific. In 1888 Grover Cleveland wrote to Congress 
about one of these cases. Of more than 200 New York Indians with allotments in 
Kansas, he said.
From death and the hostility o f the settlers, who were drawn 
in that direction by the fertility of the soil and other advantages, all of 
the Indians gradually relinquished their selections, until of the Indians 
who had removed thither from the State of New York only thirty- 
two remained in 1860. ...
The files of the Indian Office show abundant proof that they 
did not voluntarily relinquish their occupation.
The proof thus referred to is indeed abundant, and is found in 
official reports and affidavits made as late as the year 1859. By these 
it appears that during that year, in repeated instances, Indian men and 
widows of deceased Indians were driven from their homes by the 
threats of armed men; that in one case at least the habitation of an 
Indian woman was burned, and that the kind of outrages were 
resorted to which too often follow the cupidity of whites and the 
possession of fertile lands by defenseless and unprotected Indians. ...
H. Rept. No. 1576, May 28, 1880, 46* Cong., 2"** sess., 10. As quoted by Cohen, 209.
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[quoting an Indian agent] These Indians have been driven off 
their land and claims upon the New York tract by the whites, and 
they are now very much scattered and many o f them are very 
destitute.
It was found in 1860 that of all the Indians who had prior to 
that date selected and occupied part o f these lands but thirty-two 
remained, and it seems to have been deemed but justice to them to 
confirm their selections by some kind of governmental grant or 
declaration, though it does not appear that any of them had been able 
to maintain actual possession of all their selected lands against white 
intrusion. ...
In 1861 and 1862 mention was made by the agents of the 
destitute condition of these Indians and of their being deprived of 
their lands, and in these years petitions were presented in their behalf 
asking that justice be done them on account of the failure of the 
Government to provide them with homes.
In the meantime, and in December, 1860, the remainder o f 
the reserve not allotted to the thirty-two survivors was thrown open 
to settlement by Executive proclamation. Of course this was 
followed by increased conflict between the settlers and the Indians. It 
is presumed that it became dangerous for those to whom lands had 
been allotted to attempt to gain possession of them. On the 4th day 
of December, 1865, Agent Snow returned twenty-seven of the 
certificates of allotment which had not been delivered, and wrote as 
follows to the Indian Bureau;
A few of these Indians were at one time put in possession of 
their lands. They were driven off by the whites; one Indian was 
killed, others wounded, and their houses burned. White men at this 
time have possession of these lands, and have valuable improvements 
on them. The Indians are deterred even asking for possession. I 
would earnestly ask, as agent for these wronged and destitute people, 
that some measure be adopted by the Government to give these 
Indians their rights. ...
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... There is great necessity that some relief should be afforded 
to them by legislation o f Congress, authorizing the issue o f patents to 
the allottees or giving them power to sell and convey.
In this way they will be enabled to realize something from the 
land, and the occupants can secure titles for their homes. ...
The occupancy upon these lands of the settlers seeking relief, 
and of their grantors, is based upon wrong, violence, and oppression.
A continuation of the wrongful exclusion of these Indians from their 
lands should not inure to the benefit of the wrongdoers.
It is interesting to note that this case had been documented for more than 28 years 
by the time Grover Cleveland asked for action. It might never have been addressed 
had it not been for the passage o f the General Allotment Act. To have Indians 
destitute from past allotments on hand when the remaining Indians were to be 
accorded the same treatment was all too embarrassing. As it was, this case and 
others provide significant foreshadowing of the events that would occur under the 
General Allotment Act.
The General Allotment Act'^^ or “Dawes Act” was passed in 1887, only two 
years after Congress extended its criminal jurisdiction over Indian country. This act 
authorized the breakup of reservations into individually owned plots of land. 
Indians accepting allotments and adopting “the habits of civilized life” would 
automatically be made citizens of the United States. The end result was supposed to
James Richardson, ed., vol. 7, pp 5239-5243. 
U.S. Statutes at Large. 24:388.
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be the dissolution of the tribes. Though the allotments were fairly large, even when 
parceled out to every tribal member it did not take all the holdings of the tribe to 
furnish the plots. This meant that there was a surplus. As with the 1860 allotment, 
it was a surplus that would be given to Whites.
Several tribes, most notably the Five Tribes, were exempted from the 
General Allotment Act for a variety of reasons. They were politically astute and 
able to lobby on their own behalf; they had relatively successful governments with 
constitutions; they had prosperous citizens; and some, like the Choctaw, had treaties 
that seemed to preclude the act.‘^ "’ They were under constant pressure to accept 
allotment, but consistently refused. Though the refusal was partially based on the 
importance of common ownership of land, it was as much a matter of citizenship. 
An illustration of this is the Choctaw reaction to the Oklahoma Organic Act of 
1890^ "^* which, among other things, allowed Indians in Indian Territory to apply for 
U.S. citizenship without forfeiting tribal rights.
The Choctaws were greatly aroused over this attempt to 
undermine their government, and strong efforts were made to 
prevent their citizens from taking the oath of allegiance to the United 
States. When the Council met, a law was passed disqualifying such 
apostates from voting, holding ofiSce, or serving on the jury. The
153 TREATY WITH THE CHOCTAW {1830, Sept. 27} 7 Stat., 333. Proclamaüon, Feb. 24, 1831. 
Article 4 expressly forbids allotment. For text, see Appendix D , number 5.
U.S. Statutes at Large, 26:81.
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United States had expected that large numbers would apply for 
citizenship, but almost the only applications came from a few who 
had violated Choctaw law and wished to escape the jurisdiction of 
the tribal courts.
The main effect of the Oklahoma Organic Act was to further whittle down 
the Indian Territory. The Territory of Oklahoma was created out of that portion of 
Indian Territory not owned by the Five Tribes. Thus by the end of 1890, Indian 
Territory had been reduced to the holdings of the Five Tribes. The Five Tribes 
steadfastly maintained their treaty rights in the face of growing pressure for 
allotment. By 1894, the Dawes Commission was using the oldest argument for the 
allotment of Five Tribes land.
The resources of the Territory itself have been developed to such a 
degree and are of such immense and tempting value that they are 
attracting to it an irresistible pressure from enterprising citizens. The 
executory conditions contained in the treaties have become 
impossible of execution. It is no longer possible for the United 
States to keep its citizens out of Indian Territory.
157Allotment was forced on the Five Tribes by the Curtis Act of 1898 
Possibly fearing the strength and resilience of the Five Tribes governments, the U.S. 
Government undertook specific legislation to abolish them. '"Negotiations" arrived
Angie Debo, The Rise and Fall o f  the Choctaw Republic, The Civilization o f the American 
Indian Series vol. 6, (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma, 1961), 184.
From Senate Miscellaneous Document no 24, 53"* Cong., 3""* sess., serial 3281, pp 8-12 as 
quoted by Prucha, Documents o f  U.S. Indian Policy, 191.
U.S. Statutes at Large, 30:495.
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at a target date of March 4^, 1906 for the abolition of tribal government, though in 
1910 Indian Affairs Commissioner Leupp described the process more correctly,
... [B]y successive acts of Congress the Five Civilized Tribes were 
shorn of their governmental functions; their courts were abolished 
and the United States Courts established; their chief executive 
officers were made subject to removal by the President, who was 
authorized to fill by appointment the vacancies thus created; 
provision was made for the supersession of their tribal schools by a 
public school system maintained by general taxation; their tribal taxes 
were abolished; the sale of their public buildings and lands was 
ordered; their legislatures were forbidden to remain in session more 
than thirty days in any one year; and every legislative act, ordinance 
and resolution was declared invalid unless it received the approval of 
the President. The only present shadow or fiction o f the survival of 
the tribes as tribes is their grudging recognition till all their property 
or proceeds thereof, can be distributed among individual members.
Despite the U.S. government’s efforts, the Five Tribes’ governments continued in 
existence because of the protracted length of the allotment process. It was much 
easier to deal with the Indians through their own governmental mechanisms. 
Besides, there was little risk. If anything important came up the U.S. government 
could always force the tribal government to act as a rubber-stamp, or impose a veto.
As allotment proceeded, there was agitation to unite Oklahoma Territory 
and Indian Territory to form one state. In 1905, with abolition of their governments
Francis E. Leupp, The Indian and His Problem (IP 1910), 336-337. As quoted in Cohen, 429- 
430.
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and amalgamation into a non-Indian state imminent, representatives of the Five 
Tribes attempted to form a separate state of the union to maintain some element of 
self-government. Local conventions were held to elect delegates to a constitutional 
convention. The constitution was drafted, ratified and sent to the U.S. Congress.
The whole movement was a most expressive demonstration 
o f the political vitality that still existed in the Indian citizenship. The 
white residents had been invited to participate, but they took little 
interest, and the press and public sentiment seemed to be generally 
hostile. The account of any of the local conventions with its tribal 
leaders in attendance, its debates in English and the local Indian 
language, and its smoothly running parliamentary procedure is 
strongly reminiscent of the great days of tribal politics...
Despite historical recognition of their fitness for statehood, the U.S. Congress did 
not consider the Five Tribes’ request. Instead, in 1906, the Enabling Act^^° united 
the territories and opened the way for Oklahoma’s statehood, which finally occurred 
on November 16^\ 1907. President Theodore Roosevelt, welcoming Oklahoma into 
the union in his 7^ Annual Message of December 3"* 1907 sought to reassure the 
Indian people, “Oklahoma has become a State, standing on a full equality with her 
elder sisters, and her future is assured by her great natural resources. The duty of the 
National Government to guard the personal and property rights o f the Indians within
Ddoo, A nd Still the Waters Run, 163-164.
U.S. Statutes at Large. 34:267, as amended 34:1286.
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her borders remains of course unchanged.’.161
Despite Roosevelt’s assurances the Indian people were devastated by 
allotment, particularly in the new state of Oklahoma. Whole books have been 
devoted to the topic so a lengthy exposition of its effects is unnecessary for the 
present work. The first and one of the best books on allotment is Angie Debo’s And  
Still the Waters R i m As described there and elsewhere, allotment was a lengthy 
process that began with the compilation of a census roll generally referred to as the 
“final roll” for that tribe. Apocalyptic as that sounded, it is not surprising that many 
people resisted inclusion on the roll. To accept allotment was to accept the final 
repudiation of solemn treaties; to accept the loss of your nation. In the end virtually 
all accepted allotment because it was the only way to keep any land. But the land 
they retained would not be theirs for long. Allotment was implemented by 
appointed officials who, almost to a man, held stock in land speculation companies. 
Dozens of schemes were used by Whites to gain control first of “surplus” land and 
then of the land and money of individual Indians. Rennard Strickland provided a 
short summary of such schemes.
We could not possibly examine in detail the entire process of the
seizure. A few of the more common devices were:
Richardson, vol. 10, p. 7438. 
Reference in footnote 147 on page 85.
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1. Fraudulent deeds, approved by courts of law, signed by other 
than the owner of the land;
2. Purchase prices far below market or actual appraised value of the 
land, again approved by courts of law;
3. Payments of bribes for court approval of fraudulent land sales;
4. Excessive administration and guardianship fees;
5. Embezzlement of Indian money and personal expenditure of trust 
funds for the benefit of the trustee;
6. False heirship claims or destruction of Indian wills; and
7. Gifts to charities or individual citizens of Indian assets without 
knowledge or approval of the Indian.*®^
During the decades of allotment first one then another faction would prevail in the 
U.S. Congress. Legislation swung the spectrum from protecting Indian property to 
facilitating its acquisition by whites. Even the protective legislation wasn’t of much 
help. White entrepreneurs were often able to take advantage of it.
Perhaps the clearest statement of the practical effect of allotment is an oft- 
quoted statistic produced by the U.S. Government when debating an end to 
allotment. According to the Government, Indian landholdings shrank from 
138,000,000 acres before allotment to only 48,000,000 when allotment was
Rennard Strickland, "Genocide-At-Law: An Historical and Contemporary View of the Native 
American Experience," 34 U. Ks. L. Rev. 733.
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ended/®'^ Bad as that sounded, the U.S. Government admitted that it was worse. 
The statistics were
... misleading for of the remaining 48,000,000 acres, more than 
20,000 acres are contained within areas which for special reasons 
have been exempted from the allotment law; whereas the land loss is 
chargeable exclusively against the allotment system.
Furthermore, that part of the allotted land which has been lost 
is the most valuable part. Of the residual lands, taking all the Indian- 
owned lands into account, nearly one half, or nearly 20,000,000 
acres, are desert or semidesert...
... For about 100,000 Indians the divestment has been 
absolute. They are totally landless as a result of allotment.
... Through the allotment system, more than 80 percent of 
the land value belonging to all the Indians in 1887 has been taken 
away from them; more than 85 percent of the land value o f allotted 
Indians has been taken away.
In Oklahoma, the situation was perhaps the worst. Oklahoma Indians land holdings 
dropped from 20 million acres to 3 million acres under a l l o t m e n t . A s  past 
experience had indicated and the minority opinion of Congress had prophesied, 
allotment turned out to be little more than a way of taking land away from the
165
Hearings, Committee on Indian Affairs, 73"^  Cong., 2"*^  sess., on H.R. 7902, p 15-18. Extracted 
from citation by Cohen, 216. Various authors have quoted this as coming from William 
Bropliie and Sophie Aberle, The Indian: Am erica’s Unfinished Business, (Norman, University 
of Okilalioma, 1966), 20, though Brophy and Aberle cited Cohen.
Ibid.
Remarks on tlie Indian Reorganization Act by Edgar Howard o f  Nebraska, Congressional 
Record, June 15, 1934, vol. 78, part 11, 73"* Cong., 2"“* sess., p 11726. As cited by Carter Blue 
Clark, “Tlte New Deal for Indians,” Between Two Worlds, ed. by Arell Morgan Gibson, The 
Oklalioma Series vol. 22, (Oklaltoma Historical Society, 1986), 73.
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Indians. 167
Many Indian nations went to court for relief from allotment. The most 
important decision resulting from these cases is the 1903 Supreme Court decision in 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock}^^ The Kiowa’s had attempted to protect their lands in the 
1867 Treaty o f Medicine Lodge. Article 12 of that treaty read.
No treaty for the cession of any portion or part o f the 
reservation herein described, which may be held in common, shall be 
of any validity or force as against the said Indians, unless executed 
and signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians 
occupying the same, and no cession by the tribe shall be understood 
or construed in such manner as to deprive, without his consent, any 
individual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract o f land 
selected by him as provided in Article 3 of this treaty.
Since the requisite number of signatures had not been gathered, the BCiowas felt that 
allotment could not proceed in the way the U.S. Government had imposed.
Justice Wliite’s majority opinion in the case made it clear that congressional 
plenary power included the breaking o f treaties. The court also made it clear that
I cannot help but note here that my family received about 3000 acres altogether under allotment 
of which only about 100 acres are still owned by the family today.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 187 U.S. 553 (1903). For an excellent account o f  this case, see Blue 
Clark, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: Treaty Rights and Indian Law at the End o f  the Nineteenth 
Century, Law in tlte American West vol. 5, (Lincoln and London: University o f Nebraska, 
1994).
TREATY WITH THE KIOWA AND COMANCHE {1867, Oct. 21, 15 Stat.,81. Ratified. July 
25, 1868. Proclaimed, Aug. 25. 1868.
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they would not even exercise judicial review over such an exercise of power. 170
The provisions in article 12 of the Medicine Lodge treaty of 
1867 ... cannot be adjudged to materially limit and qualify the 
controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and 
protection of the Indians and to deprive Congress, in a possible 
emergency, when the necessity might be urgent for a partition and 
disposal of the tribal lands, of all power to act... . Congress has 
always exercised plenary authority over the tribal relations of the 
Indians and the power has always been deemed a political one not 
subject to be controlled by the courts.
In view of the legislative power possessed by Congress over 
treaties with the Indians ... the action of Congress is conclusive upon 
the courts.
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian 
treaty, though presumably such power will be exercised only when 
circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in 
disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the 
interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should be 
so. ...
... If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be 
understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of its power, 
relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress and not to 
the courts.
Despite the efforts of the Indian nations, the new state Oklahoma^’  ^ had 
arisen to encompass them. It appeared political amalgamation was a fact. Indians
Tills position was slowly relaxed over time, but the courts still only exercise limited review over 
Congress’s plenary autliority.
Lone Wolf v. H itchcock . Ibid., 553-568.
An ironic appellation suggested by Choctaw Chief Allen Wright. The name means “red 
people” in tlie Choctaw language.
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with allotments would become citizens of the U.S. Disregarding a government 
report‘d stating that Indians did not want citizenship. Congress would force 
citizenship on the remaining non-citizen Indians with the Citizensliip Act*^ ** of 1924. 
This act was a serious departure for the Congress. Prior to this the Indian’s 
allegiance^’  ^ had been a key issue. The U.S. Government recognized that their 
allegiance was to their tribal governments and were thus not made citizens by the 
accident of having been bom within the territorial limits of the U.S.
Indians bom within the territorial limits of the United States, 
members of and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian 
tribes, (an alien though dependent power,) although in a geographical 
sense bom in the United States, are no more ‘bom in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof’ within the meaning of 
the first section of the fourteenth amendment, than the children of 
subjects of any foreign government bom within the domain o f that 
government, or the children bom within the United States, o f 
ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations.
Earlier acts, like the General Allotment Act, had required either the passive
acceptance of an allotment, which presumably severed tribal ties, or a positive act on
the part of the Indian to sever tribal ties.
Administration of the Indian Office (Bureau o f Municipal Research Publication no. 65, 1915), 
17. As cited by Cohen, 155.
U.S. Statutes at Large. 43:253.
Allegiance was a key citizenship issue around tlie world as well as in the U.S., see United States 
V. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). Pages 655-658 discuss this issue giving numerous 
international precedents.
Elk V. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94. (1884), 102.
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...And every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United 
States to whom allotments shall have been made under provision of 
this act, or under any law or treaty, and every Indian bom within the 
territorial limits of the United States who has voluntarily taken up, 
within said limits, his residence separate and apart from any tribe of 
Indians therein, and has adopted civilized life is hereby declared to be 
a citizen of the United States...
The Indian Citizenship Act required neither positive action nor passivity on the part 
of the individual, it imposed citizenship regardless. It did not require the taking of 
an oath of allegiance like naturalization required; Indians were unlikely to freely 
change allegiance. Thus Native Americans came to hold a unique position in U.S. 
society, recognized as having dual allegiance — one of which is imposed by the U.S. 
Government.
Passage of the act was comparatively easy. It appeared to grant a boon to 
Indians, while actually changing their status very little. In their tribal relations they 
were still under the guardianship o f the government and it was fairly easy to deny 
them the franchise. In some states Native Americans were effectively denied the 
vote until the 1950’s. Thus for the Whites there was little to lose and everything to 
gain. Citizenship seemed to mean a step toward assimilation; removal of restrictions
U.S. Statutes at Large, 24:388, §6.
The Indian Citizenship Act and dual allegiance are the topics o f Alexandra Witkins, T o  
Silence a Drum: The Imposition o f United States Citizenship on Native Peoples”, Historical 
Rejlections/Réjlexions Historiques, (New York: Alfred University, 1995), vol. 21, no. 2, 353- 
383.
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on alienation of Indian property; and taxation. In return, it granted little but 
unwanted citizenship, though citizenship would make it easier to militate for 
individual rights.
To facilitate the move to citizenship under allotment, the U.S. government 
established a series of schools meant to replace the church-run schools o f the peace 
p o l i c y . B I A  schools provided most of the education for Indian children through 
the I920’s and a significant amount through World War II. Their numbers declined 
somewhat in 1934 and steadily declined after World War H, though some remain to 
this day. There was a slow' evolution of the schools, but until the 1960’s they taught 
basic academic and job skills in the English language within a patriotic, Christian 
framework, stressing individuality and self-reliance. Punishment was often brutal^** 
and was aimed at stamping-out the child’s “Indianness,” particularly their native 
language. Many of the schools were boarding schools that removed the children 
from their parents. Initially this was done forcibly, but in the mid 1890’s this was
' These are common elements o f the discussion of tlie Indian Citizenship Act, however all appear 
and are documented in Linda S. Parker, “The Indian Citizenship Act o f 1924”, Between Two 
Worlds: The Survival o f  Twentieth Century Indians, ed. by Arrell Morgan Gibson, The 
Oklahoma Series vol. 22, (Oklahoma Historical Society, 1986), 44-71.
Prucha, Great Fatlier, Chapters 27 and 32 examine tlie Indian schools and particularly the 
boarding schools, as does Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate 
the Indians, 1880-1920, (Lincoln and London; University of Nebraska, 1984), chapter 6.
Commissioner Burke implemented reforms in 1929, see Prucha, The Great Father, 929, but the 
charges o f cruelty in tlie system continued.
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forbidden.'*^ Partly to teach skills, but mainly as a cost-cutting measure, almost all 
labor for the maintenance and operation of the schools was supplied by the children. 
In 1928, the U.S. Government sponsored Meriam report stated that the nature of 
this labor would “ ...constitute a violation of the child labor laws in most states." 
The amount of work done by the children declined after this, though they still did 
much of the work. The older generation of Native Americans alive today contains 
many boarding school alumni who recount the hard work, harsh discipline and loss 
of native language that characterized the boarding schools.
Despite allotment, citizenship and schooling, Indian people still did not fit in 
U.S. society. The main efifect of the policies had been to take Indian land and 
attempt to deprive them o f their culture. By the 1930’s this process was clearly a 
failure. In a nation wracked by depression, Indian people were the worst-off of all. 
Reformers sought to fix the problem with the Wheeler-Howard Act o f  1934, also 
known as the Indian Reorganization Act.'*'* Though Oklahoma Indians were 
initially exempted from the more important provisions of the act, they were finally
Removal o f  children from the state or territory o f the parents without their consent was made 
illegal by C/.S. Statutes at Large 28:906, and coercion in transferring students was made illegal 
by U.S. Statutes at Large 29:348.
The Problem o f  Indian Administration, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1928), as cited by Prucha, 
The Great Father, 838.
'*■* U.S. Statutes at Large, 48:948.
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included by the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 185
In urging passage of the Wheeler-Howard Act, President Roosevelt made 
clear some of its reasoning and aims.
The Wheeler-Howard Bill embodies the basic and broad 
principles of the Administration for a new standard of dealing 
between the Federal Government and its Indian wards.
It is, in the main, a measure of justice that is long overdue.
We can and should, without further delay, extend to the Indian the 
fundamental rights of political liberty and local self-government and 
the opportunities of education and economic assistance that they 
require in order to attain a wholesome American life. This is but the 
obligation of honor of a powerful Nation toward a people living 
among us and dependent upon our protection.
Certainly the continuance of autocratic rule, by a Federal 
Department, over the lives of more than two hundred thousand 
citizens of this Nation is incompatible with American ideals of liberty.
It also is destructive of the character and self-respect of a great race.
The continued application of the allotment laws, under which 
Indian wards have lost more than two-thirds of their reservation 
lands, while the costs of Federal administration of these lands have 
steadily mounted, must be terminated.
Indians throughout the country have been stirred to a new 
hope. They say they stand at the end of the old trail. Certainly, the 
figures of impoverishment and disease point to their impending 
extinction, as a race, unless basic changes in their conditions of life 
are effected.
I do not think such changes can be devised and carried out
185 U.S. Statutes at Large, 49:1967.
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without the active cooperation of the Indians themselves.
The Wheeler-Howard Bill offers the basis for such 
cooperation. It allows the Indian people to take an active and 
responsible part in the solution o f their own problems.
Thus the same government that had sought to abolish Indian self-government now 
proclaimed such a move contrary to “fundamental rights of political liberty” and 
believed that the Indians themselves had a part in their own salvation. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, part of the reasoning was the cost of administering to the Indians.
The Wheeler-Howard Act did not mean that the U.S. Government had given 
up on complete absorption of the Indian nations. It just meant that the government 
recognized that allotment had failed. Assimilation was still the goal.
The Wheeler-Howard Act, the most important piece of Indian 
legislation since the eighties, not only ends the long, painful, futile 
effort to speed up the normal rate of Indian assimilation by 
individualizing tribal land and other capital assets, but it also 
endeavors to provide the means, statutory and financial, to repair as 
far as possible, the incalculable damage done by the allotment policy 
and its corollaries.
Likewise, the recognition of tribal governments was not a recognition of those 
governments that had been abolished, but rather extension of self-government by
Samuel Roseiunan, ed.. Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. RoosevelL 1934, (New  
York: Random House, 1938), 202. Item 67, Statement on the Wheeler-Howard Bill.
Annual Report o f  the Secretary o f  the Interior, 1934, 78-83 extracted from a quote in Prucha, 
Documents o f  U.S. Indian Policy, 225.
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provisions to
...authorize and legalize tribal organization and incorporation, which 
give these tribal organizations and corporations limited but real 
power, and authority over their own affairs...
Indian nations which incorporated under the Wheeler-Howard Act or the Oklahoma 
Indian Welfare Act were not only recognized as having limited self-government, but 
could also receive various benefits under the act, including loans. Many of Indian 
nations recognized by the U.S. Government today were incorporated under these 
acts.
Opposition to the Wheeler-Howard Act was imrnediate and vociferous, but 
World W ar-n delayed substantive reaction. Those opposing the Wheeler-Howard 
Act, and those favoring assimilation in general, found a lot of ammo for their cause 
in the Second World War. There were around 25,000 Native Americans in uniform 
at the end o f the war.‘*^  Their impressive service record included two Medals of 
Honor, 34 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 51 Silver Stars, 47 Bronze Stars and 71 
Air M e d a l s . T h e s e  men had proven their ability and deserved complete
Ibid.. as quoted by Prucha at 227.
U.S. OfiBce of Indian Affairs, Indians in the War, (Lawrence Kansas: Haskell Printing 
DepartmenL 1945), I gives conservative figures totaling 24,551 for enlisted and non­
commissioned officers, with the vast majority serving in the Army. The total number of  
officers was unknown.. Billy Hester, the autlior’s uncle, was one of the relatively small number 
of Indians in the U.S. Navy. He served as an antiaircraft gurmer assigned to merchant ships 
during the war.
Ibid.
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citizenship according to those opposed to the Wheeler-Howard Act. Complete 
assimilation, particularly political absorption, was the goal. Indians had proven 
themselves “worthy” of this. Federal supervision of sufiBciently “advanced” Indian 
nations was to be terminated.
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to 
make Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject 
to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and 
responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United 
States, and to grant them all o f the rights and prerogatives pertaining 
to American citizenship; And
Whereas the Indians within the territorial limits of the United 
States should assume their full responsibilities as American citizens:
Now, therefore, be it
resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
concurring).
That it is the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible 
time, all of the Indian tribes and Individual numbers thereof located 
within the states o f .. .  and all of the following named tribes, should 
be freed from Federal supervision and control and from all the 
disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians ... [A] 11 
offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the States of .... should be 
abolished. ...
Termination failed almost before it began. The first tribe to be terminated, 
the Menominee, were coerced into termination;^^ it was done too rapidly for
U.S. Statutes at Large. 67:B132 
See Pruclia, The Great Father. 1050.
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appropriate planning; and, in the end, there was another mass transfer o f tribal assets 
away from tribal members. The supposed boon of becoming “Americans” had again 
worked out to the detriment of the Native Americans.
The “paper” genocide o f American Indians under the termination 
policy subjected the Eisenhower administration to much criticism. 
“Termination” itself, became an ambiguous word in federal Indian 
policy that signified the extinction of numerous things; tribal 
governments, allotments, reservations, Indian rights, treaty 
obligations. ...
In retrospect the termination policy of the second Eisenhower 
administration was a failure.
Tribes scheduled to be terminated, some having “voluntarily” requested it, began to 
work against termination. They were quickly joined by those Indian nations not on 
the termination list. For Native Americans it became a crusade. Though termination 
had slowed before the end of the 1950’s and ended altogether in the mid 1960’s, it 
was a word that inspired fear among Indian people for decades to come.^ '^*
In the same year that the Termination Act became law, another attempt was 
made to forcibly incorporate the Indian nations. Public Law 280*^  ^ was a 
compromise to complete termination in which any state which could assume civil
Donald L. FLxico, “Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy in the I950’s” (PhD. 
diss.. University of Oklahoma, 1980), 230.
An entertaining, short, account of termination can be found in Deioria, Custer D ied fo r  Your 
Sins, Ibid., chapter 3 ,.
U.S. Statutes at Large, 67:588.
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and criminal jurisdiction over the Indian nations within their borders without the 
consent of the Indian nations. State control was not to be complete however, as the 
trust status of reservation lands was not terminated. Because o f this, the states 
could not tax these lands. States requesting jurisdiction thus had little or no 
additional tax base to draw on for the costs of law enforcement. Despite this 
drawback, the assumption o f power over the Indian nations was enough to cause 
five states to be written directly into the legislation and several more to assume such 
authority later.
The expansion o f metropolitan areas near Indian reservations has 
increased the states’ interest in regulating and exploiting residential 
and recreational development on trust land. States have been notably 
desirous of acquiring pollution and subdivision control. The 
discoveiy of substantial energy resources on reservations, and 
consequent industrial development, have spurred similar state interest 
in regulating and taxing those activities.
States assumed authority for their own benefit, often doing little to maintain 
law and order on the reservations after they assumed jurisdiction. The Omaha and 
Winnebago reservations o f  Nebraska were left with no law enforcement once 
Federal officers departed. States were unhappy with the result because it did not
Carole E. Goldberg, 'Public Law 280: The limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation 
Indians”, 22 U.C.L.A. L.Rev.. 535 (1975). This article also provides a fine overview o f the 
law, its causes and effects.
Goldberg, 552. Section B, 551-558 examines the problem o f financing state jurisdiction 
including law enforcement.
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give them all the powers they wanted, while forcing them either to pay for law 
enforcement or accept lawlessness within their borders. Though Eisenhower asked 
Congress to amend the bill to provide for Indian consultation, they did not do so.^ ®* 
Indian nations were thus forced to accept this assimilationist policy. It was not until 
1968 that Congress would provide for consent as a part of the Civil Rights Act. 
Since that time. No Indian nation has consented to state jurisdiction.
The social changes started in the 1960’s were as profound in Indian country 
as elsewhere. The emphasis switched back from assimilation to self-determination 
of Indian nations. As President Johnson stated in a 1968 special message to 
Congress on the problems of the American Indian,
Mississippi and Utah—the Potomac and the Chattahoochee— 
Appalachia and Shenandoah . . . The words of the Indian have 
become our words—the names of our states and streams and 
landmarks.
His myths and his heroes enrich our literature. His lore colors 
our art and our language. For two centuries, the American Indian has 
been a symbol of the drama and excitement of the earliest America.
But for two centuries, he has been an alien in his own land.
Relations between the United States Government and the 
tribes were originally in the hands of the War Department. Until 
1871, the United States treated the Indian tribes as foreign nations.
It has been only 44 years since the United States afSrmed the 
Indian's citizenship; the full political equality essential for human
198 Prucha, The Great Father, 1045.
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dignity in a democratic society. ...
But political equality and compensation for ancestral lands 
are not enough. The American Indian deserves a chance to develop 
his talents and share fully in the future of our Nation. ...
The American Indian, once proud and free, is tom now 
between white and tribal values; between the politics and language of 
the white man and his own historic culture. His problems, sharpened 
by years of defeat and exploitation, neglect and inadequate effort, 
will take many years to overcome. ...
No enlightened Nation, no responsible government, no 
progressive people can sit idly by and permit this shocking situation 
to continue.
I propose a new goal for our Indian programs: A goal that 
ends the old debate about "termination" of Indian programs and 
stresses self-determination; a goal that erases old attitudes of 
paternalism and promotes partnership self-help. ...
In our efforts to meet that responsibility, we must pledge to 
respect fully the dignity and the uniqueness of the Indian citizen.
That means partnership—not paternalism.
We must affirm the right of the first Americans to remain 
Indians while exercising their rights as Americans.
We must affirm their right to freedom of choice and self- 
determination.
Such sweeping changes would not occur immediately. Major legislation 
expanding Native American self-governance would only be enacted after the 
Johnson administration. Under Johnson, Titles II-VU of the Civil Rights Act of
Warren Reed. ed.. Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 
1968-69, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), item 113, 335-344.
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ig 6 g2 oo with Indian people and nations, but were mixed in their action.
Title n  §202 imposed most of the “Bill of Rights” of the U.S. Constitution on Indian 
nations to regulate their power over their members, and §203 did the same for 
habeiis corpus protection. Title HI set up a model code for courts of Indian 
offenses. Title IV required tribal consent for state assumption o f jurisdiction, and 
§403 (a) even allowed retrocession for those states already under P.L. 280. Title V 
added “assault resulting in serious bodily injury” to the crimes that were originally 
created by the Major Crimes Act. Possibly the most welcome change was Title VI. 
It allowed legal counsel contracts between Indian nations and their lawyers to 
automatically go through in 30 days if the Bureau of Indian Affairs took no action. 
This keeps the B.I.A. from hampering the tribes function either through neglect or 
stonewalling on approval of these contracts. Title VU provided for publication of 
various helpful guides and documents including the treaties, so they would be 
available to protect Indian rights. Thus none of the elements of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1968 actually increased sovereignty or self-governance, though Title IV at least 
kept the power from being usurped by the states. Title El can only be viewed as an 
imposition of external laws, however well-intentioned, actually diminishing 
sovereignty.
U.S. Statutes at Large, 82:77-81.
I l l
Though court cases affecting sovereignty were mixed in the 1970’s,^“  ^ the 
sweeping changes outlined by Johnson and supported by his successors would be 
implemented in a string o f legislation beginning in 1975 and culminating in 1994/°^ 
P.L. 93-638, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act^°  ^ allows 
Indian nations to act as government contractors, providing their own services. 
Indian nations receiving these “638 contracts” expect to receive a number of 
benefits. Monies that had gone to non-Indian contractors to provide these services 
now go to the Indian nation itself. Some of the monies for administering the 
programs now flow to the tribal government rather than the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. But perhaps most importantly, the Indian nations provide their own services, 
knowing their own needs; sympathetic to their own problems; cognizant of their 
own customs.
Though a watershed change in policy, self-determination contracts are still
Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a M odem  
Constitutional Democracy, (New Haven and London: Yale, 1987), 59-62 discusses the 
contradictory cases o f this period. In the end the courts relied on the notion of inherent 
sovereignty, mirroring the legislative initiatives being advanced, so a detailed discussion of 
these cases is unimportant. However, the fact that they occurred is just another example that 
the law is in flux and tire status o f  Indian sovereignty is far from certain.
Tire most important in order o f passage are, P.L. 93-638, Jan 4* 1975, known as the “Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act”; U.S. Statutes at Large 88:203. P.L. 100- 
472, Oct. 5* 1988; U.S. Statutes at Large 102:2298, particularly Title IE, known as the “Self- 
Governance Demonstration Project”; P.L. 101-644, Nov. 29* 1990, U.S. Statutes at Large 
104:4665; P.L. 103-176, Dec. 3, 1993, U.S. Statutes at Large 107:2004, known as the “Indian 
Tribal Justice Act”; P.L.103-413 Oct 25* 1994, U.S. Statutes at Large 108:4270, particularly 
Title II, known as the “Self-Govemance Act”.
U.S. Statutes a t Large 88:203.
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much like any other U.S. Government contract. It is still the Federal Government 
that determines the needs to be met and the programs to meet them. The initiative 
possible under these contracts is severely limited. P.L. 103-413, Title II, the Self- 
Govemance Act^”** changes this by allowing Indian nations to “compact” rather than 
contract these services. Compacting is considered a govemment-to-govemment 
agreement in which the Indian nation takes over responsibility for various services. 
By compacting they can have all of the benefits of 638 contracts along with greater 
initiative. Trying a New Way: The Independent Assessment Report on the Self- 
Govemance Demonstration Project outlined a number of benefits of self- 
governance including, better law enforcement; improved quality o f tribal services; 
remarkable flexibility in meeting needs; facilitation of long-range planning; increased 
responsibility and accountability for tribal officials; better record management and 
accounting; increased participation of tribal members in priority setting; more 
efficient utilization of resources; quicker response to changing needs; consolidation 
of programs; and revision o f tribal budgeting, organization, administration and 
government.
U.S. Statutes at Large 108:4270. Elements o f this were originally tried on a temporary basis 
under P.L. 100-472, Oct. 5* 1988, U.S. Statutes at Large 102:2298, Title HI, known as the 
Self-Govemance Demonstration Project.
The Center for the Study of Indian Law and Policy, the University o f Oklahoma and The Center 
for Tribal Studies, Nortlieastem State University, Tahlequah, Trying a New fVay: The 
Independent Assessment Report on the Self-Govemance Demonstration Project, (GPO, 1991),
vn-vin..
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Most importantly, under these acts, the U.S. Government has committed 
itself to a particular view of the relationship between the Federal Government and 
the Indian nations.
The Congress, after careful review of the Federal 
Government's historical and special legal relationship with, and 
resulting responsibilities to, American Indian people, finds that—
(1) the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has 
served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people 
and their communities by depriving Indians of the full opportunity to 
develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self-government, 
and has denied to the Indian people an effective voice in the planning 
and implementation of programs for the benefit of Indians which are 
responsive to the true needs of Indian communities; and
(2) the Indian people will never surrender their desire to control their 
relationships both among themselves and with non-Indian 
governments, organizations, and persons.^”®
With this view in mind, the U.S. Government committed itself to a particular policy. 
Congressional declaration of policy
(a) Recognition of obligation of United States
The Congress hereby recognizes the obligation of the United States 
to respond to the strong expression of the Indian people for self- 
determination by assuring maximum Indian participation in the 
direction of educational as well as other Federal services to Indian 
communities so as to render such services more responsive to the 
needs and desires of those communities.
206 U.S. Code, Title 25, Chapter 14. Subchapter H, §450.
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(b) Declaration of commitment
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the 
Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with, and 
responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the Indian people as a 
whole through the establishment of a meaningful Indian self- 
determination policy which will permit an orderly transition from the 
Federal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians to 
effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the 
planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and 
services. In accordance with this policy, the United States is 
committed to supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the 
development of strong and stable tribal governments, capable of 
administering quality programs and developing the economies of 
their respective communities.^”’
Perhaps most interesting is the official U.S. Government statement 
concerning the origin of Indian nation governmental powers.
(3) Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the exercise of 
administrative authorities, has recognized the self-determination, self- 
reliance, and inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes;
(4) Indian tribes possess the inherent authority to establish 
their own form of government, including tribal justice systems;’”*
Thus since the mid 1990’s, Indian people have been technically viewed as 
having inherent sovereignty, the inherent authority for self-government through their 
respective Indian nations despite their imposed U.S. citizenship. The statements of 
the United States Government appear to be sincere and forceful in the defense of
U.S. Code. Title 25, Chapter 14, Subchapter H, §450a.
U.S. Code. Title 25, Chapter 38, §3601. Other references to inherent sovereignty or authority 
of all or specified tribes are found in tlie texts of §1300f, §1301, §2501, §3602, §3631 and in 
tlie notes of §458aa, §1300f and §1301 all in their respective chapters o f  Title 25.
IIS
Indian sovereignty, codified into law. But the U.S. pledged itself in hundreds of 
prior treaties and laws, repudiating each in turn to the detriment o f Indian people 
and their nations. From the informal breaking of treaties done by individual 
Americans to their legal repudiation by act of Congress, the laws of the United 
States have only protected Indian nations intermittently and poorly. They have as 
often served to destroy them. At the present time, bills are introduced in every 
session of Congress to do away with all or some of the laws protecting Indian 
nations. Just one Senator in the 105*'’ Congress introduced five bills that would have 
limited tribal sovereign i m m u n i t y . I f  history is any indication, it is only a matter of 
time before such legislation is passed and the attitudes behind them again become 
official policy.
209 Senator Slade Gorton introduced S. 1691, S.2298, S.2299, S.230I and S.2302 for this purpose.
116
Chapter 3: A Case for Sovereignty
In the Government you call civilized, the happiness of the people is constantly sacrificed 
to the splendors of empire. Hence the origin of your codes of criminal and civil laws; 
hence your dungeons and prisons. We have no prisons; we have no pompous parade of 
courts; we have no written laws; and yet judges are as highly revered among us as they 
are among you, and their decisions are as much regarded.
W e have among us no exalted villains above the control of our laws. Daring wickedness 
is here never allowed to triumph over helpless innocence. The estates of widows and 
orphans are never devoured by enterprising swindlers.
We have no robbery under the pretext of law.
Joseph Brant, Thayendanegea, Mohawk^’°
It is clear from the history of Federal Indian law and policy that many o f the 
problems of modem Native Americans were directly caused by the United States 
Government. Whatever the legality or morality of what happened, on the most 
conservative account. Native American people were divested of a continent; 
deprived of their independent governments; deprived of their cultures and physically 
decimated. On the surface, there is certainly a link between sovereignty and how 
Indian people have fared over the last two-hundred years. As sovereignty has been 
infringed, Indian people have been harmed; as sovereignty has been reafBrmed they 
have recovered.
Kent Nerbum and Louise Mengeikoch eds.. Native American Wisdom, The Classic Wisdom 
Collection, (San Rafael CA; New World Library, 1991), 78-79.
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The clearest link between the problems faced by Native Americans and the 
actions of the United States is the direct one of dispossession. Historical 
infringements of Indian sovereignty have coincided with dispossession that directly 
caused most or all of the harm. There is still a link to sovereignty however, as the 
eras of greater sovereignty saw improvements in conditions despite the fact that the 
real losses caused by direct actions were either not compensated for, or were poorly 
compensated for. Thus to account for improvements in eras o f  greater sovereignty 
one must look to sovereignty itself and not just a lack of exploitation. In addition, 
the recent Federal policy of self-governance recognizes the commonsensical view 
that people often know their own problems and needs best. This would, at least in 
part, explain why eras of increased sovereignty have been so positive — further 
strengthening the idea that sovereignty itself is important.
A better case for the link between sovereignty and Indian well-being can be 
made by recalling the kinds of problems faced by Indian people as outlined in 
Chapter One. Dispossession may account in part for the poverty, and the poverty 
may account in part for alcoholism and poor educational achievement but it cannot 
account for all of it. Education in particular provides a link to policies affecting 
sovereignty. Though college attendance is limited by ability to pay, education 
through high school is available to all Indian people regardless of their relative 
poverty. Yet they often do not take advantage of it. Thus some factor or factors
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besides poverty must be important.
As seen in Chapter One, locus of control was the key factor that showed up 
repeatedly in explanations of poverty, alcoholism and lack of educational 
motivation. People who believe that they are not in control o f their own lives are 
likely to suffer from these problems. Statistically, Indian people are apt to believe 
that they are not in control of their own lives.
The history of Federal Indian law and policy provides a clear and convincing 
reason for this. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, this history is one in which Indian 
nations were slowly deprived of their lands and independence despite their best 
efforts to the contrary. Indian nation governments have been recognized, not 
recognized, abolished, re-instated, lionized and despised with little regard to their 
actual function. The Federal Government of the United States claims the legal right, 
through the plenary power doctrine, to complete control over Indian nation 
governments and it has the power to enforce this claim. This legal claim is bolstered 
by a claim o f guardianship/trust authority that extends the claim down to individual 
Indian people as members of their respective nations.
Recent laws that recognize the inherent and retained sovereignty of Indian 
nations represent the culmination of long years o f work on the part of Native 
American people, their nations and sympathizers. Though these laws are currently
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in force, the claim of plenary power remains. Continued challenges to Indian 
sovereignty, particularly in the context of this claim of Federal power and its history 
of use, make the current laws appear tenuous. Though some might argue that the 
current state of law empowers Native Americans to take control o f their own 
destiny, hundreds of years of history have taught them otherwise.
If the current laws empowering Indian people were to continue as long in the 
fiiture as the contradictory laws extend into the past, we might expect some of the 
ills engendered by history to be overcome. Eventually Native American people 
might again believe themselves to be the masters of their own fate. But this leaves 
the source of the problems untouched for generations, likely ensuring their 
continuation. This statement of the issue is also somewhat disingenuous. Given the 
history. Native American doubts as to the sincerity of current policy and uncertainty 
about its future are far from unreasonable. If anything, it would be unreasonable to 
expect them to believe that the current trend o f self-governance will continue.^"
If external locus of control, manifest in the Indian case as loss of 
sovereignty, is a significant factor in many o f the problems of Indian people, then we
*' ' Tliough many specialists seem to tliink tliat tliis trend will continue. In a special feature in 22 
Am. Ind. L. Rev., (1999), 585-622, Louis F. Claiborne, Reid Peyton Chambers and Douglas 
B.L. Endreson, all wrote articles concluding that most major elements o f Indian self- 
governance already in place would remain in force. Though there were no dissenting opinions 
presented, Claiborne did express some misgivings that will be enumerated infia at 150-151.
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finally have a clearer idea about why these problems seem so intractable. U.S. 
Government programs have been unable to solve the problems because of the fact 
that they are U.S. Government programs. Whether administered by the Indian 
nations as 638 contracts or under self-governance compacts, the spectre o f Federal 
control remains. Congress still claims plenary power — the ultimate threat to Indian 
sovereignty. Though theorists like Wilkinson believe that the plenary power 
doctrine is not as all-powerful as is often claimed, their positions are like theories 
meant to persuade and don’t really touch on the most problematic elements of 
plenary power.^*  ^ The reality lies in cases like United States v. Wheeler in which the 
Supreme Court ruled, “The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique 
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance o f Congress and is subject to 
complete defeasance.”^^ ^
The U.S. Government has made great strides toward relinquishing control, 
but even if they are sincere they would still have to convince the Indian people of 
this for the locus of control problem to be solved. The U.S. Government seems to 
have accepted the rightness of Indian self-governance. The question then is how to
Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern 
Constitutional Democracy, (New Haven and London: Yale, 1987), his section entitled ‘The 
Higher Sovereign” on pages 78-89 sets out to show, among other things, that plenary power is 
not unlimited. But on page 79 he provides a litany of the worst “by-products” o f plenary power 
saying, “None of these by-products of the plenary power doctrine has been shaken by the 
modem Court nor is any likely to be.”
United States V. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, (1978), at 323.
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establish the bona fides. The obvious answer to this question is that the Federal 
Government specifically renounce plenary power and those elements o f the 
trust/guardian relationship that provide control over Indian people as opposed to a 
mere duty to protect Indian people and their resources fi"om others.
If one accepts the link between locus of control and the well being of Native 
Americans and if they are at all motivated to enhance Indian well being, then they 
should be in favor of relinquishment of Federal plenary power.
Renunciation of plenary power would not only be a key element in solving 
the problems faced by Native Americans, but it would bring them closer to having 
true sovereignty. The U.S. Government recognizes the inherent and retained 
sovereignty of Indian nations, but it is unclear just how this differs fi"om self- 
determination or self-governance. If there is a difference, and if the Federal 
Government is committed to the sovereignty of Indian nations, then the policy 
should be something other than just self-determination or self-governance though 
these are the names for the policy initiatives prevailing today. These words have 
been used more-or-less interchangeably in this work so far. Now we shall have 
provide a short account differentiating sovereignty from the other terms.
A thorough analysis of sovereignty would be a topic requiring volumes, but 
for our purposes that is unnecessary. We are only concerned here with what
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sovereignty amounts to within the framework of U.S. law and political philosophy. 
Though self-determination and self-governance may describe limited powers of self- 
government, sovereignty is generally characterized as, “supreme, absolute and 
uncontrollable.” '^'* U.S. Government recognition of the inherent sovereignty of 
Native American nations would seem to conflict directly with Congressional plenary 
power under such a definition. Clearly the power o f Indian nations is neither 
supreme nor absolute if Congress has plenary power.
But sovereignty is as much or more about the source o f these powers and 
the right of their employ. This aspect of sovereignty is characterized as, “the self 
sufficient source of political power... the absolute right to govem.” '^  ^ This second 
element of sovereignty is essential to understanding the U.S. form of “divided” 
sovereignty. Individual states in the U.S. are spoken of as sovereign despite the fact 
that they are in many ways subordinate to the Federal Government. If the 
sovereignty of Indian nations can be accounted for within this system, then Federal 
pronouncements o f Indian sovereignty do not contradict their claim of plenary 
power.
Henry Campbell Black, Black’s  Law Dictionary, 6* edition by the publishers editorial staff, 
Joseph R. Nolan, Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, M.J. Connolly, Stephen C. Hicks, and Martina N. 
Alibrandi, (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1990), 1396.
Ibid.
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The American form o f sovereignty is a departure from the old idea of 
absolute, indivisible sovereignty, though those ideas still linger in the standard 
definitions of sovereignty. As Daniel Webster put it.
The Sovereignty of government is an idea belonging to the other side 
of the Atlantic. No such thing is known in North America. Our 
governments are all limited. In Europe, sovereignty is of feudal 
origin, and imports no more than the state of the sovereign. It 
comprises his rights, duties, exemptions, prerogatives and powers.
But with us, all power is with the people. They alone are sovereign; 
and they erect what governments they please, and confer on them 
such powers as they please. None o f these governments is sovereign, 
in the European sense of the word, all being ordained by written 
constitutions. It seems to me, therefore, that we only perplex 
ourselves when we attempt to explain the relations existing between 
the general government and the several State governments, according 
to those ideas of sovereignty which prevail under systems essentially 
different from our own.^"^
On this standard view, the people o f the United States acting through the 
constitutional conventions formed the Constitution which lays out which powers are 
held by the Central Government and the state governments.
From these conventions, the constitution derives its whole authority.
Daniel Webster, The Works o f  Daniel Webster^ volume HI. (Boston: Charles C. Little and James 
Brown, 1851), 469. Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law, Ibid., 54 
quotes a portion o f this, incorrectly attributing it to Thomas Jefferson. The cite for this quote, 
on page 172, uses the appropriate voliune and page from Webster, but attributes it to “The 
Works of Thomas Jefferson,” a clear conflation with the Webster title. Wilkinson probably 
took this quote from C.E. Merriani, History o f  the Theory o f  Sovereignty Since Rousseau, 
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law Volume XII, Number 4, (New York: Columbia 
University, 1900). It correctly cites Webster on page 166, provides a slightly longer extract in 
the texL and extends the quote in a footnote Just as Wilkinson did later.
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The government proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and 
established,’ in the name of the people; and is declared to be 
ordained, ‘in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice and 
insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to 
themselves and to their posterity.’ The assent of the states, in their 
sovereign capacity, is implied, in calling a convention, and thus 
submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at 
perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It 
required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the state 
governments. The constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete 
obligation and bound the state sovereignties.^*’
Thus the states are said to be sovereign though their power is severely limited by the 
Federal Government. This is because the power of both the state and Federal 
Governments are derived from the same source: the people. The United States 
government, through the Constitution, is founded on the principle of popular 
sovereignty.
To recognize this view of sovereign authority, a group could be said to have 
sovereign power if and only if their power o f self-government is unlimited, or is 
limited and or subservient only to group(s) of which they are a part and to whom 
they have voluntarily given the power. On this view, Indian nations would have 
true sovereignty only if they are limited by or subservient only to groups o f which 
they are part and to whom they have voluntarily given power. Arguably neither o f 
these conditions obtain. Indian people were involuntarily made citizens as described
217 M ’CuUoch V. State o f  Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), 403-404.
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on pages 98-100 supra, making their group membership unclear; and they have 
never voluntarily relinquished their power — certainly not the plenary power 
Congress claims.
This account appears to fit the vague but powerful notion of federal 
“divided” sovereignty generally held in the United States. If one accepts it as a 
plausible account of sovereignty within the dominant political philosophy o f the 
United States, then plenary power would appear to be incompatible with it. Thus, if 
the Federal Government really recognizes Indian sovereignty, it should relinquish 
plenary power as incompatible with its own political philosophy. Though later 
arguments will strengthen this view of sovereignty and the incompatibility of plenary 
power within it, perhaps the clearest argument for this position comes from a 
Supreme Court case that appears to agree with much of the reasoning and even 
applies it directly to an Indian related case.
In the 1991 case of Blatchford v. Native Village o f Noatal^^^ the Supreme 
Court examined various issues including the surrender of sovereign immunity by 
state and tribal governments. Part of their reasoning is based on the 1934 case 
Principality o f Monaco v. State o f M ississippi''^ which they quote at some length.
■'* Blatchford v. Native Village ofNoatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
Principality o f  Monaco v. State o f  Mississippi, 219 U.S. 313 (1934).
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The relevant portion o f that case, also quoted in Blatchford v. Noatak reads:
There is also the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing 
attributes o f sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their 
consent, save where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in 
the plan o f the convention.' The Federalist, No. 81. The question is 
whether the plan of the Constitution involves the surrender of 
immunity when the suit is brought against a State, without her 
consent, by a foreign State.
Thus it would appear that the Court recognizes that the powers of sovereignty, or at 
least sovereign immunity, can only be voluntarily surrendered by a sovereign. The 
Court goes on to apply this idea to states and Indian tribes, finding that the 
reasoning doesn’t apply in the same way due to relevant differences between the 
two.
Respondents argue that Indian tribes are more like States 
than foreign sovereigns. That is true in some respects: They are, for 
example, domestic. The relevant difference between States and 
foreign sovereigns, however, is not domesticity, but the role o f each 
in the convention within which the surrender of immunity was for the 
former, but not for the latter, implicit. What makes the States' 
surrender o f immunity from suit by sister States plausible is the 
mutuality of that concession. There is no such mutuality with either 
foreign sovereigns or Indian tribes. We have repeatedly held that 
Indian tribes enjoy immunity against suits by States, Potawatomi 
Tribe, supra, at 509, as it would be absurd to suggest that the tribes 
surrendered immunity in a convention to which they were not even 
parties.
Ibid., 322-323.
Blatchford v. Native Village o f  Noatak, Ibid., 782.
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This shows that the Supreme Court recognizes not only the standard notion 
o f popular sovereignty and it’s authority to grant sovereign powers via convention; 
but also the fact that the Indian nations were not party to such a convention and thus 
cannot have granted such powers. Though the case refers only to sovereign 
immunity there seems to be no way of differentiating that particular power from 
other sovereign powers, and the court provided no such reasoning in this case. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s ruling in the 1982 case Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe~^~ refers somewhat less eloquently to the idea that sovereign power must be 
waived by the holder of sovereign authority, but makes it clear that this is true for all 
sovereign powers. Justice Thurgood Marshall writing for the majority, said of the 
various Federal, State, local and Indian Governments,
Each of these governments has different attributes of sovereignty, 
which may also derive from different sources. These differences, 
however, do not alter the principles for determining whether any of 
these governments has waived a sovereign power through contract, 
and we perceive no principled reason for holding that the different 
attributes of Indian sovereignty require different treatment in this 
regard. Without regard to source, sovereign power, even when 
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts 
subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless 
surrendered in unmistakable terms.^^
Thus it would seem the courts recognize that all sovereign powers, not just
~  Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, (1982). 
Ibid., 149.
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immunity, must be delegated by the sovereign authority.
The requirement of “mutuality” in the Blatchford v. Native Village o f 
Noatak decision seems not only to strengthen this, but it also seems to be pointing 
to the importance of group membership. Though the decision is unclear on this 
point, it may be in agreement with the previously presented idea that the forced 
nature of Indian citizenship in the United States precludes their being subsumed 
under U.S. sovereignty. These two requirements are however separate and either of 
them is sufficient to make Congressional plenary power inconsistent with 
Congressionally recognized inherent Indian sovereignty. So even if one does not 
accept the importance of group membership, the necessity of a grant by convention 
remains. Ultimately, if one takes U.S. law and political philosophy seriously, the 
U.S. Government has never had the authority to take away Indian powers of 
sovereignty. The authority to grant such power is inherent in the Indian nations 
alone.
The “sources” of plenary power are insufficient to overcome this kind of 
objection. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution is often cited as the source of 
Congressional plenary power. Indeed, it has been said that, “Today federal power 
over Indian affairs is accepted as tracing primarily to the Indian Commerce
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C l a u s e . . . B u t  given the U.S. position on sovereignty, this does not make sense. 
Clearly plenary power cannot exist if it is based on any element o f the Constitution, 
since that document is the result of a convention that did not include Indian nations. 
Even if this argument could be overcome, the Commerce Clause seems insuflBcient 
for such a grant of power. As argued supra at 60-61, the Commerce Clause only 
purports to grant power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. Even after 
adding all the other powers that Congress wields with respect to foreign nations, 
Marshall’s delineation of the powers of Congress with respect to Indian nations is 
certainly not plenary, though he deems them sufficient for all essential^ purposes.
Nonetheless this kind of explanation has been given in cases like Mackey v. 
Cox, supra at 80, in which it appears that the court is citing the Commerce Clause as 
putting Indian nations “under the Constitution.” Even ignoring the Constitution’s 
lack of authority to transfer another sovereign’s powers and its failure to mention 
anything like “plenary power,” this position would still be absurd. If mere mention 
in the Constitution is sufficient to place a group “under the Constitution” and give 
Congress plenary power over the group, then the same Commerce Clause would 
give the U.S. Congress plenary power over every foreign nation.
“ ■* David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson and Robert A. Williams, Jr., Federal Indian Law:
225
Cases and Materials, 3"^  ed., (St. Paul: West Publisliing, 1993), 326.
As quoted supra at 60, “These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation o f our 
intercourse with the Indians.”
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The closest that one can come to finding a legitimate source for plenary 
power, one that recognizes popular sovereignty, is in the use of the 
trust/guardianship relation. As noted supra at 83, the court used such a justification 
in United States v. Kagama stating that, “From their very weakness and 
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with 
them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises a duty of 
protection, and with it the power.” But this explicitly recognizes the United States 
itself as the source of the weakness prompting Federal guardianship. Such a 
justification, if taken seriously, would be a case of “might making right.” 
Subjugation of another country, regardless of reason, would be taken to grant 
legitimate power over that country.
The Court’s citation of treaties requiring such protection may be an attempt 
to use the sovereign authority o f the Indian nations to justify Federal presumption of 
sovereign power, with the relevant treaties taking the role of constitutional 
convention. While it is plausible that treaties could convey sovereign powers, their 
use in this instance cannot be taken to grant plenary power. The key problem with 
such a position would be that it again uses the aggression of U.S. citizens and states 
to justify the Federal government’s usurpation of sovereign powers. The fact that 
the aggressor and protector are but two parts of the same country is ironic. Such a 
case would be analogous to claiming that a Texas invasion of Mexico gives the U.S.
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authority to assume sovereign powers over Mexico because they have defense 
treaties with Mexico. It would certainly seem that the treaties mean the U.S. is 
supposed to keep Texas from invading, not allow the Federal Government to take 
over in its stead.
Of course some people may be willing to grasp the nettle and say that might 
makes right. Some might even want to avoid the whole issue of Indian sovereignty 
by an outright claim of conquest. Though this position should by now be held in 
contempt by all, it has certainly been used in Indian affairs. As John Marshall wrote,
...The United States then have unequivocally conceded to that great 
and broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this 
country. They hold, and assert in themselves, the title by which it 
was acquired. They maintain, as all others have maintained, that 
discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of 
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest...
...Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot 
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals 
may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been 
successfully asserted...
However extravagant the pretension of converting the 
discovery of a country into conquest may appear; if it has been 
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country 
has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass 
of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and 
cannot be questioned... However this restriction may be opposed to 
natural right, and to the usages o f civilized nations, yet, if it be 
indispensable to that system under which the country has been 
settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it
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may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be
226rejected by Courts of justice.
These resounding phrases of Marshall were not meant to justify the taking of 
sovereign powers or the assumption of sovereign authority, at most they justified the 
taking of land. As quoted supra at 39, “discovery gave an exclusive right to 
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.” 
Though conquest was cited as a means of extinguishing Indian title, it was never 
cited as a reason diminishing Indian sovereignty in any other way. As shown in the 
preceding chapter, a large segment of the history of Indian relations to the United 
States, the removal period, is characterized by takeover of Indian land with the 
Indians removing to new territories where they might be free to continue governing 
themselves. Though sovereign power within territory taken by the United States 
passed to the United States, the Indian nations did not lose their sovereign powers 
within any territory they still controlled or came to control. This was recognized by 
President Jackson in that part of his statement quoted supra at 48 in which he 
advised the Cherokee to, “emigrate beyond the Mississippi or submit to the laws o f 
those States.” It was recognized by McLean in his concurrence as quoted supra at 
65, “...Indian tribes within our states should exchange their territories, upon 
equitable principles, or, eventually, consent to become amalgamated in our political
226 Extracted from the extended quotation supplied supra at 39-40.
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communities.” It seems clear in the statement of President van Buren quoted supra 
at 66, where he said that the territory they were removing to was “exempt from all 
intrusions by white men..
Even the conquest of the land was taken to be problematic when you look at 
Marshall’s words. Phrases like, “ ...whatever private and speculative opinions of 
individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim...” or “However 
extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery o f a countiy into conquest 
may appear...” or “However this restriction may be opposed to natural right...” all 
seem to point to some serious misgivings on the part of the very Chief Justice whose 
decision asserts the use of conquest. The problem is that the taking o f land, 
particularly the taking of land that threatens the sovereignty o f another, is 
problematic within the legal philosophy of the United States.
Clearly the sanctity of property is central to the legal precepts of the United 
States. The importance of the sovereignty of others and how the sovereignty of 
others affects American understanding of the acceptability of conquest is something 
that took longer to work out. This problem is precisely the one that led to removal. 
If one annexes a territory that contains a people having sovereign authority, the 
annexation is an extension o f power over them. However, under a system that 
recognizes the legitimacy of popular sovereignty, only those people in the territory
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to be annexed actually have the authority to grant such power. You cannot take 
power, only they can give it to you. In the United States, the Indian nations were 
forced to retreat to retain their sovereign powers, something the Federal 
Government encouraged. The actions o f the U.S. during removal seem to show that 
the U.S. had a developing awareness o f how their assertion of the importance of 
popular sovereignty could serve as a limitation on conquest.
Fittingly, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was among the first persons to 
deny the right of conquest specifically on the grounds of self-determination of 
peoples.
The adoption of Wilsonian principles marked a revolution in 
the moral stance adopted by the Allies, from one which regarded the 
territory of the enemy as legitimate spoils of war to one which 
claimed to view that territory in the context of the self-determination 
of its inhabitants; from one which relied upon the operation of the 
right of conquest to one which apparently repudiated its validity....
... the principle of self-determination runs directly counter to 
the suggestion that states may acquire rights of sovereignty merely by 
virtue of conquest.^’
Wilsonian principles have been almost universally accepted in a series of treaties, 
charters and other agreements.^^* Since 1945 conquest has been against settled
Sharon Kerman. The Right o f  Conquest: The Acquisition o f  Territory by Force in International 
Law and Practice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 139.
^  Ibid.. Part Two: The Demise o f the Right o f Conquest in the Twentieth Century, pages 133-301 
traces this evolution. In particular Chapter 6, pages 179-248. examines the legal elements of 
the demise o f conquest.
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international law .^
The fact that the modem prohibition on conquest is specifically based on the 
notion of self-determination and popular sovereignty which is a cornerstone of U.S. 
law and political philosophy, should give pause to anyone wishing to invoke 
conquest. Though it took some time for the consequences of accepting popular 
sovereignty to be fully understood, that does not mean that the outcome of U.S. 
acceptance of the principle should have been any dififerent historically than it is now. 
Any claim that the United States has a right to sovereignty over Indian people on the
basis of conquest is in contradiction to the American principle o f popular
sovereignty. As President Woodrow Wilson said.
No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and 
accept the principle that governments derive all their powers from the 
consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand
peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were
property.
Even if there were some way around the “might makes right” problem for 
asserting plenary grants of power in the treaties, it is implausible that the Indian 
nations have ever conveyed such power to Congress through them. As noted supra
^  W. Michael Reisman, tlie Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law at Yale 
University, stated tliis unequivocally in a telephone conversation on March 4*, 1999.
Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds.. The Public Papers o f  Woodrow Wilson, voliune 
11 (New York: Harper, 1926), 4 1 1. From a speech made January 22"^ 1917.
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at 62, John Marshall said of the treaty clauses creating the guardianship relation, 
“This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more 
powerful; not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting 
as subjects to the laws of a master.” Thus it is clear that the courts originally did not 
view the Indian nations as having granted plenary power through their acceptance of 
U.S. protection.^‘ The fact that John Marshall, the originator of the 
trust/guardianship notion, should make this statement adds more force to it. But 
even if Marshall hadn’t made the statement, it should be clear that a nation would 
not give up the very thing that they are wishing to protect by asking for protection. 
The Indian nations were seeking to assure their continued national existence, not 
convey the power to destroy themselves.
The fact that surrender of plenary power is tantamount to national 
destruction should, in itself, be enough to show that Congress cannot have such 
power without contradicting the idea of popular sovereignty. Under popular 
sovereignty, sovereign powers must be granted by the people having sovereign 
authority. The United States, through all its branches, recognizes the inherent 
sovereignty of Indian nations. This appears to be recognition that they have such 
authority. If the United States recognizes such authority, then the only way the
3 1 Some additional support for this is given in the surrounding text, supra 61-63.
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United States could have plenary power over the Indian nations is if the nations 
granted those powers. Under plenary power Indian sovereignty is said to be, 
“subject to complete defeasance.”^^ This would mean that the Indian nations had 
granted the United States the power to deprive them of all powers, effectively 
ending their existence as nations. This is certainly implausible. In addition, it 
contradicts U.S. recognition that, “...the Indian people will never surrender their 
desire to control their relationships both among themselves and with non-Indian 
governments, organizations, and persons.”^^ Thus it would seem that the 
commonly cited sources o f plenary power cannot possibly have conveyed it.
The only remaining principle o f United States’ law advanced as somehow 
legitimately granting power over Indian nations, is the doctrine o f discovery. That 
doctrine was explicitly invoked by Marshall in the 1823 Johnson v. McIntosh 
decision which was quoted at length, supra 39-40. Though it is cited only as giving 
the United States the right to extinguish the Indian title o f occupancy, that right 
would seem to intrude on Indian sovereign powers. A sovereign, in possession of 
all sovereign powers, would have the right to dispose of their property in any way 
they please. The United States recognizes the inherent sovereignty of Indian nations
As stated in United States v. Wheeler, quoted supra at 121.
U.S. Code, Title 25, Chapter 14, Subchapter H, §450, extracted from the extended quote 
provided supra at 114.
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and specifically recognizes that, prior to the appearance of Europeans the Indian 
nations were, in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample domain.” '^* 
In other words, prior to the advent of the Europeans, the Indian nations not only 
had complete sovereign authority but also had all sovereign powers. So, if the 
doctrine of discovery is cited as giving the United States the sole right to extinguish 
Indian title, then it clearly denies certain sovereign powers to the Indian nations. If 
this is a legitimate source of sovereign powers within the American system, then it is 
one that purports to convey sovereign powers without grant by the sovereign 
authority.
That this position is held by the Courts seems clear. As MacLean wrote in 
his concurring opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,
At no time has the sovereignty of the country been 
recognized as existing in the Indians, but they have been always 
admitted to possess many of the attributes of sovereignty. All the 
rights which belong to self government have been recognized as 
vested in them. Their right of occupancy has never been questioned, 
but the fee in the soil has been considered in the government. This 
may be called the right to the ultimate domain, but the Indians have a 
present right of possession.^^
In this opinion, MacLean seems to be saying that the Indian nations have all the
From Jolm Marshall’s opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia quoted supra at 55.
Worcester v. Georgia, Ibid., 580.
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attributes of sovereignty but the “fee” which is in the hands of the U.S. Government. 
The U.S. Government claims this fee through the doctrine of discovery as previously 
seen in Johnson v. McIntosh. This fee then gives the U.S. Government “ultimate 
dominion.” The U.S. Government holds the fee, but what is a fee?
A freehold estate in lands, held of a superior lord, as a reward for 
services, and on condition of rendering some service for it. The true 
meaning of the word “fee” is the same as that of “feud” or “fief,” and 
in its original sense is taken in contradistinction to “allodium,” which 
latter is defined as a man’s own land, which he possesses merely in 
his own right, without owing any rent or service to any superior.^®
In a sense then, the U.S. Government might be claiming to be the ultimate feudal 
overlord, the King or Queen who is sovereign. This is an odd position for a country 
that denies the divine right of kings and substitutes for it the sovereignty o f the 
people. Though some of the old sense of “domain” and “fee” undoubtedly colored 
the views of officials of the time, the more defensible position would be to say that 
the U.S. was imposing its version of land tenure. This is also more in keeping with 
the historical development of the doctrine of discovery, which will be examined 
shortly.
Without hearkening back to feudalism, it is hard to see how the United 
States could claim something like plenary power on the basis o f the doctrine of
236 Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, Ibid., 614.
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discovery. All the doctrine o f discovery purports to do is restrict the Indian 
sovereign power to convey (or not to convey...) the land to whom they please. 
Nonetheless this seems to be an essential element of the claim within cases like 
United States v. Kagama, quoted supra 82-84. In examining the sources of plenary 
power there, the court said, “But they [the United States] asserted an ultimate title 
in the land itself by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or to transfer it to 
other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority.”
Though it is doubtful that the doctrine o f discovery implies plenary power, it 
still presumes to transfer sovereign powers without any grant by the sovereign 
authority: the Indian people. Can this transfer of power make sense under the 
American system of popular sovereignty?
The most thorough analysis of the doctrine of discovery is Robert A. 
Williams Jr.’s book. The American Indian in Western Legal T h o u g h t As 
Williams lays it out, the doctrine’s development was long and complex. However, 
two main threads recur and appear to have been the basis of the United States claim: 
Religion and Lockean views of land tenure. As Williams wrote,
Columbus’s discoveries in the Crown’s name were based on the
presumption, affirmed in its essentials by Pope Alexander’s bulls of
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought, (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University, 1990).
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donation, that Christian European discovery o f territory held by 
infidel or pagan nonbelievers vested title in the discovering European 
nation.^*
John Marshall’s use of the doctrine o f discovery in Johnson v. McIntosh 
appears to rely in part on the religious grounding of discovery. Laying out the 
discovery claim made by the Europeans and taken over by the United States, 
Marshall says,
... the character and religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for 
considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of 
Europe might claim an ascendancy. The potentates of the old world 
found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample 
compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them 
civilization and Christianity.^^
Thus it would appear that part of the U.S. claim is based on religion. But 
this contradicts the supposedly secular nature of United States. Though it may not 
technically conflict with the Amendment to the Constitution, it escapes only 
because it doesn’t require any law to be passed. The United States has inherited the 
claims of the Europeans, which are fundamentally based on laws respecting an 
establishment of religion. This certainly breaks the spirit of the law, if not the letter. 
If  we were to seriously accept discovery based on religion, then the land title of non- 
Christians in the United States and everywhere else in the world would be suspect.
^  Ibid., 99.
From the extended quote supra 39-40.
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We cannot seriously consent to a law that would allow countries to “legitimately” 
take over other countries just because they are the “wrong” religion.
The other possible justification for the claim that discovery can convey 
sovereign power is its grounding in Lockean notions o f  property. Williams lays out 
part o f this connection in sections entitled “Locke’s Theory and the Indians’ 
‘Wastelands’” and “Locke’s Theory Applied: The Colonial Radicals’ Praxis on the 
Indian Frontier.” '^*® On Williams’ view, Locke’s justification for taking of Indian 
land was not really part of the doctrine o f discovery proper, but was more nearly the 
colonists’ competing account. Either way, since the colonists are the ones who 
ultimately became the United States and established their ownership of the land via 
the doctrine of discovery, we can expect that it would be a part o f their reasoning 
when applying the doctrine. On this account private property originates in labor. 
As Locke wrote.
Thus this Law of reason makes the Deer, that Indian's who 
hath killed it; ‘tis enough to be his goods who hath bestowed his 
labour upon it, though before, it was the common right of every one.
And Amongst those who are counted the Civiliz’d part of Mankind, 
who have made and multiplied positive Laws to determine Property, 
this original Law of Nature for the beginning o f  Property, in what 
was before common, still takes place; and by vertue thereof, what 
Fish any one catches in the Ocean, that great and still remaining 
Common of Mankind; or what Ambergriese any one takes up here, is
Robert A. Williams, Jr, American Indian in Western Legal Thought, Ibid., 246-251.
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by the Lxibotir that removes it out of the common state Nature left it 
in, made his Property who takes that pains about it.
Of course this is only the beginning of property. Eventually a system of land tenure 
can develop which limits what one may appropriate by labor. In Locke’s words,
‘Tis true in Land that is common in England, or any other 
Country, where there is Plenty of People under Government, who 
have Money and Commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any 
part, without consent o f all his Fellow-Commoners: Because this is 
left common by Compact, i.e. by the Law of the Land, which is not 
to be violated. And though it be Common in respect of some men, it 
is not so to all Mankind, but is the joint property of this Country, or 
this Parish.
Thus once a society develops a system of land tenure, property must be 
appropriated through that system — even if the property is part o f the commons.
The following passage from the case Johnson v. McIntosh, makes it clear 
that this was a part of the idea o f property applied in the United States.
By the law of nature, they [the Indians] had not acquired a fixed 
property capable of being transferred. The measure of property 
acquired by occupancy is determined, according to the law of nature, 
by the extent of the men’s wants, and their capacity of using it to 
supply them. ... Upon this principle the North American Indians 
could have acquired no proprietary interest in the vast tracts of 
territory which they wandered over; and their right to the lands on
John Locke, Two Treatises o f  Government, U, §30. From the volume edited by Peter Laslett in 
the Cambridge Texts in the History o f Political Thought series, (Cambridge and New York; 
Cambridge University', 1988). All quotes from this work are transcribed with emphasis 
pimctuation and spelling as they appear in this edition.
John Locke, Two Treatises o f  Government, Ibid.,11, §35.
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which they hunted, could not be superior to that which is acquired to 
the sea by fishing in it. ... According to every theory of property, the 
Indians had no individual rights to land; nor had they any collectively, 
or in their national capacity; for the land was not being used by them 
in such a manner as to prevent their being appropriated by a people 
of cultivators. ... The right derived from discovery and conquest can 
rest on no other basis; and all existing titles depend on the 
fundamental title of the crown by discovery. '^*^
But despite Johnson v. McIntosh^ this kind of reasoning cannot justify 
assumption of sovereign powers over Indians because the reasoning cannot properly 
be applied to the Indian nations. Many Indian nations cultivated the land. Most 
American schoolchildren can tell you that Indian people were the originators of 
com. Much more importantly though, the Indians had a system o f land tenure and 
governments to go along with them. The U.S. Government recognized this every 
time they treated with a particular tribe for the cession of a particular piece of land. 
The U.S. Government even sought to destroy the system of common ownership 
used by most Indian nations by passing the General Allotment Act as described 
supra at 85-86. Thus it should be impossible for the United States to claim that the 
doctrine of discovery even applies to American Indians nations, much less that they 
can derive plenary power from it.
The applicability of teira millius^ Australian law’s version o f the doctrine of
Johnson v. McIntosh. Ibid., 569-570. This segment even specifically cites Locke.
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discovery, has been called into question on the same grounds. The relevant case, 
Mabo V. Queensland}'^ not only confirms the reasoning presented above, but it 
should lead us to consider some of the dynamics of striking down such laws.
When British colonists went out to other inhabited parts of 
the world, including New South Wales, and settled there under the 
protection of the forces of the Crown, so that the Crown acquired 
sovereignty recognised by the European family o f nations under the 
enlarged notion o f terra nullius, it was necessary for the common law 
to prescribe a doctrine relating to the law to be applied in such 
colonies, for sovereignty imports supreme internal legal authority. ...
The view was taken that, when sovereignty of a territory could be 
acquired under the enlarged notion of terra nullius, for the purposes 
of the municipal law, that territory (though inhabited) could be 
treated as “desert uninhabited” country. The hypothesis being that 
there was no local law already in existence in the territory, the law of 
England became the law of the territory (and not merely the personal 
law of the colonists). ... Ex hypothesi, the indigenous inhabitants of a 
settled colony had no recognised sovereign, else the territory could 
have been acquired only by conquest or cession. The indigenous 
people of a settled colony were thus taken to be without laws, 
without a sovereign and primitive in their social organisation. ...
The facts as we know them today do not fit the “absence of 
law” or “barbarian” theory underpinning the colonial reception of the 
common law of England. That being so, there is no warrant for 
applying in these times rules of the English common law which were 
the product of that theory. It would be a curious doctrine to 
propound today that, when the benefit o f the common law was first 
extended to Her Majesty’s indigenous subjects in the Antipodes, its 
first fruits were to strip them of their right to occupy their ancestral
244 107 A.L.R. I (1992) (Australian High Court). Quotations extracted here will be from Getches, 
Wilkinson and Williams, Federal Indian Law, Ibid., and will refer to pages in that volume.
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lands. Yet the supposedly barbarian nature o f indigenous people 
provided the common law of England with the justification for 
denying them their traditional rights and interests in the land.
... The theory that the indigenous inhabitants of a “settled” 
colony had no proprietary interest in the land thus depended on a 
discriminatory denigration of indigenous inhabitants, their social 
organisation and customs. ...
... If it were permissible in past centuries to keep the common 
law in step with international law, it is imperative in today’s world 
that the common law should neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an 
age o f racial discrimination.
The fiction by which the rights and interests of indigenous 
inhabitants in land were treated as nonexistant was justified by a 
policy which has no place in the contemporary law of this
9 4 5country. ...
In this decision, Australia recognizes the injustice o f laws like the doctrine of 
discovery. Thus it would seem that not only the sovereignty, but the very title to the 
land held by current Euro-Australians would be in question. Yet this is not so. In 
the remainder of its decision, the Australian Court finesses the issue by examining 
the basis of indigenous land tenure.
Native title has its origin in and is given content by the 
traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs 
observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and 
incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by 
reference to those laws and customs. ...
Of course, since European settlement o f Australia, many
2-15 Ibid.. 1011-1012.
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clans or groups of indigenous people have been physically separated 
from their traditional land and have lost connection with it. ... Where 
a clan or group has continued to acknowledge the laws and (so far as 
practicable) to observe the customs based on the tradition of that 
clan or group, whereby their traditional connection with the land has 
been substantially maintained, the traditional community title of that 
clan or group can remain in existence. ... However, when the tide of 
history has washed away any real acknowledgement of traditional 
law and any real observance o f traditional customs, the foundations 
of native title has disappeared.
But the “tides of history” did not wash away native tradition, the tides of 
Europeans did. The decision maintains the status quo of ownership and power as 
much as possible while recognizing the past injustice of terra nullius. However, in 
doing so it is effectively making might right again. If the discoverers can disrupt 
native communities enough to disrupt their social order, they can claim legal title. 
Though the Mabo v. Queensland decision strikes down an unjust law, it creates a 
new more complicated set of unjust doctrines that perpetuate their results.
The European colonial nations have become trapped by their own sense of 
justice. As they have come to understand how their past actions conflict with their 
own sense of justice, they have called into question their own right to exist. A 
recognition of this problem goes all the way back to the beginning. As Marshall said 
in Johnson v. McIntosh.,
Ibid., 1013-1014.
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However extravagant the pretension of converting the 
discovery of a country into conquest may appear; if it has been
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country
has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass 
of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and 
cannot be questioned...
Modem U.S. recognition o f the inherent and retained sovereignty of the 
Indian nations must be seen in this light. The U.S. is attempting reconcile its right to 
exist with its own recognition of the injustices that gave it birth and nurtured it. The 
centrality of popular sovereignty to United States’ law makes it impossible not to 
recognize the sovereignty of Indian nations. Thus something like the doctrine of
inherent and retained sovereignty must exist. However, to retain its own
sovereignty — its power — the United States has subordinated Indian sovereignty 
under a plenary power doctrine that again fails to recognize the real import of 
popular sovereignty.
The labyrinth of Indian law is necessary to hide the fact that the United 
States is violating its most fundamental principles;
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness.—That to secure these rights. Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent o f
247 Extracted from the extend quote supra at 40.
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the governed.^ ***
The doctrine of inherent and retained sovereignty under the plenary power of 
Congress is just the most recent turn in the labyrinth.
To the extent that inherent and retained sovereignty recognizes the right of 
Indian people to govern themselves, it is good. The empowerment of Indian people 
can help to overcome the problems linked to locus of control. Though plenary 
power stands in the way o f immediate realization of the full benefits of this 
empowerment, it may be the best that can be gotten from the United States. If  the 
doctrine could be maintained in the face o f plenary power, it might be an acceptable 
pragmatic solution even though it does not fully recognize Indian sovereignty. 
Unfortunately, the inherent contradictions make the situation tenuous.
Indian people are seen as being a part of the United States, yet they are 
recognized as having an independent inherent sovereignty. Though the prerogatives 
that go along with this sovereignty are few and easily outweighed by the negatives 
that go along with Indian history, many Americans resent the prerogatives. As 
Louis Claiborne put it,
...for one untutored in Indian Law, the major decisions of the 
supreme court seem very questionable, if not downright “un- 
American.”
The Declaration o f  Independence
ISO
• Why should Indians enjoy special preferences in jobs and 
government contracts?
• Why should Indian property and Indian Reservation income be 
uniquely exempted from State and local taxes, even when Indians 
receive some services paid for by those taxes?
• Why should Indians who pay no state and local taxes be entitled 
to vote in state and local elections?
• Why should tribal governments have the power to regulate and 
tax non-Indians on reservations on a Reservation who are 
ineligible to sit on the tribal council or to participate in the 
election of council members?
• Why should Indians alone be free to hunt and fish free of most 
restrictions, except of their own choosing?
• Why should relatively few Indians in the State of Washington be 
assured the right to catch half the salmon, while the other 
fishermen are compelled to share the other half?
• WTiy should Indians have the unique right to preempt scarce 
water which, for the most part, they do not even use today?
These, and like questions, challenge very fundamental principles, 
embodied in mottos that every schoolboy learns: ”No taxation 
without representation,” “government is color blind,” “equality under 
the law,” “one man one vote.” Of course, there are special reasons 
for these exceptional rules. But I should not like the Court (or 
Congress) to be bound by the answers a Gallup poll would give these 
questions.^**^
As Claiborne points out, these questions stem from fundamental principles, 
principles as fundamental as that of popular sovereignty and much more well-known
Louis F. Claiborne, “The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions in Indian Cases”. 22 Am. Ind. L. 
Rev., (1999), 587-588.
151
than the intricacies of Indian law. The current level of Indian sovereignty can’t be 
maintained in the face o f such objections. Either Indians are or are not a part of the 
United States. The U.S. Government claims they are and most Americans wouldn’t 
even question it. Despite this the U.S. Government administers to its Indian citizens 
differently. If the Indian nations had been taken into the Union under a compact that 
defined these differences, then they would be straightforwardly laid out and would 
have been agreed to by the citizens o f the United States. If they had been taken into 
the Union under a compact at all, differences or no, it would at least have made their 
sovereignty within the Federal system of divided sovereignty comprehensible. As it 
is, the compatibility of the fundamental principles of the United States with the laws 
that protect Indian sovereignty is at least as questionable as the compatibility of 
those fundamental principles with the laws that originally took away Indian 
sovereignty. While the fundamental principles supporting Indian sovereignty are 
hidden behind the intricacies and contradictions of Indian law, the same principles 
revealed in their full glory can be used to destroy Indian sovereignty.
The majority of American are completely unaware of the issues o f Indian 
sovereignty. The only ones to whom these issues matter are the Indians and their 
sympathizers on one side and all the non-Indians who resent the “special treatment” 
of the Indians on the other side. In an era when affirmative action programs are in 
retreat, Indian sovereignty is certain to be in trouble.
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Congressional renunciation o f plenary power, or judicial revocation of it, 
would not solve the problem. The fundamental tensions in the remaining laws 
would still be there, as would the tensions between Indian society and the dominant 
society. However, the end of plenary power would eliminate the most objectionable 
o f the vestiges of the old colonial system. Perhaps more importantly it would buy 
time and bring the issue to the attention of a broader public. If all the U.S. citizens 
who are not directly affected by Indian sovereignty were to consider the issues in the 
light of the fundamental principles o f the United States, they might be truly 
recognize the inherent sovereignty o f Indian nations. Congressional renunciation of 
plenary power would be dramatic and it would help show the way to understanding. 
It would buy time by denying Congress the ability to eliminate Indian sovereignty 
with the stroke of a pen when anti-sovereignty pressure mounts.
Indian people must understand that their sovereignty is a direct threat to the 
very existence of the United States — if only to its existence as a particular image 
in the mind of its people. If the U.S. truly recognized Indian sovereignty, it would 
be recognizing the illegitimacy of its origins. Thus the first move for Indian people 
must be to recognize the right of the United States to exist. To some, this may seem 
overly dramatic, but ultimately it is at the core of the problem. If  plenary power is 
renounced, Indian nations will have much greater potential power. But it is power 
they must refrain from using until a compact can be made which recognizes their
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power and, possibly, freely grants the United States certain powers. Until that time, 
they must recognize and be bound by existing Indian law.
This idealistic dream is one that will probably never work. Too many people 
have vested interests in maintaining their power over Indian nations. Yet, it is the 
only one available and it may have some slim hope of succeeding. Euro-Americans 
have come a long way in the last two-hundred years. They renounced slavery in the 
1860’s and finally managed to get rid of the discriminatory laws that perpetuated 
many related injustices into the I960’s. Though they still have a long way to go on 
that issue, they have advanced. In the 1990’s they finally codified a recognition of 
the inherent sovereignty of Indian nations. Perhaps before the end of the next 
century they can finally do away with the Indian law that perpetuates the original 
injustice.
“Government derives its just power from the consent o f the governed,” is 
not only the fundamental principle of U.S. Government, but among the greatest 
statements of moral truth ever made. Every American should be proud of this 
statement, but until Indian sovereignty has been truly recognized, that statement will 
ring hollow.
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Appendix A
The Bureau of Indian Affairs Mission Statement
The Bureau o f Indian Affairs' mission is to enhance the quality of life, to 
promote economic opportunity, and to carry out the responsibility to protect and 
improve the trust assets o f American Indians, Indian Tribes and Alaskan Natives. 
We will accomplish this through the delivery o f quality services, maintaining 
govemment-to-govemment relationships within the spirit o f Indian self- 
determination.
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Appendix B
Mission Statement of The Office of Indian Education Programs
Recognizing the special rights of Indian Tribes and Alaska Native entities 
and the unique govemment-to-govemment relationship of Indian Tribes and Alaska 
Native villages with the Federal Government as affirmed by the United States 
Constitution, U.S. Supreme Court decisions, treaties. Federal statutes, and 
Executive Orders, and as set out in the Congressional declaration in sections 2 and 3 
of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (Pub. L. 93- 638; 88 
Stat. 2203; 25 U.S.C. 450 and 450a), it is the responsibility and goal of the Federal 
government to provide comprehensive education programs and services for Indians 
and Alaska Natives. As acknowledged in section 5 of the Indian Child Welfare Act 
of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-608; 92 Stat. 3069; 25 U.S.C. 1901), in the Federal 
Govemment's protection and preservation of Indian Tribes and Alaska Native 
villages and their resources, there is no resource more vital to such Tribes and 
villages than their young people and the Federal Government has a direct interest, as 
trustee, in protecting Indian and Alaska Native children, including their education. 
The mission of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Indian Education Programs, is 
to provide quality education opportunities from early childhood through life in 
accordance with the Tribes' needs for cultural and economic well-being in keeping
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with the wide diversity of Indian Tribes and Alaska Native villages as distinct 
cultural and governmental entities. The Bureau shall manifest consideration of the 
whole person, taking into account the spiritual, mental, physical and cultural aspects 
of the person within family and Tribal or Alaska Native village contexts.
157
Appendix C 
Mission Statement of the Indian Health Service
The IHS provides a comprehensive health services delivery system for 
American Indian and Alaska Natives with opportunity for maximum tribal 
involvement in developing and managing programs to meet health needs. The goal 
o f IHS is to raise the health status of the American Indian and Alaskan Native 
people to the highest possible level.
To carry out its mission and to attain its goal, IHS (1) assists Indian tribes in 
developing their health programs through activities such as health management 
training, technical assistance, and human resource development; (2) facilitates and 
assists Indian tribes in coordinating health planning, in obtaining and utilizing health 
resources available through the Federal, State, and local programs, in operating 
comprehensive health care services, and in health program evaluation; (3) provides 
comprehensive health care services, including hospital and ambulatory medical care, 
preventative and rehabilitative services, and development of community sanitation 
facilities; and (4) serves as the principal Federal advocate for Indians in the field of 
health to ensure comprehensive health services for American Indian and Alaska 
Native people.
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Appendix D 
Treaty Excerpts
The following excerpts from treaties and agreements between the United States and 
various Indian nations show that the United States explicitly recognized various 
rights and attributes o f Indian nations as laid out in the following xey. Arguably 
every treaty, by its v e ^  nature, recognizes the sovereignty, independence, 
government, laws and jurisdiction of Indian nations. The treaties exceipted here 
represent only a small fraction of all the treaties made between the U.S. and the 
Indian nations.
All treaty excerpts taken from Charles J. Kappler, Indian Treaties 1778-1883, 
(Mattituck New York; Amereon House, 1972; reprint of Indian Affairs: Treaties 
and Laws, Volume II, Treaties, Washington D.C.: GPO, 1904 ).
Key:
J: Explicit recognition of jurisdiction of Indian nation. Instances where an Indian 
nation is guaranteed to never be included in the jurisdiction of any territory or state 
of the union are included in this category.
C: Explicit recognition of Indian nation courts.
L: Explicit recognition of Indian nation laws/regulations.
P: Guarantee of Indian ownership in perpetuity of land.
G: Explicit recognition of Indian nation government.
R: Guarantees a perpetual right to self-government. Instances where there is a 
stipulation that U.S. laws do not interfere with Indian nation laws et cetera are taken 
to oe of this sort.
O: Guarantees a perpetual right to ownership in-common
1. P
TREATY WITH THE WYANDOT, DELAWARE, OTTAWA, CHIPPEWA, 
POTTAWATIMA AND SAC NATIONS {1789, Jan. 9} 7 Stat., 28. Proclamation, 
Sept. 27, 1789.
... do by these presents, renew and confirm the said boundary line; to the end that the 
same may remain as a division line between the lands of the United States of 
America, and the lands of said nations, forever.
2. J
TREATY WITH THE CHIPPEWA (1826, Aug. 5} Stat., 7, 290. Proclamation, 
Feb. 7, 1827.
ARTICLE 3. The Chippewa tribe grant to the government of the United States the 
right to search for, and carry away, any metals or minerals from any part of their
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country. But this grant is not to aJBfect the title of the land, nor the existing 
jurisdiction over it.
3. J P
TREATY WITH THE WESTERN CHEROKEE (1828, May 6} 7 Stat., 311. 
Proclamation, May 2.8, 1828.
WHEREAS, it being the anxious desire of the Government of the Umted States to 
secure to the Cherokee nation of Indians, as well those now living within the limits 
of the Territory of Arkansas, as those of their friends and brothers who reside in 
States East of the Mississippi, and who may wish to join their brothers of the West, 
a permanent home, and which shall, under the most solemn guarantee of the United 
States, be, and remain, theirs forever a home that shall never, in all future time, be 
embarrassed by having extended around it the lines, or placed over it the jurisdiction 
of a Territory or State, nor be pressed upon by the extension, in any way, of any of 
the limits of any existing Territory or State...
ARTICLE 2. The United States agree to possess the Cherokees, and to guarantee it 
to them forever, and that guarantee is hereby solemnly pledged, of seven millions of 
acres of land, to be bounded as follows, viz...
4. P
TREATY WITH THE DELAWARES {1829, Sept. 24} 7 Stat., 327. Proclamation, 
Mar. 24, 1831.
...shall be conveyed and forever secured by the United States, to the said Delaware 
Nation, as their permanent residence: And the United States hereby pledges the faith 
of the government to guarantee to the said Delaware Nation forever, the quiet and 
peaceable possession and undisturbed enjoyment of the same, against the claims and 
assaults or all and every other people whatever.
5. J  L P G R
TREATY WITH THE CHOCTAW {1830, Sept. 27} 7 Stat., 333. Proclamation, 
Feb. 24, 1831.
ARTICLE 2. The United States under a grant specially to be made by the President 
of the U. S. shall cause to be conveyed to the Choctaw Nation a tract of country 
west of the Mississippi River, in fee simple to them and their descendants, to inure 
to them while they snail exist as a nation and live on it...
ARTICLE 4. The Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged 
to secure to the said Choctaw Nation of Red People the jurisdiction and government 
of all the persons and property that may be within their limits west, so that no 
Territory or State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the 
Choctaw Nation o f Red People and their descendants; and that no part of the land 
granted them shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State; but the U. S. shall 
forever secure said Choctaw Nation from, and against, all laws except such as from
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time to time may be enacted in their own National Councils, not inconsistent with 
the Constitution, Treaties, and Laws of the United States; and except such as may, 
and which have been enacted by Congress, to the extent that Congress under the 
Constitution are required to exercise a legislation over Indian Affairs. But the 
Choctaws, should this treaty be ratified, express a wish that Congress may ^ an t to 
the Choctaws the right of punishing by their own laws, any white man who shall 
come into their nation, and infringe any of their national regulations.
6. P
TREATY WITH THE SENECA, ETC. {1831, July 20} 7 Stat., 351. Proclamation, 
Apr. 6, 1832.
ARTICLE 2. In consideration of the cessions stipulated in the foregoing article, the 
United States agree to cause the said band of Senecas and Shawnees, consisting of 
about three hundred souls, to be removed in a convenient and suitable manner to the 
western side of the Mississippi river, and will grant by patent, in fee simple to them 
and their heirs forever, as long as they shall exist as a nation and remain on the 
same, a tract of land to contain sixty thousand acres, to be located under the 
direction of the President o f the United States...
7. P
TREATY WITH THE KICKAPOO {1832, Oct. 24} 7 Stat., 391. Proclamation, 
Feb. 13, 1833.
...it is hereby agreed that the country within the following boundaries shall be 
assigned, conveyed, and forever secured, and is hereby so assigned, conveyed, and 
secured by the United States to the said BCickapoo tribe, as their permanent 
residence, viz...
8. P
TREATY WITH THE WESTERN CHEROKEE {1833, Feb. 14}7 Stat., 414. 
Proclamation, Apt. 12, 1834.
ARTICLE 1. The United States agree to possess the Cherokees, and to guarantee it 
to them forever, and that guarantee, is hereby pledged, of seven millions o f acres of 
land, to be bounded as follows viz...
9. J  L G  R
AGREEMENT WITH THE CHEROKEE {1835, March 14} Unratified. Indian 
Office, box 1,Treaties 1802-1853. See Senate Doc. No. 120, 25th Congress, 2d 
session, p. 459.
ARTICLE 6. The United States hereby covenant and agree, that the lands ceded to 
the Cherokee nation, in the foregoing article, shall, in no future time, without their 
consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or 
Territory; but they shall secure to the Cherokee Nation the right, by their National 
Councils, to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for 
the government and protection of the persons and property within their own
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country, belonging to their people, or such persons as have connected themselves 
with them: Provided always. That they shall not be inconsistent with the 
Constitution of the United States, and such acts of Congress as have been or rnay be 
passed for the regulation of Indian affairs; and also, that they shall not be considered 
as extending to such citizens and Army of the United States, as may travel or reside 
in the Indian country, according to the laws and regulations established by the 
government o f the same.
10. J L G R
TREATY WITH THE CHEROKEE {1835, Dec. 29} 7 Stat., 478. Proclamation, 
May 23, 1836.
WHEREAS the Cherokees are anxious to make some arrangements with the 
Government of the United States whereby the difficulties they have experienced by a 
residence within the settled parts of the United States under the jurisdiction and laws 
of the State Governments may be terminated and adjusted; and with a view to 
reuniting their people in one body and securing a permanent home for themselves 
and their posterity m the country selected by their forefathers without the territorial 
limits of the State sovereignties, and where they can establish and enjoy a 
government o f their choice and perpetuate such a state of society as may be most 
consonant with their views, habits and condition; and as may tend to their individual 
comfort and their advancement in civilization.
ARTICLE 5. The United States hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to 
the Cherokee nation in the forgoing article shall, in no future time without their 
consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction o f any State or 
Territory. But they shall secure to the Cherokee nation the right by their national 
councils to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deern necessary for 
the government and protection o f the persons and property within their own country 
belonging to their people or such persons as have connected themselves with them: 
provided always tnat they shall not be inconsistent with the constitution of the 
United States and such acts o f Congress as have been or may be passed regulating 
trade and intercourse with the Indians; and also, that they shall not be consioered as 
extending to such citizens and Army of the United States as may travel or reside in 
the Indian country by permission according to the laws and regulations established 
by the Government of the same.
11. P
TREATY WITH THE OTTAWA, ETC. {1836, Mar. 28} 7 Stat., 491.
Proclamation, May 27, 1836.
ARTICLE 8. It is agreed, that as soon as the said Indians desire it, a deputation 
shall be sent to the southwest of the Missouri River, there to select a suitable place 
for the final settlement of said Indians, which country, so selected and o f reasonable 
extent, the United States will forever guaranty and secure to said Indians.
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12. P
TREATY WITH THE MIAMI {1838, Nov. 6} 7 Stat., 569 Proclamation, Feb. 8, 
1839.
ARTICLE 10. The United States stipulate to possess, the Miarm tribe of Indians of, 
and guarranty to them forever, a country west of the Mississippi river, to remove to 
and settle on, when the said tribe may be disposed to emigrate from their present 
country, and that guarranty is hereby pledged: And the said countiy snail be 
sufficient in extent, and suited to their wants and condition and be in a region 
contiguous to that in the occupation of the tribes which eniigrated from the States of 
Ohio and Indiana. And when the said tribe shall have emigrated, the United States 
shall protect the said tribe and the people thereof, in their rights and possessions, 
against the injuries, encroachments and oppressions of any person or persons, tribe 
or tribes whatsoever.
13. P C
TREATY WITH THE CHEROKEE {1846, Aug. 6} 9 Stat., 871. Ratified Aug. 
8,1846. Proclaimed Aug. 17, 1846.
ARTICLE 1. That the lands now occupied by the Cherokee Nation shall be secured 
to the whole Cherokee people for their common use and benefit; and a patent shall 
be issued for the same, including the eight hundred thousand acres purchased, 
together with the outlet west, promised by the United States, in conformity with the 
provisions relating thereto, contained in the third article o f the treaty of 1835, and in 
the third section of the act of Congress, approved May twenty-eighth, 1830, which 
authorizes the President of the United States, in making exchanges of lands with the 
Indian tribes, "to assure the tribe or nation with which the exchange is made, that 
the United States will forever secure and guarantee to them, and their heirs or 
successors, the country so exchanged with them; and if they prefer it, that the 
United States will cause a patent or ^ an t to be made and executed to them for the 
same: Provided, always, That such lands shall revert to the United States if the 
Indians become extinct or abandon the same."
14. J C L P G R O
TREATY WITH THE CHOCTAW AND CHICKASAW {1855, June 22} 11 Stat., 
611. Ratified Feb. 2 1, 1856. Proclaimed Mar. 4, 1856.
ARTICLE 1 And pursuant to an act of Congress approved May 28, 1830, the
United States do hereby forever secure and guarantee the lands embraced within the 
said limits, to the members of the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes, their heirs and 
successors, to be held in common; so that each and every member of either tribe 
shall have an equal, undivided interest in the whole: Provided, however. No part 
thereof shall ever be sold without the consent of both tribes, and that said land shall 
revert to the United States if said Indians and their heirs become extinct or abandon 
the same.
ARTICLE 5. The members of either the Choctaw or the Chickasaw tribe, shall have 
the right, freely, to settle within the jurisdiction of the other, and shall thereupon be 
entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens thereof; but no 
member of either tribe shall be entitled to participate in the funds belonging to the 
other tribe. Citizens of both tribes shall have the right to institute and prosecute suits
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in the courts of either, under such regulations as may, from time to time, be 
prescribed by their respective legislatures.
ARTICLE 6. Any person duly charged with a criminal offence against the laws of 
either the Choctaw or the Chickasaw tribe, and escaping into the jurisdiction of the 
other, shall be promptly surrendered, upon the demand of the proper authorities of 
the tribe, within wnose jurisdiction tne offence shah be alleged to have been 
committed.
ARTICLE 7. So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the United 
States and the laws made in pursuance tnereof, regulating trade and intercourse with 
the Indian tribes, the Choctaws and Chickasaws shall be secured in the unrestricted 
right of self-government, and full jurisdiction, over persons and property, within 
their respective limits; excepting, however, all persons, with their proper^, who are 
not by birth, adoption, or otherwise citizens or members o f either the Choctaw or 
Chickasaw tribe, and all persons not being citizens or members o f either tribe, found 
within their limits, shall be considered intruders, and be removed from, and kept out 
of the same, by the United States agent, assisted if necessary by the military, with 
the following exceptions, viz; Such individuals as are now, or may be in the 
employment of the Government, and their families; those peaceftilly travelling, or 
temporarily sojourning in the country or trading therein, under license from the 
proper authonty of the United States, and such as may be permitted by the 
Choctaws or Chickasaws, with the assent of the United States agent, to reside 
within their limits, without becoming citizens or members of either of said tribes.
15. J R
TREATY WITH THE CREEKS, ETC. {1856, Aug. 7} 11 Stat., 699. Ratified Aug.
16, 1856. Proclaimed Aug. 28, 1856.
ARTICLE 14. Any person duly charged with a criminal offense against the laws of 
either the Creek or Seminole tribe, and escaping into the jurisdiction of the other, 
shall be promptly surrendered imon the demand of the proper authority of the tribe 
within wnose jurisdiction the offense shall be alleged to have been committed.
ARTICLE 15. So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the United 
States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof regulating trade and intercourse 
with the Indian tribes, the Creeks and Seminoles shall be secured in the unrestricted 
right of self-government, and full jurisdiction over persons and property, within their 
respective limits; excepting, however, all white persons, with their property, who are 
not, by adoption or otherwise, members of eitner the Creek or Seminole tribe; and 
all persons not being members of either tribe, found within their limits, shall be 
considered intruders, and be removed from and kept out of the same by the United 
States agents for said tribes, respectively; (assisted, if necessary, by the military ;) 
with the following exceptions, viz: such individuals with their families as may be in 
the employment of the Government of the United States; all persons peaceably 
travelling, or temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license 
from the proper authority of the United States; and such persons as may be 
permitted by the Creeks or Seminoles, with the assent of the proper authorities of 
the United States, to reside within their respective limits without becoming members 
of either of said tribes.
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16. L G R
TREATY WITH THE SEMINOLE {1866, Mar. 21} 14 Stat., 755. Ratified, July 
19, 1866. Proclaimed, Aug. 16, 1866.
ARTICLE 7. The Seminole Nation agrees to such legislation as C onfess and the 
President may deem necessary for the better administration o f the rights of person 
and property within the Indian Territory: Provided, however, (that) said legislation 
shall not in any manner interfere with or annul their present trioal organization, 
rights, laws, privileges, and customs.
17. C L G  R
TREATY WITH THE CHOCTAW AND CHICKASAW {1866, Apr. 28} 14 Stat., 
769. Ratified June 28, 1866. Proclaimed July 10, 1866.
ARTICLE 4. The said nations further agree that all negroes, not otherwise 
disqualified or disabled, shall be competent witnesses in all civil and criminal suits 
and proceedings in the Choctaw ana Chickasaw courts, any law to the contrary 
notwithstanding...
ARTICLE 7. The Choctaws and Chickasaws agree to such legislation as Congress 
and the President o f the United States may deem necessary for the better 
administration of justice and the protection of the rights of person and p ro p e ^  
within the Indian Territory: Provided, however. Such legislation shall not in anywise 
interfere with or annul their present tribal organization, or their respective 
legislatures or judiciaries, or the nghts, laws, privileges, or customs o f the Cnoctaw 
and Chickasaw Nations respectively.
Eighth. The Choctaws and Chickasaws also agree that a court or courts may be 
established in said Territory with such jurisdiction and organization as Congress may 
prescribe: Provided, That the same shall not interfere with the local judiciary of 
either of said nations
IS. J L G R
TREATY WITH THE CREEKS (1866, June 14} Ratified July 1866. Proclaimed 
Aug. 11. 1866
ARTICLE 2. The Creeks hereby covenant and agree that henceforth neither slavery 
nor involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment o f crimes, whereof the 
parties shall have been duly convicted in accordance with laws applicable to all 
members of said tribe, shall ever exist in said nation; and inasmucn as there are 
among the Creeks many persons of African descent, who have no interest in the soil, 
it is stipulated that hereafter these persons lawfully residing in said Creek country 
under tneir laws and usages, or who have been thus residing in said country, and 
may return within one year from the ratification of this treaty, and their descendants 
and such others o f the same race as may be permitted by the laws of the said nation 
to settle within the limits o f the jurisdiction of the Creek Nation as citizens (thereof) 
shall have and enjoy all the rights and privileges of native citizens, including an equal 
interest in the soil and national funds, and the laws of the said nation shall be equally 
binding upon and give equal protection to all such persons, and all others, of 
whatsoever race or color, who may be adopted as citizens or members o f said tribe.
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ARTICLE 3. In compliance with the desire of the United States to locate other 
Indians and freedmen thereon, the Creeks hereby cede and convey to the United 
States, to be sold to and used as homes for such other civilized Indians as the United 
States may choose to settle thereon, the west half of their entire domain, to be 
divided by a line running north and south; the eastern half of said Creek lands, being 
retained by them, shall, except as herein otherwise stipulated, be forever set apart as 
a home for said Creek Nation...
ARTICLE 10. The Creeks agree to such legislation as Congress and the President 
o f the United States may deem necessary for the better administration o f justice and 
the protection of the rights of person and proper^ within the Indian territory: 
Provided, however, (That) said legislation shall not in any manner interfere with or 
annul their present tribal organization, rights, laws, privileges, and customs. The 
Creeks also agree that a general council, consistmg of delegates elected by each 
nation or tribe lawfully resident within the Indian territory, may be annually 
convened in said territory, which council shall be organized in such manner and 
possess such powers as are hereinafter described.
19. J C G
TREATY WITH THE CHEROKEE {1866, July 19} 14 Stat., 799. Ratified July 27, 
1866. Proclaimed Aug. 11, 1866.
ARTICLE 2. Amnesty is hereby declared by the United States and the Cherokee 
Nation for all crimes and misdemeanors committed by one Cherokee on the person 
or property of another Cherokee, or o f a citizen of the United States, prior to the 
fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and sixty-six; and no right of action arising out 
o f wrongs committea in aid or in the suppression of the rebellion shall be prosecuted 
or maintained in the courts o f the United States or in the courts of the Cherokee 
Nation.
ARTICLE 13. The Cherokees also agree that a court or courts may be established 
by the United States in said Territory, with such jurisdiction and organized in such 
manner as may be prescribed by law: Provided. That the judicial tribunals of the 
nation shall be allowed to retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases 
arising within their country in which members of the nation, by nativity or adoption, 
shall be the only parties, or where the cause of action shall arise in the Cherokee 
Nation, except as otherwise provided in this treaty.
ARTICLE 14. The right to the use and occupancy of a quantity o f land not 
exceeding one hundred and s i ^  acres, to be selected according to legal 
subdivisions in one body, and to include their improvements, and not including the 
improvements of any member o f the Cherokee Nation, is hereby granted to every 
society or denomination which has erected, or which with the consent of the 
national council may hereafter erect, buildings within the Cherokee country for 
missionary or educational purposes. But no land thus granted, nor buildings which 
have been or may be erected thereon, shall ever be sold or (o)therwise disposed of 
except with the consent and approval of the Cherokee national council and the 
Secretary of the Interior. And whenever any such-lands or buildings shall be sold or 
disposed o f the proceeds thereof shall be applied by said society or societies for like 
pu^oses within said nation, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
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20. J
TREATY WITH THE POTAWATOMI {1867, Feb. 27} 15 Stat., 531. Ratified 
July 25, 1868. Proclaimed, Aug. 7, 1868.
ARTICLE 3. After such reservation shall have been selected and set apart for the 
Pottawatomies, it shall never be included within the jurisdiction of any State or 
Territory, unless an Indian Territory shall be organized, as provided for in certain 
treaties made in eighteen hundred and Sixty-six with the Choctaws and other tribes 
occupying "Indian country;" in which case, or in case of the organization of a 
legislative council or other body, for the regulation of matters affecting the relations 
or the tribes to each other, the Pottawatomies resident thereon shall have the right to 
representation, according to their numbers, on equal terms with the other tribes.
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